P.F. Strawsona pierwotność pojęcia osoby a problem umysł-ciało - JÓZEF BREMER (Autor) (2019)
10.24425/pfns.2019.130924
http://journals.pan.pl/dlibra/publication/130924/edition/114346/content
Oryginalny artykuł naukowy
From a historical point of view, Peter F. Strawson’s philosophical studies are an important element within contemporary interdisciplinary investigations of the mind-body problem. The aim of this article is to present and analyze Strawson’s program of descriptive metaphysics, along with the associated conception of persons, that he has proposed. In the second part, I also present his non-reductive naturalism, focusing on two of his analyses that belong to the field of mind-body relations: these concern the problem of other minds, and the question of the nomological reduction of mental states of persons to physical ones (i.e. mind-body identity theory). I then point to several possibilities of using Strawson’s conception of persons in the context of issues raised by other questions linked to the mind-body problem (namely, personal identity as it relates to split-brain persons, and the different phases of a person’s development).
Keywords: filozofia