

MICHAŁ WAWRZONEK

MEMORY, POLITICS,
AND LEGACY
OF METROPOLITAN
ANDREY SHEPTYTSKY



IGNATIANUM UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Archbishop of Lviv of the Greek Catholic rite Andrey Sheptytsky
on his way to the Belvedere Palace in Warsaw (1925).

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INTRODUCTION

The topic of memory studies related to Ukraine and the politics of memory in Ukraine have already attracted the attention of many scholars.¹ The issue of the Holocaust in Ukraine and its commemoration has been particularly scrutinized.² The life of Metropolitan Sheptytsky

¹ Oxana Shevel, “Memories of the Past and Visions of the Future: Remembering the Soviet Era and Its End in Ukraine,” in: *Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration*, eds. Jan Kubik, Michael Bernhard, New York 2014, pp. 146–170; *The Burden of the Past: History, Memory, and Identity in Contemporary Ukraine*, eds. Anna Wylegała, Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper, Bloomington 2020; Tomasz Stryjek, *Ukraina przed końcem historii. Szkice o polityce państw wobec pamięci*, Warszawa 2014; *Kultury historyczne Polski i Ukrainy. O źródłach nieporozumienia między sąsiadami*, eds. Tomasz Stryjek, Volodymyr Sklokin, Warszawa 2021; Barbara Törnquist-Plewa, Yuliya Yurchuk, “Memory Politics in Contemporary Ukraine: Reflections from the Post-colonial Perspective,” *Memory Studies* 12 (2019), no. 6, pp. 699–720; Yuliya Yurchuk, “Historians as Activists: History Writing in Times of War. The Case of Ukraine in 2014–2018,” *Nationalities Papers* 49 (2021), no. 4, pp. 691–709.

² Olga Baranova, “Conceptualizations of the Holocaust in Soviet and Post-Soviet Ukraine and Belarus: Public Debates and Historiography,” *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures* 34 (2020), no. 1, pp. 241–260; Omer Bartov, *Erased: Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine*, Princeton 2007; Idem, “Дискомфортне питання: відповідь моїм критикам,” *Україна Модерна* 15 (2009), pp. 326–347; Anna Chebotarova, “Collective Memory on the Holocaust in Post-Soviet Ukraine,” in: *The Burden of the Past. History, Memory and Identity in Contemporary Ukraine*, eds. Anna Wylegała, Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper, Bloomington 2020, pp. 183–205; John-Paul Himka, “The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crown,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 53 (2011) no. 2–4, pp. 209–243; Idem, “Debates in Ukraine Over Nationalist Involvement in the Holocaust, 2004–2008,” *Nationalities Papers* 39 (2011), no. 3, pp. 353–370; Idem, “The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Ukraine,” in: *Bringing the Dark Past to Light: The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Europe*, eds. John-Paul Himka, Joanna Beata Michlic, Lincoln–London 2013,

and his activity in the ecclesial, social, national, and political realms has been of interest to many researchers.³ The book consists of five chapters. The first chapter presents the main theoretical assumptions of the work and a justification for the choice of Metropolitan Sheptytsky as well as a description of the Ukrainian mnemonic field. The second chapter discusses the challenges related to the memory of Sheptytsky, which the actors creating the Ukrainian historical culture had to face on the eve of the collapse of the USSR and after Ukraine gained independence. The third chapter contains an analysis that attempts to link selected elements of Sheptytsky's legacy with the Europeanization of Ukrainian historical culture after the Revolution of Dignity. The fourth chapter shows the mutual relationships and dependencies between Polish and Ukrainian historical culture in connection with restoring the memory of Sheptytsky. The final chapter contains an attempt to reconstruct selected elements of Sheptytsky's activities, which are significant for the entirety of his heritage and which have not yet been described in full.

This book was written thanks to a grant from the Polish National Science Centre (Grant No. UMO/2015/19/B/HS6/01257). When I started the project in 2015, I did not expect it to last so long. However, the topic of collective memory in Ukraine has not become outdated. On the contrary, as part of the nation-building process, it has become increasingly important over time. This also refers to the memory of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky.

pp. 626–662; Idem, “Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky and the Holocaust,” in: *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry*, vol. 26: *Jews and Ukrainians*, eds. Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, Antony Polonsky, Liverpool 2014, pp. 337–360; Timothy Snyder, *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning*, London 2016.

³ *Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki. Studia i materiały*, ed. Andrzej A. Zięba, Kraków, 1994; *Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptytskyi*, eds. Paul R. Magosci, Andrii Kravchuk, Alberta 2009; Magdalena Nowak, *Dwa światy. Zagadnienie identyfikacji narodowej Andrzeja Szeptyckiego w latach 1865–1914*, Gdańsk 2018; Ліліана Гентош, *Митрополит Шептицький 1923–1939. Виробування ідеалів*, Lviv 2015; *Kościół, naród, państwo. Działalność Metropolity Andrzeja Szeptyckiego (1865–1944)*, ed. Andrzej Roman Szeptycki, Wrocław 2011; Андрій Михалейко, *Митрополит Андрій Шептицький і нацистський режим 1941–1944*, Lviv 2021.

The research project would not be possible without the help of a number of people. Thus, I would like to express my profound gratitude to:

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CHAPTER 1*

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

1.1. Theoretical framework

“Collective memory,” “historical memory,” “cultural memory,” “social memory,” “public memory,” and “national memory”—these terms are used the most by researchers, often without finding a common language, without creating a single, agreed upon definition.

The starting point of this study is the concept of “collective memory” formulated by Maurice Halbwachs in its “classical” sense. The notion of “cultural memory” is closely related to this theoretical approach. According to Astrid Erll it means “the interplay of present and past in socio-cultural contexts.”¹ Erll’s approach offers a wider look at the problem of collective memory and “allows for an inclusion of a broad spectrum of phenomena as possible objects of cultural memory studies—ranging from individual acts of remembering in a social context to group memory (of family, friends, veterans, etc.) to national memory with its ‘invented traditions,’ and finally to the host of transnational *lieux de mémoire* such as the Holocaust and 9/11.”² It is worth noting that the notion of culture refers to “a community’s specific way of life, led within its self-spun webs of meaning.”³ This approach is rooted in

* Chapter 1 is co-authored by Olha Morozova (University of Warsaw/The Bohdan Khmelnytsky National University of Cherkasy).

¹ *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, eds. Astrid Erll, Ansgar Nünning, Berlin–New York 2008, p. 2.

² *Ibidem*.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

the German academic tradition of cultural studies. Astrid Erll argues that “cultural memory” can be useful as an “umbrella term” for research in various scientific disciplines. Among other things, it can be “the starting point for memory research in the social sciences.”⁴ The concept of cultural memory was developed by John Assman, among others. He emphasized several important features of cultural memory.⁵ Since this study focuses on the nation-building process, it is worth emphasizing its function in “the concretion of identity.” Assman argued, that “the objective manifestations of cultural memory are defined through a kind of identificatory determination in a positive (‘We are this’ or in a negative (‘That’s our opposite’) sense.”⁶ Following Assman, it is worth recalling that a “capacity to reconstruct” is another typical feature of cultural memory. Although it is based on “immovable figures of memory and stores of knowledge,” they are always juxtaposed with “an actual and contemporary situation.” Therefore, depending on the current social context, the same figures of memory and stores of knowledge could be sometimes appropriated, sometimes criticized, and sometimes preserved or transformed.⁷ There is no doubt that the memory of the past is a very important factor that shapes national identity. There is one caveat: the memory of the past can only fulfill this function if there is a generally accepted consensus about the basic values on which society is to be based. The subject of the past may turn into a dangerous tool for manipulating mass consciousness.

Collective memory is a conditional and fragile construct, which is built in the clash of political and corporate interests and ideological guidelines. The past (memory) cannot be “preserved”; it is constantly mediated by the present, adapting to it, encompassing not only the accumulated historical experience, but also symbols, myths, and everything that is contained in the realm of the collective unconscious—to use the terminology of Carl Gustav Jung. At the same time, the

⁴ Ibidem.

⁵ Jan Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” *New German Critique* (1995), no. 65, pp. 130–132.

⁶ Ibidem, p. 130.

⁷ Ibidem.

possibility of sanctifying certain events and characters becomes quite real and the search for “historical truth” itself loses its meaning.⁸ Thus, objective historiography is a rather dubious term. After all, historical narrative is a reflection of events in the minds of those alive today and those to follow. A fact that passes through a researcher’s consciousness ceases to be an objective reality, becoming only an image created in his mind. Historians look at their historically determined objects from a perspective that is itself historically determined. This brings about the problem of the researcher’s responsibility for the “history” he offers to society. A politician’s responsibility for the image of the “past” that he promotes is no less of a problem. Very often, the political and ideological situation forces us to “avoid” certain “inconvenient” facts or, on the contrary, to “embellish” and “demonstrate” events.

Difficult issues from the past should be considered in the context of the present era, in accordance with the legal and moral norms of the time. It is on the principles of peaceful coexistence and defense of European democratic values that the historical policy of a united Europe was built. Even if it concerned painful and difficult events from the past, its main goal was to shape a better future. The European future of Ukraine will therefore also depend on the extent to which the policy of remembrance in Ukraine can be adapted to the standards that have been developed in Europe in this respect.

The state of permanent identity crisis in Ukraine, especially before the Revolution of Dignity, resulted from the lack of a single coherent vision of symbolic space on which its identity could be based. This led to the escalation of memory wars and the deepening of the fragmentation of symbolic space.

The same historical phenomenon can be interpreted in different ways, depending on the type of consciousness deemed appropriate to the researcher: rational or magical (mythological). Researchers of the past who represent the first type treat social reality as a sphere of practical activities in which man himself plays the leading role. In this approach, values such as freedom and democracy play a key role

⁸ *Культура історичної пам'яті: європейський та український досвід*, ed. Юрій Шаповал, Київ 2013, pp. 5–6.

and society appears as a self-conscious structure. On the other hand, researchers who operate in the sphere of magic and mythology are distinguished in their assessments of the past by maximalism and a revolutionary approach. They are characterized by a desire for compensatory justice, a victim complex, the search for external enemies, etc.⁹ When reconstructing the past, anyone can choose between realistic and mythological social analysis.

Historiography in post-communist historical cultures very often has an ideological and propagandistic function. The English historian John Tosh rightly observed that the objectivity of historical knowledge is eroding in the collective memory, for which the phenomenon of distortion and silence is not at all surprising. This is the pragmatics of collective action—for a group to acquire a collective identity, it needs a common vision of its prioritized values. In the name of such a goal, the image of the historical past is often corrected to the detriment of credibility.¹⁰

The culture of historical memory is an important factor that influences the development of society. However, cultural heritage can be destroyed, leading to a loss of a sense of the uniqueness of a given community. That is why it is so important to be able to influence the process of learning about and discovering the past. On the other hand, historical memory very often does not correlate with scientific historiography. Each new generation follows the principle of “figurative modeling,” looking for something in the past that is in line with its moods and expectations. Constructing “images of the past” inevitably involves transplanting concepts and mixing times. In fact, in the process of transferring knowledge about the past, the picture of what actually happened is distorted.¹¹ Maurice Halbwachs stated that “recollections that have not been thought about for a long time are reproduced without change. But when reflection begins to operate, when instead of letting the past recur, we reconstruct it through an effort of reasoning, what happens is that we distort this past, because we

⁹ Ibidem, p. 11.

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 12.

¹¹ Ibidem, pp. 17–18.

wish to introduce greater coherence. It is then reason and intelligence that chooses among the store of recollections, eliminates some of them, and arranges the others according to an order conforming with our ideas of the moment. From this come many alternations.”¹² For several centuries, nation-states have been more or less successful in constructing the image of a “collective past.” Quite often, this process has a political overtone. The reverence of one historical figure’s exceptional merits is frequently accompanied by claims against “others.” Identities formed under such conditions are programmed for conflict. The “fight for the past” is accompanied by a sharp clash of interests of various social strata and political actors. Because the modeled past is somehow a valuable symbolic resource and has its own mobilizing potential, interpretations of it in a polarized society acquire the power of ideological weapons.

Historical myths and symbols are deliberately used to distract the public from the harsh reality of the present. Thus, certain events and characters are sanctified, evaluation takes on a black and white nature, and everything that does not fit into given schemes is “bracketed.” A one-dimensional perception of the past gives rise to at least two extremes—a kind of national megalomania or a persistent “victim complex.”

The model of collective memory represented by scientific discourse was and remains an important component in the process of forming national identities, especially at turning points in history. Today, Ukrainians are forming a new system of values, developed by new realities. Accordingly, historical events, figures, and places are a proposed historiographical discourse, since they are symbols which play the role of a certain canon for the people and the state. This, in turn, is the basis of ideological constructions designed to influence consciousness and to shape and direct it in a predetermined direction.

According to Leonid Zashkilniak, if the policy of memory corresponds to the cultural traditions and hopes of the community, the community is strengthened and legitimized. If it does not suit them, it causes conflicts within the community and instead of being integrated,

¹² Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, Chicago–London 1992, p. 183.

it generates resistance and divisions.¹³ National memory is part of the national idea. According to Ihor Gyrych, the latter can be understood as the goal of the political activity of the elite in a certain historical period. It appeared as part of the solution to the national idea during the construction of the national state in the 19th century. Among European peoples, one can distinguish the national idea and memory (1) of a “historical” (complete) nation, or the nation that entered a new national time, already having its national/state territory and (2) of a “non-historical” (non-complete) nation which was within the boundaries of another nation-state when the national ideology matured (every nation must create a separate state). State-nation, generally speaking, had more than one nation or ethnic group under its rule at the time of the emergence of modern nationalism. From the beginning, their task was to legitimize their right to rule, at the scientific level, over those peoples who had not actually become nations yet, because all of them had the intellectual and economic capacity to liberate themselves from the rule of imperial nations—although this was far from being the case. Instead, pariah nations faced a challenge to substantiate their claims to the other European nations in order to acknowledge their right to sovereign agency.¹⁴ It was very hard to achieve this goal, as so-called non-historical nations had lost (or had never possessed) a representative class and were reduced to an inarticulate popular mass, with little if any national consciousness and a predominantly folk culture.¹⁵ The distinction between “historical” and “non-historical” nations took on a particular importance in the legal and administrative practice of the Habsburg Empire. Ukraine was one such example of these “non-historical” (incomplete) nations.¹⁶ Memory of the past is effectively an emotional

¹³ Леонід Зашкільняк, “Національний метанаратив та його соціальні функції: між наукою та історичною пам’яттю,” in: *Національна та історична пам’ять*, vol. 5, Kyiv 2012, p. 51.

¹⁴ Ігор Гирич, “Національна схема української історіографії кінця XIX – початку XX століття як ключовий елемент національної пам’яті,” in: *Національна та історична пам’ять*, vol. 5, Kyiv 2012, pp. 50–61.

¹⁵ Ivan L. Rudnytsky, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, Edmonton 1987, p. 41.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 40–41.

and mobilizing tuning fork which, working at the level of a feeling turned to the past, awakens national consciousness. Therefore, national memory became, to a certain extent, synonymous with the historical or collective memory of the people, expressed in folk art: songs, epics, legends, historical stories about the past, etc. These stories are not a stable substance, but are formed by means of public or state influence over the masses. The dominant state imposes its (self-benefitting) national memory through administrative institutions, repressive bodies, mass media information (newspapers, magazines, and literature), and education (primary and secondary schools and universities).¹⁷

All these elements create a historical culture. According to Jörn Rüsen, historical culture consists of “all kinds of knowledge, beliefs and perceptions, socio-cultural processes and contexts for their assimilation, including activities for their dissemination and commemoration practices, as well as all the functions that representations of the past perform in a given society.” Historical culture understood in this way manifests itself in a variety of dimensions that can be analyzed. Rüsen himself identified three such dimensions: esthetic, political, and cognitive. The first includes artistic representations of the past. In this case, the form of these representations plays a key role, and “the essential value is beauty.”¹⁸ This dimension is deliberately omitted from further analysis. From the point of view of the topic at hand, the other two dimensions are of key importance. In the political dimension, discourse on the past is linked to the processes of legitimizing power structures. In other words, it is shaped by actors who try to legitimize their power by influencing the historical identity of individuals, social groups, and the whole of society. “It is in this dimension that the sense-making of the past takes place, which responds to the human need for stability and to live in a state of ‘functional or

¹⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁸ *Kultury historyczne Polski i Ukrainy...*, p. 23. For more on this issue, see David Carr, “History as Orientation: Rüsen on Historical Culture and Narration,” *History and Theory* 45 (2006), no. 2, pp. 229–243.

pragmatic coherence.”¹⁹ It can be assumed that this sense of security and the satisfaction of the need for stability will be stronger, the stronger one’s belief is that the past is known and understood. Thus, the third dimension of historical culture, the cognitive one, is of such great importance. In contemporary societies, it is this dimension which historical sciences should focus on. In this case, the central value is truth.²⁰ Within historical culture, specific groups of actors can be distinguished. These groups create a kind of “hardware” of historical culture. The concepts of hardware and software of historical culture refer to the concept presented by Alexander Etkind. According to him, “in culture, as in the computer, there are two forms of memory that can be compared to hardware and software. Soft memory consists mainly of texts (including literary, historical and other narratives), while hard memory consists mainly of monuments.”²¹ This way of conceptualizing software and hardware resulted from the fact that Etkind studied the issues of collective memory from the point of view of cultural studies and anthropology.

This work, in turn, focuses more on the social and political dimensions of collective memory. Therefore, the term hardware will include here not only monuments, but above all agents that influence decisions related to memorial sites and commemoration activities. A particularly interesting place in the emerging equipment is the junction of the political field, dominated by “professional decision-makers,” and the area of science, with its “professional historians.” In this approach, the software contains not only various cultural texts and narratives, but also the state of the collective memory of a given political community.

If the main hardware agents ignore commonly shared narratives and views about the past, they lose credibility and their actions are ineffective. This can be especially dangerous for agents operating in the field of politics. Software, on the other hand, needs to be constantly

¹⁹ *Kultury historyczne Polski i Ukrainy...*, pp. 23–24.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 24.

²¹ Alexander Etkind, *Warped Mourning: Stories of the Undead in the Land of the Unburied*, Stanford 2013, p. 177.

updated to stay in line with the socio-cultural context. One such update tool is hardware-generated memory policy.

This policy is shaped by autonomous sets of rules, according to which actors function within them. These are “institutions, professions, media and addressees.”²² The first group, i.e. institutions, consists of entities operating within the education system and institutions that research and popularize knowledge, archives, museums, and exhibitions. In turn, the actors operating within the “profession” could include “specialists in historical culture”—that is, academic lecturers, librarians, archivists, and others. Actors operating in the sphere of “media” are also important for historical culture, as they are a kind of link between the first two groups and the addressees. The last group, on the other hand, are recipients of the message articulated by institutions and representatives of the profession.

At the same time, Tomasz Stryjek and Volodymyr Sklokin rightly noticed that they do not necessarily have to be passive recipients. This means that, first of all, they can choose what to accept or reject among the elements of the message from these institutions and “specialists in historical culture.” Secondly, there may also be feedback when the addressees “initiate new forms of dealing with the past themselves, to which hardware representatives respond by satisfying the needs reported by consumers.”²³ Therefore, in relation to this category, it is worth differentiating between the two types of actors: passive “addressees” and active “participants.” It can be assumed that in a historical culture shaped by the conditions of a totalitarian system, there will only be room for the “addressees.”

It is worth juxtaposing these categories with the typology of behavior of participants in Soviet totalitarianism proposed by Alexei Yurchak. This allows us to better capture the nature of the historical culture formed under this regime. Yurchak distinguished three typical groups. The first one is comprised of activists, “associated with excessive ideological activism.” The second one consists of “dissidents,

²² Ibidem, p. 25.

²³ Ibidem, p. 26.

associated with excessive critique of the system.”²⁴ Yurchak underlines that representatives of these two groups “tended to read ideological descriptions at the level of constative meanings, interpreting them as true or false.”²⁵ Thus, all of them could be qualified as “participants.” However, there was one more category of attitudes that enjoyed the greatest popularity, and therefore was the most important. Yurchak called this group “the public of *svoi*.” Being one of the “*svoi*” meant understanding how important it was to participate in Soviet ideological rituals, “paying special attention to their performative dimension, because such participation enabled creative productions of ‘normal life’ that went beyond, though not necessarily in opposition to, those that these rituals and texts described.”²⁶ This type of attitude refers to a specific kind of behavior, which Yurchak named “being *vnye*.” It came down to “occupying a position that was simultaneously inside and outside of the rhetorical field of that discourse, neither simply in support nor simply in opposition of it.”²⁷ Even if there was room for “the values of critical thinking, personal creativity, inquisitiveness, and education” within this paradigm, it led to “having little involvement with the system’s constative concerns, and even being ignorant of them.”²⁸ As far as cultural memory is concerned, this behavior corresponds to the category of “addressees.” Even if they did not identify with the Soviet order, they hardly opposed the authorities. It was not important whether they actually accepted and assimilated the “authoritative discourse” promoted under the Soviet regime, because that regime was based on their passivity. Therefore, when there is a demand or at least a place for active “participants” in historical culture, it can be assumed that this may be a manifestation of a broader process of democratization of the entire social life.

²⁴ Alexei Yurchak, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation*, Princeton 2005, p. 288.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

However, when there is also a need for “participants” within the historical culture, it can be assumed that this may be a manifestation of a broader process of democratization of the entire society.

In order to scrutinize how efforts to come to terms with the collective memory of the past are intertwined with the issue of legitimizing the social and political order, Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard’s theory of the politics of memory was applied. It seems to be a promising tool which allows for the discovery and analysis of how issues related to historical memory are interrelated with the processes running in a given political system.

According to the theory of the politics of memory, there are four types of “mnemonic actors and their dominant strategies”: “mnemonic abnegators,” “mnemonic prospective,” “mnemonic warriors,” and “mnemonic pluralists.”²⁹ The latter two seem to be particularly relevant to the agents involved in the politics of memory in Ukraine. Mnemonic warriors argue that “the problems of the present (and the future) cannot be effectively addressed unless the whole polity is set on the proper foundation, constructed according to the ‘true’ vision of history.” They count themselves as “the proprietors” of this vision, while the other actors “cultivate ‘wrong’ or ‘false’ versions of the past.”³⁰ According to Kubik and Bernhard’s concept, “the content of collective memory appears to warriors as largely non-negotiable; the only problem is how to make others accept their ‘true’ vision of the past.”³¹ Mnemonic pluralists in turn “accept that, in addition to ‘us’ and our vision of history, there are ‘them’ with their own visions of the past. ... If they disagree with those visions, they are ready to engage in a dialogue whose principal aim is the orderly pursuit of ‘the truth,’ discovery of the areas of overlap among the competing visions, and articulation of common mnemonic fundamentals

²⁹ Jan Kubik, Michael Bernhard, “A Theory of the Politics of Memory,” in: *Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration*, eds. Jan Kubik, Michael Bernhard, New York 2014, pp. 11–14.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

³¹ *Ibidem*.

that allow discussion among competing versions.”³² Kubik and Bernhard indicated three groups of “factors influencing actors’ decisions when it comes to the choice of their mnemonic strategy.” There are “cultural constraints,” “cultural choices” made by actors within these constraints, and “structural-institutional constraints of the political field in which they act.”³³ It is worth observing that some reservations have already been reported in reference to the comprehensiveness of Kubik and Bernhard’s concept. Ferenc Laczó pointed out that it “seems somewhat narrowly focused on a single moment without investigating the changing contours of historical memory” and “does not do full justice to the complexity and evolution of memory fields.”³⁴ Cédric Pellen, in turn, noted that Kubik and Bernhard did not allow for a transnational dimension of the commemorative activities or a role for actors such as “European institutions” and “foundations from abroad.”³⁵ Moreover, he aptly remarked that they “denied the influence of non-political factors and actors on the process of generating shared representations of the past.”³⁶

In fact, the authors of this theory were focused on “major political actors and political parties.” At the same time they looked into regimes with at least “a minimal level of democracy.”³⁷ In that case, there are also other nongovernmental agents which should be considered while scrutinizing the politics of memory. Marek Ziólkowski noted that, apart from institutions directly related or subordinate to the state power system, two other kinds of agents are involved in “the game of memory.” These are “civil society institutions” and “non-institutionalized

³² Ibidem.

³³ Ibidem, p. 20.

³⁴ Ferenc Laczó, review of: *Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration*, eds. Michael Bernhard, Jan Kubik, Oxford 2014, in: *Europe-Asia Studies*, September 2015, p. 2.

³⁵ Cédric Pellen, review of: *Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration*, eds. Michael Bernhard, Jan Kubik, Oxford 2014, in: *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest* 46 (2015), no. 46, p. 271.

³⁶ Ibidem.

³⁷ Jan Kubik, Michael Bernhard, “A Theory of the Politics of Memory...,” p. 2.

actors.”³⁸ Ziółkowski defined “civil society institutions” as “bottom-up voluntary spontaneous associations” focused on activity in a non-governmental sphere. Their main task is “pushing state institutions” with the intent to preserve and transform their members’ identity. “Non-institutionalized actors,” in turn, are “circles of acquaintances, informal groups, families”—or in other words, “the realm of everyday spontaneous interactions, associations and communities.”³⁹ As Jan Nowak aptly pointed out, “if we understand the democratization of a society’s life as the authorities giving back some control over society, then in this context this change will result in increased rights of non-governmental agents of social life”; likewise, these agents’ impact on the process of developing historical policy will increase.⁴⁰ It is particularly interesting to see whether the mechanisms of historical policy-making—especially those operated by state institutions—show any tendencies related to the process of democratization. With regard to Ukraine, apart from the prospects of democratization, it is also worth considering the potential symptoms of the erosion of the patronal (neo-patrimonial) model of social life that was shaped after 1991.⁴¹ The question would be the extent to which politics of memory is based on unilateral diktat, and the extent to which it stimulates the development of “a form of discourse that allows different points of view, pluralism, and taking into account the interests, convictions and

³⁸ Marek Ziółkowski, “Pamięć i zapomnianie: trupy w szafie polskiej zbiorowej pamięci,” *Kultura i Społeczeństwo* (2001), no. 3–4, pp. 5–6.

³⁹ Ibidem.

⁴⁰ Jan Nowak, *Społeczne reguły pamiętania. Antropologia pamięci zbiorowej*, Kraków 2011, p. 110.

⁴¹ Oleksandr Fisun, “Ukrainian Constitutional Politics: Neopatrimonialism, Rent-seeking, and Regime Change,” in: *Beyond the Euromaidan: Comparative perspectives on advancing reform in Ukraine*, eds. Henry E. Hale, Robert W. Orttung, Stanford 2016, pp. 181–203; Natalia Minenkova, “Transformacja reżimu politycznego Ukrainy za czasów niepodległości,” in: *Polska i Ukraina – próba analizy systemu politycznego*, eds. Stanisław Sulowski, Mykoła Prymusz, Natalia Minenkova, Bartłomiej Zdaniuk, Warszawa 2011, pp. 84–85; Vladimir Gelman, “The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism in Russia,” *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 32 (2015), no. 5, pp. 455–473; Henry E. Hale, “25 Years After the USSR: What’s Gone Wrong?” *Journal of Democracy*, 27 (2016), no. 3, pp. 24–35.

feelings of all the participants in the dialogue.”⁴² The message formulated by state institutions can complete and develop the content and standards that are popularized by various “non-state institutions” and family traditions. However, this “state” message can also entail more or less contradictory elements and interpretations.⁴³

Hence, Korzeniewski’s proposition to consider the democratization of memory to be a consequence of “society’s transformation from authoritarian to democratic” seems well-founded.⁴⁴ However, this is about a process that “occurs at the level of official interpretations of the past formulated by state representatives, at the level of public memory, as well as the level of common memory.”⁴⁵ Democratization of the social and political life starts from the evolution of relations between actors from all three mentioned levels. In particular, this process is interrelated with the emancipation of agents from “the middle level”—civil society institutions. This is not only a question of their independence from the governmental institutions, but also of their ability to influence activities of the actors related to the governmental level.

According to Gesine Schwan, “democratization of memory is a derivative of the whole political system.” This process is correlated with “democratization of political identity”⁴⁶ which means spreading values such as respect for the dignity and freedom of other people, respect for the diversity of memories and interpretations of the past, in addition to responsibility, trust and empathy.⁴⁷ Adapting the complicated history of Ukrainian-Jewish relations to the agenda of the memory politics might be favorable to the implementation and/or strengthening of these values in the political identity of the Ukrainian political community.

⁴² Jan Nowak, *Spoleczne reguly...*, p. 110.

⁴³ For more on this issue, see Anna Wylęgała, “Managing the Difficult Past: Ukrainian Collective Memory and Public Debates on History,” *Nationalities Papers*, 45 (2018), no. 5, pp. 781–785.

⁴⁴ Bartosz Korzeniewski, “Demokratyzacja pamięci wobec przewartościowań w pamięci Polaków po 1989 r.,” *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość*, 12 (2013), no. 2(22), p. 65.

⁴⁵ Jan Nowak, *Spoleczne reguly...*, p. 110.

⁴⁶ Bartosz Korzeniewski, “Demokratyzacja pamięci...,” p. 63.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*.

In order to better grasp the differences in shaping collective memory through actions undertaken by state institutions and non-state structures, as well as messages spread by families and the community, it is worth referring to the model of legacy conceptualization proposed by Jason Wittenberg.⁴⁸ It is based on events that occurred in the past, as well as contemporary phenomena that can be derived from such historical origins. Discovering or reconstructing a legacy consists in linking various segments of the world that are currently experienced by the given community with elements of the past that this community considers “its own.” As Wittenberg noted, if such a relationship can be reconstructed, then the given contemporary phenomenon becomes part of the legacy. If such a relationship cannot be indicated, the phenomenon falls outside of the area of legacy (Wittenberg describes it as “non-legacy”).⁴⁹ Wittenberg’s concept is complemented by the way legacy was defined by Jan Kieniewicz. In his depiction it is “a collection of information that can be treated as inheritance, legacy transferred, or just left to generations.”⁵⁰ Multiplying the legacy, on the other hand, means that every generation adds its own interpretation to the received deposit. This interpretation also pertains to the order of precedence of individual legacy constituents. To some extent, each generation decides which constituents are currently relevant and necessary for guaranteeing “a sense of order”⁵¹ on the individual and collective levels.

As Kieniewicz emphasized, the key issue with regard to legacy is not so much caring about the total message of all its elements as about “finding a way of reading it,” which requires “ability” and “will”; without these, even the most complex legacy is “merely a potential” whose “invoking is purposeless.”⁵² The last provision concerns the specific segment of the

⁴⁸ Jason Wittenberg, “Conceptualizing Historical Legacies,” *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*, 29 (2015), no. 2, pp. 366–378.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 370.

⁵⁰ Jan Kieniewicz, *Wprowadzenie do historii cywilizacji Wschodu i Zachodu*, Warszawa 2003, p. 364.

⁵¹ This expression is used by Kubik and Bernhard: Jan Kubik, Michael Bernhard, “A Theory of the Politics of Memory...,” p. 3.

⁵² Jan Kieniewicz, *Wprowadzenie do historii...*, p. 365.

legacy of previous generations that we deal with in the case of post-communist societies. Wittenberg calls it aborted legacy. It pertains to phenomena that existed before communism, but did not survive until the fall of communism – those which “might have become historical legacies but did not.”⁵³

1.2. Ukrainian mnemonic field

There are some important “structural-institutional constraints of the political field” which present a challenge for actors in the Ukrainian mnemonic field. First of all, the Ukrainian political field is quite sensitive to stimuli coming from external agents, particularly from Russia. The Kremlin authorities sought to ensure their hegemony in the post-Soviet space. The attempts to integrate Ukraine into Russia’s area of influence were intensified, especially during Victor Yanukovich’s presidency. Measures pursuing this goal were also taken in the frames of symbolic violence. The new “Russkiy mir” formula was launched.⁵⁴ From the beginning, the concept of “Russkiy mir” turned out to be a new project for integrating the post-Soviet space on the basis of what was perceived as a civilizational community. In 2009, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, who is one of the best known proponents of this idea, outlined the basic assumptions of the “Russkiy” community and designated its core area as comprising the territories of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus—but also parts of

⁵³ Jason Wittenberg, “Conceptualizing Historical Legacies...,” p. 371.

⁵⁴ For more on this issue, see Alicja Curanović, *The Religious Factor in Russia’s Foreign Policy*, London–New York 2012; Mikhail Suslov, *Russian World: Russia’s Policy Towards its Diaspora* (Russie. Nei. Visions, 103), Paris 2017, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/suslov_russian_world_2017.pdf; Joanna Szostek, “Russia and the News Media in Ukraine: A Case of ‘Soft Power’?” *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures* 28 (2014), no. 3, pp. 463–486; *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives*, eds. Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Richard Sakwa, Bristol 2015; Henry E. Hale, Oxana Shevel, Olga Onuch, “Believing Facts in the Fog of War: Identity, Media and Hot Cognition in Ukraine’s 2014 Odesa Tragedy,” *Geopolitics* 23 (2018), no. 4, 851–881.

Moldova and Kazakhstan.⁵⁵ Russia attempted to promote common values, “mental habits,” and the shared cultural and historical legacy in order to consolidate the alleged “Russkiy mir” community.

Actually, the concept of “Russkiy mir” was a projection of a set of forms of discourse “through which Russian political and religious leaders view Ukraine and Ukrainians.”⁵⁶ This set contains denying sovereignty and questioning any kind of Ukrainian agency in the past separate from Russia. Discourse related to the Great Patriotic War plays a particular role. Commemorative activities related to this discourse reached the status of “de facto religious cult.”⁵⁷ This highly mythologized event is considered an important factor that cemented “the eternal unity” of Russians and Ukrainians.

As Taras Kuzio asserts, “Russian security policy towards Ukraine, its annexation of Crimea and ongoing military aggression are being driven in the 21st century by late 19th century Tsarist and Russian historical myths.”⁵⁸ This means that the custom of denying Ukrainian political, cultural, and historical agency was amplified in comparison to the Soviet period. The official propaganda of the USSR “viewed Russians and Ukrainians as close but different peoples.” From the point of view of Tsarist and Russian émigré, there were no Ukrainians at all; there were only “Little Russians.”⁵⁹ These myths and stereotypes became the agenda of Russian soft power. It was spread in Ukraine *inter alia* via the Russian Centres created by the Russkiy Mir Foundation.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ “Выступление Святейшого Патриарха Кирилла на торжественном открытии III Ассамблеи Русского Мира,” <http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/928446.html>; “Патриарх Кирилл поставил Украине задачу «перезагрузить» суверенитет и направить его на укрепление Русского мира,” <https://www.religion.in.ua/news/vazhливо/6649-patriarx-Cyрил-postavil-ukraine-zadachu-perezagruzit-suverenitet-i-napravit-ego-na-ukreplenie-russkogo-mira.html>.

⁵⁶ Taras Kuzio, *Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War: Autocracy – Orthodoxy – Nationality*, London–New York 2022, p. 214.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 261.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 264.

⁶⁰ For more on this issue, see Michał Wawrzonek, “The ‘Russian World’ and Ukraine,”

The concept of “Russkiy mir” imposes a framework for interpreting the world surrounding the members of this community. This is a basic “axial” conflict which arranges the whole of society, including the fields of power and memory. This conflict was defined under the paradigm of “us” versus “the West.” However, it seems that these fields operate under slightly different rules in the Ukrainian case; they are structured by various “axial” conflicts. It seems that a crisis related to the so-called “Revolution of Dignity” was triggered by the attempt to erase these differences.

As a result, the “Europeanness” that is understood as an opposition to “Russkiy mir” has become a significant element of the symbolic capital in Ukraine. Symbolic violence is generated on this basis. Therefore, one of the main axial conflicts in the Ukrainian mnemonic field became a constraint between “us” and the “people of Moscow.” For example, this conflict was manifested in a process of decommunization. According to the Coalition Agreement between “pro-European” political forces in Verkhovna Rada, decommunization became an element of reforming the sphere of education and memory politics. Its main aim was “to prevent a recurrence of repressions and totalitarian practices.” As Taras Kuzio and Anna Oliinyk pointed out, the reference to such practices encompassed not only the USSR, but also Russia and Ukraine, under Presidents Vladimir Putin and Viktor Yanukovich.⁶¹ The events that led to the “Revolution of Dignity” as well as their aftermath caused Ukraine to shift politically and culturally toward Europe. It is no coincidence that the integration of Ukraine into the EU is intertwined not only with simple political and economic issues. There are also some “soft” factors related to the process of joining the European community, including the emerging transnational “Europeanized” narrative on memory and the attempts to promote a vision of a common European identity. As Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper pointed out, “the ‘return to Europe’ means joining

in: *Politics of the Russian Language Beyond Russia*, ed. Christian Noack, Edinburgh 2021, pp. 19–44.

⁶¹ Anna Oliinyk, Taras Kuzio, “The Euromaidan Revolution, Reforms and Decommunisation in Ukraine,” *Europe-Asia Studies* (2021), p. 3.

not only a common political and economic system, but also a common European memory in which the narratives of World War II and the Holocaust become central elements.”⁶² Thus, “the memory of the Holocaust plays the role of an ‘entry ticket’ to the European community.”⁶³ Anna Wylęgała pointed out that “the memory of the Shoah is inconvenient for Ukrainians for more reasons than the potential overshadowing of the Holodomor victims. When talking about the Holocaust, Ukrainians have not yet faced their past, and without such reflection it is difficult to propagate honest remembrance of the victims. Discussions about Ukrainian participation in the Shoah are held—with minor exceptions—primarily outside the country’s borders.”⁶⁴

At the same time a new tendency has emerged in the process of creating “the common European memory” and narrative in research and in discussions around the Holocaust. It affects quite strongly the Ukrainian mnemonic field. It is based on the conviction that “the simple equation of Holocaust perpetrators with the Nazis or Germans is misleading and deficient.” Representatives of this conceptual current attempt to reconstruct “a transnational and European nature of the perpetrators” because they consider that “the perception of the Shoah as a German or German-Jewish event is misleading.”⁶⁵ Therefore they recognize a new challenge: “writing the history of the Shoah without marginalizing the agency of local actors and showing the complex

⁶² Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper, “Memory in Post-communist Europe: Controversies over Identity, Conflicts, and Nostalgia,” *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures* 32 (2018), no. 4, p. 929; see also Lothar Probst, “Founding Myths in Europe and the Role of the Holocaust,” *New German Critique* (2003), no. 90, pp. 45–58; Marek Kucia, “The Europeanization of Holocaust Memory and Eastern Europe,” *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*, 30, (2016), no. 1, pp. 97–119.

⁶³ Anna Wylęgała, Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper, “Introduction,” in: *The Burden of the Past: History, Memory, and Identity in Contemporary Ukraine*, eds. Anna Wylęgała, Małgorzata Głowacka-Grajper, Bloomington 2020, p. 3.

⁶⁴ Anna Wylęgała, “Managing the Difficult Past...,” p. 787.

⁶⁵ Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, “Conceptualizations of the Holocaust in Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine: Historical Research, Public Debates, and Methodological Disputes,” *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures* 34 (2000) no. 1, p. 134.

relationships between them and the Germans and the Jews.”⁶⁶ Their point is to investigate and write “with empathy the history of the Holocaust.”⁶⁷ This approach is very interesting prospective and challenging at the same time.

Researchers who are trying to follow this path are particularly interested in survivor’s testimonies.⁶⁸ For example Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe asserts that “the survivor testimonies are, next to the internal OUN documents, essential to comprehend the role the Ukrainian nationalists played in the Shoah in western Ukraine.”⁶⁹ Inter alia Rossoliński-Liebe refers to the relation of Samuel Golfard who “recalled how during the pogroms in summer 1941 the local perpetrators burned the synagogue and threw the son of the Rebbe of Belz into the flames.”⁷⁰ However there is another relation referring to the recalled events in Przemyślany by Leopold Kleiman-Kozłowski. He was a survivor who was born in this city. According to his relation once the synagogue had been burned “a Roman-catholic priest along with a group of the people ran to Father Kovch (a Greek-catholic priest from Przemyślany) and asked him to help rescue the synagogue.”⁷¹ Omelian Kovch called out to German soldiers who stood next to the burning building and he demanded an access to the inside. He spoke fluent German therefore soldiers were confounded and let him go and he opened the synagogue. Father Kovch started to pull people out of the building. In that way among the others he saved Rebbe of Belz

⁶⁶ Ibidem, p. 133.

⁶⁷ Ibidem, p. 135.

⁶⁸ Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, “Conceptualizations of the Holocaust...,” p. 135.

⁶⁹ Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, “Survivor Testimonies and the Coming to Terms with the Holocaust in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia: The Case of the Ukrainian Nationalists,” *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*, 34 (2020), no. 1, p. 228.

⁷⁰ Ibidem.

⁷¹ Володимир Бірчак, Володимир В’ятрович, “Омелян Ковч – священик, патріот та праведник,” <https://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2019/03/26/153881/>.

Aaron Rokeakh.⁷² In fact relations of Golfard and Kleiman-Kozłowski complement one another. However Rossoliński-Liebe referred only to one of them. This case shows how easy is to unintentionally take a position of a mnemonic warrior being a researcher of Holocaust.

This tendency seems to be a big challenge from the point of view of the domestic actors of the Ukrainian memory field, especially when the survivors testimonies are used with the purpose to discover “the role the Ukrainian nationalists played in the Shoah in western Ukraine.”⁷³ Such attempts lead to the clash with the adherents of the Ukrainian state-official politics of memory who very often take position of the mnemonic warriors.⁷⁴

The Ukrainian mnemonic field is internally composite. Ukrainian lands have been subject to the influence of various civilizations for centuries. For a long time, Ukrainian lands were under the control of various states that disseminated not only their political and social customs in Ukraine, but also their culture, certain historical images, and stereotypes. As a result, different regional types of identity and

⁷² Евгений Шнайдер, “Двойная родина Белзских хасидов,” <https://ujew.com.ua/dvojnaya-rodina-belzskih-hasidov>. By the way, this Greek Catholic priest later provided Jews with baptismal certificates on a large scale. Since he had gained “a reputation as a reliable defender of Jews,” he was arrested by the Gestapo in 1942. Metropolitan Sheptytsky tried to free Father Kovch, but his efforts were unsuccessful. Father Kovch died in a Nazi concentration camp in Majdanek. See “Besides Heaven, This Is the Only Place Where I Would Want To Be’: The Witness of the Greek Catholic Priest-Martyr of Majdanek Blessed Omelian Kovch,” https://risu.org.ua/en/index/expert_thought/analytic/48079/.

⁷³ Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, “Survivor Testimonies and the Coming to Terms...,” p. 228.

⁷⁴ Тарас Курило, “Скандал з Россолінським-Лібе та стан української історії,” *Громадянська освіта* (2012), no. 09, <http://osvita.khpg.org/index.php?id=1330953482>; Павло Солодко, “Лекція про «фашиста» Бандеру. Конспект та хронологія скандалу,” <https://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2012/03/5/75689/>. P.A. Rudling described another very interesting example of the clash between mnemonic warriors related to Ukraine—The Yád Vashem Institute and the Ukrainian state’s entities involved in shaping an official memory politics: Per Anders Rudling, “The Cult of Roman Shukhevych in Ukraine: Myth Making with Complications,” *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies* 5 (2016), no. 1, pp. 54–57.

memory of the past have formed. In general, two main paradigms for reconstructing “paths to the present” have emerged in Ukraine. Western Ukraine was influenced by a closer connection with the cultural and societal patterns of Central and Western Europe. In turn, “images of the past” in eastern Ukraine were created in isolation from “the West.” They were heavily influenced by Russian and Soviet historical culture.

From 1991 to 2014, these differences were used to create different dividing lines within the Ukrainian political field.⁷⁵ As a result, they provided a pretext for questioning “the viability of Ukraine as a nation-state within the borders of the former Soviet Union.”⁷⁶ On the basis of these doubts, a widespread belief was born that Ukraine was fundamentally divided into two parts. One was considered “Europeanized,” while the other was seen as Russified and Sovietized.

According to Tatiana Zhurzhenko, the “myth of ‘two Ukraines’” was a reconstruction of the political and cultural realities of Ukraine, based on a certain vision of history, on opinion polls and election results, on Western theoretical constructs, cultural stereotypes and ideological prejudices.⁷⁷ At the same time, however, Zhurzhenko described quite convincingly the significant, real differences between the socio-political conditions in eastern and western Ukraine, resulting from the “divided history.”⁷⁸ For example, she admitted that “Ukraine seems to be trapped between these two different models of dealing with Soviet history: the ‘East’ is not able to externalize completely the communist experience, and the ‘West’ has obvious difficulties with appropriating it as a part of its own national history.”⁷⁹

⁷⁵ For more on this issue, see Ararat L. Osipian, Alexander L. Osipian, “Regional Diversity and Divided Memories in Ukraine: Contested Past as Electoral Resource, 2004–2010,” *East European Politics and Societies*, 26 (2012), no. 3, pp. 616–642.

⁷⁶ Tatiana Zhurzhenko, “The Myth of Two Ukraines,” *Eurozine* (2002), p. 1, <https://www.eurozine.com/the-myth-of-two-ukraines/>.

⁷⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 2.

⁷⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 4–6.

⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 5–6.

It seems that starting with the Orange Revolution, Ukrainians have gained a chance to get out of this trap. The real breakthrough in this matter came during the Revolution of Dignity. After Euromaidan, the nation-building process in Ukraine gained a new dynamic. Ukrainian identity was consolidated in the face of Russian aggression around ideas and patterns typical of the civic model of nationalism.⁸⁰ Those who, for various reasons, questioned the ontological status of the Ukrainian political community within an independent and sovereign state were excluded from political life. Tensions within the field of Ukrainian memory are no longer attractive to agents in the political field. However, this does not necessarily mean that these tensions became extinct.

While studying the regional characteristics of the memory of Ukrainians, Yaroslav Hrytsak noticed a certain regularity: the further away this or that historical event or historical figure is from the present, the greater is the unanimity in its assessment among the inhabitants of various regions.⁸¹ In addition, a certain cyclical nature of changes in the approach to interpreting the past is noticeable. Political traditionalism is replaced by a rivalry of interpretations of the past, which in turn may turn into a conflict of memory.⁸² As for the structure of the Ukrainian mnemonic field, one may distinguish the dominating center (Kyiv) and a number of peripheries with their own subfields. One periphery is the territory of former Galicia. It is very important that the tension between the legacy of the former Galicia and the cultural capital of other Ukrainian lands traditionally comprises very distinctive features of Ukrainian society.

In other words, for a long time, the historical memory between the “Kyivian center” and the “Galician periphery” was based on different values, symbols, and heritage models. The structure of the social

⁸⁰ For more on this issue, see “Ukrainian Identity: Changes, Trends, Regional Aspects,” *National Security and Defense* (2016), no. 3–4 (161–162), pp. 39–40, https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/eng/NSD161-162_2016_eng.pdf.

⁸¹ Ярослав Грицак, *Життя, смерть та інші неприємності*, Київ 2008, p. 232.

⁸² Ольга Волянчук, *Закономірності суспільної пам'яті: політологічний аналіз. Національна та історична пам'ять: Зб. наук. праць*, vol. 5, Київ 2012, pp. 37–46.

field of Ukraine's "center" was developed by such experiences as Russification—carried out consistently well before 1917—the Stalinist terror of the 1930s, and the almost total Sovietization and isolation from the influence of Western European civilization (or very limited and selective contact with it). However, within the structure of the Galician subfield, among others, were engraved the consequences of its organic, centuries-old participation in this civilization. Although the extremely intense experience of the Soviet period was imposed on it, key differences between it and the "Kyivian center" have not been eliminated.

It should be emphasized that the cultural capital of the Galician subfield was heavily stigmatized during the entire Soviet period. Official Soviet propaganda created an image of Galicia as a culturally foreign area. Metropolitan Sheptytsky played a very important role in this image.⁸³ He was in fact the focus of all the negative stereotypes with which Soviet propaganda sought to disavow the Galician part of Ukraine's national heritage. Therefore, the question of how far this tension can consolidate and how much this "system of belief bonding" will break down in the case of Ukraine is particularly interesting, especially at present.

Today, Metropolitan Sheptytsky is widely seen as one of the key figures in the social, political, and cultural life of Ukrainians living in the region of Galicia—and after 1918, on Poland's interwar lands. Celebrating the anniversary of Sheptytsky's birth on a national level can be regarded as a manifestation of the "symbolic interaction" between the "Kyivian center" and the "post-Galician periphery."

Some of the issues from the past generate particular cultural and political constraints in the Ukrainian mnemonic field that affect the actors' choices of strategy. For example, there are a legacy of anti-Semitism and stereotypes toward different nationalities relevant to Ukraine. Also, there might be ways of remembering World War II that differ between former Galicia and the rest of Ukraine and a renaissance of symbols related to Ukrainian nationalism in the new social, political, and cultural context since 2014. One of the most important

⁸³ Paulina Byzdra-Kusz, "Obraz metropolity Andrzeja Szeptyckiego w propagandowej literaturze Ukraińskiej Socjalistycznej Republiki Radzieckiej," *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość* (2021), no. 1(37), pp. 455–480.

sources of constraints is the legacy of foregoing public discourse on the Holocaust in Ukraine.⁸⁴ In that case actors' cultural choices made within constraints mentioned above refer to some alternative patterns of conceptualizing the past. For example, this is an issue of choice between a concept of World War II and the Great Patriotic War. Another important choice relates to evaluation of the activities of OUN and UPA (Nazi's collaborators co-responsible for the Holocaust or "fighters for independence").⁸⁵ The Greek-catholic Church is also an object of alternative epistemological approaches (supporter of the Ukrainian nationalist movement or defender of the basic human moral values in the Ukrainian social life.⁸⁶

Any community that seeks to define itself as a nation and that seeks to form its own state must construct, disseminate, and perpetuate a version of national memory that would be acceptable and attractive to all its members, or at least to a large majority. First of all, it is about shaping the vision of the history of Ukraine as a community and a multi-ethnic state that is integrated with Europe. In other words, it is about creating a "biography" of the Ukrainian nation that is acceptable from the point of view of the education system and the international community. This "biography" is created by anthropomorphizing the historical development of a given community. As a consequence, the assumption that the process has a beginning and then evolves and reaches the highest state of development—as does a human life—becomes fundamentally important.⁸⁷ Therefore, there is an urgent need to re-evaluate the hitherto achievements of historiography, which concerns the so-called "Soviet period in the history of

⁸⁴ Andrii Portnov, "The Holocaust in the Public Discourse of Post-Soviet Ukraine," in: *War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*, eds. Julie Fedor, Markku Kangaspuro, Jussi Lassila, Tatiana Zhurzhenko, London 2017, pp. 347–370.

⁸⁵ Per Anders Rudling, "The Cult of Roman Shukhevych in Ukraine..." pp. 26–65.

⁸⁶ Олег Беген, Олександр Зайцев, Василь Стефанів, *Націоналізм і релігія: Греко-Католицька Церква та український націоналістичний рух у Галичині (1920–1930-ті роки)*, Lviv 2011. See also the review of this book by Liliana Hentosh: *Україна Модерна* 19 (2012), http://uamoderna.com/images/archiv/19/um_19_gentosh.pdf.

⁸⁷ Леонід Зашкільняк, "Національний метанаратив..." p. 89.

Ukraine.” So far, it has not been possible to develop a new approach to this period within the framework of a comprehensive approach to the history of Ukraine. President Victor Yushchenko’s nationalizing course only intensified the confrontation in Ukrainian society. The process of eroding traditional ideologies was accompanied by the manipulative practices of influencing social awareness. Therefore, the strategy of “nationalizing” historical memory in Ukraine turned out to not be very effective. The historical memory of citizens remained ambivalent and susceptible to external influences. In the process of reinterpreting the past, divisive events and facts (e.g., the colonial status of Ukraine in the USSR) came to the fore, and the issue of historical memory became a tool in the political struggle. Discussions on the content of Ukrainian textbooks, which took place in October 2007 on the initiative of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, were very characteristic in this respect. Historians analyzed 12 school textbooks and came to the conclusion that school historical literature does not meet the criteria of modern historical science and the needs of Ukrainian society. Archaism, the dominance of a militaristic approach, the overuse of the categories of “national oppression” and “colonial status,” hyperideology, aggressive impulsiveness, an irrational view of history, etc., are emphasized.⁸⁸ One of the proposals for the basis of the national metanarrative in its educational version for school education was developed by a group of Ukrainian historians under the direction of Natalia Yakovenko. Its proponents tried to bring the national educational meta-narrative closer to the scientific one. Their main demands were formulated as follows: the general principles of updating the content of school history courses in Ukraine should be based on the principle of anthropologization (“humanization”) of the past, so that all students may identify with Ukraine’s past.⁸⁹ According to research conducted in 2012, in the didactics of history, the transition from the Soviet to the ethnocentric vision took place while the old patterns from the authoritarian era were still maintained. “The ‘fight for the past’ in the

⁸⁸ *Шкільна історія очима істориків-науковців. Матеріали Робочої наради з моніторингу шкільних підручників історії України*, Київ 2008, pp. 43–44.

⁸⁹ Леонід Зашкільняк, “Національний метанаратив...”, p. 93.

space of school history was accompanied by the rapid replacement of old symbols and heroes with new ones without any critical understanding of them.” Moreover, Oksana Tkach stated that the material concerning the past is presented unilaterally within the self-contradictory ethnic paradigm. It is dominated by “binary value judgments (own/other)” and a simplified (black-and-white) vision of the past.⁹⁰ Apparently, the problem of cultural choices is not so important in the case of the Ukrainian mnemonic field. According to opinion polls conducted before Euromaidan, “a substantial part of the population is *ambivalent* about the contested historical past (rather than siding up firmly with one or another camp of mnemonic warriors).”⁹¹ Oxana Shevel asserted that it had formed a favorable background for developing a pillarized mnemonic field in Ukraine.⁹² As for modern Ukraine, many observers have noted the diversity and ambivalence of historical memory in Ukrainian society. Many of these differences stem from myths and pre-Soviet and Soviet stereotypes. These myths include “Eastern Slavic unity,” “Ukrainian statelessness,” “ethnic kinship of Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarusians,” “the hostility of Western civilization toward Ukraine and Ukrainians,” “the brotherly family of nations in the USSR,” “victory in the Great Patriotic War,” etc. All these stereotypical representations actually leave no room for Ukraine and Ukrainians as agents on the political map of Eastern Europe. They also preclude Ukrainians becoming aware of their own national identity and the related need to have a sovereign state.⁹³ In the Ukrainian case ambivalent attitudes actually are not neutral. In particular it refers to the mnemonic contest between “east” and “west.” This is a consequence of the activity of the external mnemonic warrior—Russia which positions itself “as a kin-state in an ongoing and ever more aggressive quest to reassert its regional dominance and its great power

⁹⁰ Оксана Драч, “Коллективна пам’ять і національна історія у середній освіті України доби незалежності,” *Київські історичні студії: науковий журнал* (2019), no. 2(9), p. 49.

⁹¹ Oxana Shevel, “Memories of the Past and Visions of the Future...” p. 153.

⁹² Ibidem.

⁹³ Леонід Зашкільняк, “Національний метанаратив...” p. 89.

status.”⁹⁴ In searching for legitimization of this status Russia attempts to interfere in the processes in the memory fields of the “near abroad” countries. In the case of Ukraine Russian activities related to the manipulation of historical memory are focused particularly on “the events of World War II and the projection of the divisions of that time into the present conflict. The much exploited Nazi collaboration in western Ukraine is set against the anti-fascist heroism of Russia.”⁹⁵

To a great extent Russian efforts were focused on gaining a right to act on behalf of those who were “ambivalent” and who tried to be “neutral” regarding to the intra-Ukrainian memory and identity debates. The space for “ambivalent” attitudes has distinctly shrunken after the Euromaidan. Mykola Riabchuk pointed out that “the majority of the Russian-speaking Ukrainians and the plurality of Ukraine’s ethnic Russians who had largely remained ambivalent in their loyalty to both Moscow and Kyiv, have opted ultimately for the Ukrainian cause driven primarily by civic rather than ethnic, cultural, or linguistic considerations.”⁹⁶ At the same time, Riabchuk asserts that “this does not mean that the problem of a harmonious coexistence of two major cultural groups in one country is already solved.”⁹⁷

1.3. A few words about the history of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC)

At the end of 16th century majority of the Orthodox bishops of the Kyiv archeparchy decided to break their canonical ties with Constantinople and placed themselves under the authority of the pope in Rome. Finally it happened after signing the act of the union in Brest

⁹⁴ Erika Harris, “What is the Role of Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Russia–Ukraine Crisis?” *Europe-Asia Studies* 72 (2020), no. 4, p. 14.

⁹⁵ Ibidem.

⁹⁶ Mykola Riabchuk, “‘Two Ukraines’ Reconsidered: The End of Ukrainian Ambivalence?” *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 15 (2015), no. 1, p. 152.

⁹⁷ Ibidem.

in 1596.⁹⁸ In that way the Uniate Church emerged. Its clergy and believers belonged to the Catholic Church but they preserved an organizational autonomy and the eastern rite.

After the final partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1795 the structures of the Uniate Church started to function in two states: Russian Empire and the Habsburg Monarchy. The majority of the Uniate Church's structures in the Romanov Empire was liquidated in 1839. Its clergy and faithful were forced to "come back" to the Orthodox Church.⁹⁹ The last Uniate eparchy in the Russian state lasted till 1875 (eparchy of Chełm).¹⁰⁰ The Uniate Church survived in the Habsburg Monarchy in Galicia. It was renamed to the Greek-Catholic Church and it gained a new separate organizational frames based on the formally restored in 1807 Archeparchy of Halych. With time the UGCC became a pivotal institution of the Ukrainian national life in Galicia.

The process of formation of the new elites of the UGCC was strongly affected by the reform of the Order of Saint Basil the Great which started in 1882.¹⁰¹ It was the only Greek-Catholic monastic community at that time. The reformed Basilian order was "the most far-reaching response to the national movement from a Christian perspective."¹⁰² John-Paul Himka asserted, that the Basilian monks "borrowed and improved upon the methods of the national movement in

⁹⁸ For more on this issue, see Borys A. Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform: The Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1998.

⁹⁹ Софрон Мудрий, *Нарис історії Церкви в Україні*, Івано-Франківськ 1999, pp. 375–395.

¹⁰⁰ Ibidem, pp. 390–391; Богдан Боцюрків, *Українська греко-католицька церква й радянська держава (1939–1950)*, Lviv 2005, pp. 7–8; John-Paul Himka, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: The Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867–1900*, Montreal–Kingston 1999, pp. 57–60.

¹⁰¹ For more on this issue, see *Добромільська реформа і відродження української Церкви*, ed. Олександра Левків, Lviv 2003; Петро Шкарб'юк, *Монаший чин отців василіян у національному житті України*, Lviv 2005.

¹⁰² John-Paul Himka, *Religion and Nationality...*, p. 161.

order to initiate a religious revival among the spiritually endangered Ruthenian peasantry.”¹⁰³

Pope Leo XIII entrusted the Polish Jesuits with carrying out the reform. The entire process of rebuilding the Basilian Order lasted from 1882 to 1904. One of the first candidates to enter the reformed novitiate was young Roman Sheptytsky. As a monk, he took the name Andrew. Soon after, he became one of the most prominent representatives of the “reformed” Basilian monks.

The UGCC’s position in the Ukrainian social life in Galicia was questioned at that time by increasing wave of the anticlerical mood among the laic representatives of the Ukrainian elites.¹⁰⁴ This Church got at least partially its social leadership back under the metropolitane Andrey Sheptytsky. He actively supported the Ukrainian strivings in political, economic and cultural spheres including the issue of the state-building in the Eastern Galicia at the end of the World War I.

During the interwar period the Ukrainian national life in Galicia was strongly influenced by the underground nationalist movement. Some part of the Greek-catholic clergy sympathized with the nationalists and supported their activity. One of the leaders of the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) Andriy Melnyk had very close relations with A. Sheptytsky.¹⁰⁵ After the former Eastern Galicia had been incorporated to the Soviet Union, the UGCC became one of the main obstacles to the process of sovietization. Therefore the Soviet authorities decided to smooth it out and they held a so called “council” in 1946. Its participants were strictly supervised by the NKVD. This gathering “decided” on liquidation of the UGCC and

¹⁰³ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁴ More on this issue see: Роман Лехнюк, *На порозі модерного світу: українські консервативні середовища в Галичині в першій чверті XX століття*, Lviv 2019, pp. 181–204.

¹⁰⁵ Олександр Зайцев, Олег Беген, Василь Стефанів, *Націоналізм і релігія. Греко-Католицька Церква та український націоналістичний рух у Галичині (1920–1930-ті роки)*, Lviv 2011, pp. 240–2411; Ліліана Гентош, *Митрополит Шептицький...*, p. 205.

declared “reunion” with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).¹⁰⁶ As a result the UGCC was formally eliminated. The Russian Orthodox Church not only discussed (as it finally seemed) the consequences of the events in 1596, but also “consumed” the ecclesial structure and infrastructure, which she herself after the period of Bolshevik repression would never be able to rebuild and would not be in a position to compete with. It was no accident that during the whole Soviet period the densest network of the ROC’s parishes existed in the Lviv, Stanislaviv (Ivano-Frankivsk) and Ternopil oblasts, meaning in the former “uniates” areas.

In subsequent years, the liquidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and its consequences has become—especially from the perspective of the Moscow Patriarchate, a constitutive element of an official Soviet order. However the UGCC survived in the underground. The “catacomb church” was supported by the UGCC structures on exile (in Western Europe, North and South America).¹⁰⁷ Finally, the UGCC was legalized in December 1989. This event not only called into question further activities of the Russian Orthodox Church in the territory of former Galicia. The catacomb Uniate Church became a symbol of a fight for freedom and was one of the few elements of Ukrainian identity which were not Sovietized.

Allegedly, “the voluntary return” of the Greek Catholic Church to the bosom of the Orthodox Church, which was to take place as a result of the so called “council” in Lviv 1946, was one of fundamental foundation myths which were to legitimate Soviet power in the territory of the former Galicia. Therefore, the permission to legalize the UGCC again called into question the legal validity of the communist party’s monopoly not only in the ideological sphere, but also in the power structures and in the public space. When the era of the

¹⁰⁶ More on this issue: Богдан Боцюрків, *Українська греко-католицька церква...*, pp. 89–186; *Ліквідація УГКЦ (1939–1946). Документи радянських органів державної безпеки*, vol. 1–2, ed. Володимир Сергійчук, Київ 2006.

¹⁰⁷ Borys Gudziak, Switlana Hurkina, Oleh Turij, “Hierarchia i duchowieństwo ukraińskiego Kościoła grekokatolickiego w podziemiu,” in: *Polska–Ukraina. 1000 lat sąsiedztwa*, vol. 4, ed. Stanisław Stępień, Przemyśl 1998, pp. 311–339.

Ukrainian independence had begun the UGCC was of few well institutionalized structures of the social life with non-Sovietized and non-Russified identity.

1.4. Why Sheptytsky?

The Sheptytsky case is interesting for at least three reasons. Firstly, it is a very good example for scrutinizing the topic of memory politics on different levels. The commemoration of Sheptytsky was launched by state institutions, as well as by non-governmental entities and individuals. Secondly, the legacy and biography of Sheptytsky very effectively generate all the main constraints affecting mnemonic strategies of different actors in the Ukrainian mnemonic field. Thirdly, the case of Sheptytsky's commemoration shows cultural memory's "capacity to reconstruct." The meaning of this reconstruction relies on adapting Sheptytsky's legacy to the needs of the process of nation-building in Ukraine and to the question "Who are we and what is our opposite?"

For example, on the one hand Sheptytsky condemned the political terror fomented by the Ukrainian nationalists and competed with them for "the souls" of Ukrainians. At the same time, he maintained close relations with the leaders of the Organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) who were receiving support from the UGCC in various ways. Sheptytsky maintained good and friendly relations with the Jewish community, especially in Lviv. However, when members of nationalist military groups had started or actively had joined the pogrom in Lviv, he officially supported the "renewal" of the Ukrainian state in July 1941 under the aegis of the OUN. On July 5th 1941 metropolitan Sheptytsky drew up an address "on the occasion of the liberation of Halychyna from Soviet occupation." At the end of this address he gave an order to pray for "good fortune for the victorious German army."¹⁰⁸ Afterwards he contributed to the action of saving

¹⁰⁸ "Послання митр. Андрія Шептицького до духовенства й вірних з приводу визволення Галичини з радянської окупації," in: *Митрополит Андрей Шептицький. Життя і діяльність. Документи і Матеріали 1899–1944*, vol. 2, part 1, ed. Андрій Кравчук, Lviv 1998, p. 518.

Jews launched by several structures of the UGCC. As a result, the Yad Vashem Institute still has serious reservations about granting Sheptytsky the title “Righteous among the nations.” At the same time, the International Catholic-Jewish Historical Commission concluded in 2000 that “no other high-ranking Catholic Churchman, to the best of our knowledge, provided such direct eye-witness testimony and expressed concern for Jews *qua* Jews (and as primary targets of German bestiality) in the same way.”¹⁰⁹

Sheptytsky was a representative of the aristocracy. The Sheptytskys descended from the Ruthenian gentry and the grandfather of Andrey Sheptytsky was likely baptized in the Eastern Rite as well.¹¹⁰ However, when the future metropolitan was born, the world of the Galician nobility had already been entirely polonized. Thus, he was apparently completely strange for the Ukrainian people in Galicia at the time—from both the cultural and societal points of view. However, Sheptytsky became one of the most prominent leaders of the Ukrainian national life.

Sheptytsky was raised in an ultramontane spirit. Therefore, consolidating the ties between his religious community and the Catholic Church, and its center in the Vatican, was one of the most important points of his priestly agenda. On the other hand, he attempted to build relationships with representatives of the Ukrainian elite from Galicia who were members of the Orthodox Church. Sheptytsky aimed to strengthen and develop the Greek-Catholic Church, borrowing institutional patterns from the Western Christian tradition (e.g., making the Eastern Rite branches of the Latin monastic orders and promoting celibacy). At the same time, he attempted to eliminate the consequences of latinizing the Greek-Catholic tradition and he encouraged the clergy to return to the Eastern Christian sources. In other words, he coped with the conflict between fidelity to the Eastern Christian identity and participation in the community of the Catholic

¹⁰⁹ “The Vatican and the Holocaust: A Preliminary Report,” <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/preliminary-report-on-the-vatican-during-the-holocaust-october-2000-2#24>.

¹¹⁰ Magdalena Nowak, *Dwa światy...*, p. 41.

Church dominated by the Western tradition.¹¹¹ Sheptytsky regarded communism as threat not only to his Church, but also to the existential basics of the Ukrainian nation and to the cultural foundations of the European model of social order. However, in 1944 he drew up words of thanks to Stalin for the Red Army unifying the Ukrainian lands and liberating them from the German invaders.¹¹² Potentially, Sheptytsky's legacy and related symbolic capital might be useful in "Europeization." It provides an opportunity to come to terms with various problematic issues from the past, one of which is the topic of the Holocaust in Ukraine.

¹¹¹ Ibidem, pp. 164–182.

¹¹² *Хресною дорогою: функціонування і спроби ліквідації Української Греко-Католицької Церкви в умовах СРСР у 1939–1941 та 1944–1946 роках. Збірник документів і матеріалів*, ed. М.І. Гайковський, Lviv 2006, pp. 99–101.

CHAPTER 2

SHEPTYTSKY'S LEGACY AND THE UKRAINIAN HISTORICAL CULTURE

This chapter begins with a presentation of the first steps taken during Gorbachev's *perestroika* period to restore the memory of Sheptytsky. The close connection of these attempts with the process of the UGCC leaving "the catacombs" are emphasized and the main agents involved in these activities are characterized. They were generally bottom-up, voluntary, spontaneous associations, non-institutionalized entities, and entities related to the emerging civil society. At the same time, the attitude of representatives of the Soviet state, including the KGB, is described. Until the very end of the Soviet Union, they tried to control and interfere in activities aimed at extracting Sheptytsky's memory from the aborted legacy. It turns out that Ukrainian "professional historians," both in the *perestroika* period and later, played a marginal role in these activities. Why did Sheptytsky's legacy become a major challenge for most agents of hardware of the Ukrainian historical culture? The main purpose of the chapter is to answer this question.

2.1. Rediscovering an "aborted legacy"

The period 1989–1990 was a time when the UGCC finally emerged from the underground and returned to legal activity. This concerned not only reconstituting the organizational structures, but also taking over the churches that had been confiscated by the Soviet state. Part of this process was also restoring the memory of the heritage of the

past related to the Church. One key element of this heritage was the memory of Metropolitan Sheptytsky. For decades, it had been manipulated for the purposes of Soviet propaganda. Even under Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost*, the symbolic capital associated with this figure was treated as a threat to the existing order.

The atmosphere of that time is quite well reflected in the account left by Mary Klachko, an American historian associated with the Ukrainian diaspora in the USA. In the 1980s, she was working on a book about Sheptytsky's travels to Western Europe and America. Consequently, she intended to conduct a query in the Central State Historical Archives in Lviv, where documents related to Metropolitan Sheptytsky were stored. It was not an easy task, because until 1989 historians had had limited access to these materials, and some documents were not allowed to be shared at all.¹ Mary Klachko obtained permission to access the Sheptytsky archive after three years of effort. The Ukrainian-American researcher finally reached Lviv at the end of June 1988.

According to Klachko, "while in Lviv, we were eager to ascertain various rumors about the location of the corpse of Metropolitan Sheptytsky. We sought permission to the crypt in the Cathedral of St. George where it had originally been interned."² As Klachko further explained, "these rumors arose from the sound of digging in the crypt when a burial site was being prepared for the Orthodox archbishop Fotyi."³ The researcher obtained permission to visit the cathedral four hours before her planned departure from Lviv to Kyiv. She was informed of this by Petro Kohut, who, as Klachko noted, was "the party member who had been assigned to be our daily companion." After 1945, he "worked in trade and tourism." He was also a social activist.⁴ Nonetheless, "for some time" after the war, he "carried out tasks" for

1 Orest J. Maciuk, "Archiwum metropolity Szeptyckiego we Lwowie," in: *Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki. Studia i materiały*, ed. Andrzej A. Zięba, Kraków 1994, p. 214.

2 Report of Mary Klachko on her visit to the Cathedral of St. George in Lviv, attached to a letter from October 27, 1988, Private Archive of the Sheptytsky Family, JKS-MA3, 3.38.

3 Ibidem.

4 "Помер перший голова товариства «Лемківщина» в Україні," <http://lemky.com/390-pomer-pershiy-golova-tovarisstva-lemkvschina-v-ukrayin.html>.

the Soviet military intelligence and for the counterintelligence department of the KGB.⁵ When Mary Klachko and Kohut arrived at the cathedral, three more men were waiting for them. One of them asked people who were praying in front of various icons to leave the temple. Then "he closed the door and locked it. Then we were taken to the main altar. On the right side of its front they removed a heavy rug which had covered a metal door. They unlocked the door, pulled it open, then helped us to descend the steep metal stairs which brought us to a small chapel."⁶ Metropolitan Sheptytsky's coffin was in a locked room, which could be seen through a small window in the wall.

Mary Klachko's description of her visit to Lviv allows us to better understand the meaning of the "aborted legacy," which did not necessarily mean physical elimination. In the Soviet reality, two conditions were of key importance: the ability to impose a discourse which the authorities would deem appropriate regarding a given element of the memory field and the officially ordered conspiracy of silence about everything that went beyond this discourse. The KGB ensured that no one broke from this decreed conspiracy of silence. In the case of Sheptytsky, this concerned both access to the crypt where he was buried and to the archive which contained materials that contradicted the narrative of official Soviet propaganda.

In the following months, the process of the UGCC emerging from the catacombs gained momentum. On August 27, 1989, on the initiative of dissident circles, an "ecumenical meeting of many thousands" was held in Lviv. Its participants adopted a resolution demanding the legalization of the UGCC. In addition, a telegram was sent to Pope John Paul II, in which they wrote: "Before our eyes, the prophecy of the blessed memory of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky about the renewed and wonderful revival of the new Church is being fulfilled. We see in this an evident miraculous sign, we beg the Holy Father to recognize our Ukrainian saint and allow us to worship him."⁷

5 http://www.hrono.ru/biograf/bio_k/kogutpm.php.

6 Report of Mary Klachko....

7 М. Клячко, "Лист митрополита Шептицького до Сталіна," *Свобода*, 30.12.1989, p. 2.

On September 7, 1989, a huge demonstration took place in Lviv, attended by tens of thousands of people demanding the legalization of the UGCC. A portrait of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky was carried at the head of the procession.⁸ The authorities were no longer able to enforce a conspiracy of silence about the Metropolitan of Halych and about what had happened to the Greek Catholic Church in 1946. The memory of Sheptytsky came from the sphere of “aborted legacy.”

A few months after the legalization of the UGCC, on May 4, 1990, a solemn conference and concert were held in Lviv on the occasion of the 125th anniversary of the birth of Metropolitan Sheptytsky. The organizers of this event were entities that in today's language are referred to as “non-governmental.” However, in this case and taking into account the circumstances in which they functioned, the term “outside the system” seems more appropriate. They included the Lviv branch of the organization “Memorial,” the Shevchenko Scientific Society, the UGCC Defense Committee, and the association “Myloserdia” [Mercy]. Unfortunately, information on the last group could not be found. The others, on the other hand, were composed of dissident circles and activists of the previously illegal UGCC.

The initiative to hold a conference devoted to Sheptytsky came from representatives of the intelligentsia who were associated with the Lviv Medical Institute. The event was held in the hall of the university. As one of its main originators, Yurii Turkevych, wrote, when planning the conference, its organizers had in mind Sheptytsky's guidelines, according to which “the more people who deal with the organization of national life, who are to work on it, the more common the adopted principles of this organization are, the more there are common beliefs, common needs, common traditions, a sense of solidarity and many other features and state virtues among those who belong to it, the more strength such a human organization has. Therefore, the organizing committee decided to involve the most progressive, outstanding scholars of the Lviv region, social activists, writers and guests from the

⁸ Мар'яна Іванишин, “Як УГКЦ з підпілля виходила (відео),” <https://photo-lviv.in.ua/yak-ugkts-z-pidpillya-vyhodyla-video/>.

diaspora” to participate in this event.⁹ The conference turned out to be a great event—at least for those times. According to Yurii Turkeyvych, about 1,000 people gathered in the auditorium, which was intended for 500 people. Several thousand more people came to the building where the meeting was held. With them in mind, loudspeakers were placed in the windows so that the crowd gathered outside could follow what was happening inside. A series of speakers shared with the audience their personal memories of meeting with Metropolitan Sheptytsky and tried to outline the most important themes from his life and work. As one of the co-organizers of the event, Oleksandr Kitsera, recalled, “there were an awful lot of people” and everyone wanted to hear “for the first time the real word about the metropolitan.”¹⁰ It was a special period in Ukrainian society. In March 1990, the first competitive elections to the collective bodies of state power at the central (Verkhovna Rada of the USSR) and regional (oblast, district, and city councils) levels were held. At the same time, events took place that led to significant re-evaluations in the symbolic sphere, on which the Soviet order had been based.¹¹ As stated by Yaroslav Hrytsak, “the events of 1989 and early 1990 gave the impression that the Ukrainian movement had already reached the necessary critical mass and that now its primary task was to seize political power in the republic.”¹² These words particularly refer to the situation in former Galicia, where the decision to legalize the UGCC was an additional catalyst for change. It was of fundamental importance for the construction of new

⁹ *Матеріали конференції присвяченої життю та діяльності митрополита Архидия Шептицького*, Lviv 1990, p. 2.

¹⁰ “Онлайн-конференція ‘Шептицький 155’: відео,” https://risu.ua/onlajn-konferenciya-sheptickij-155-video_n112220.

¹¹ On October 28, 1989, the Verkhovna Rada of the USSR adopted a resolution to grant the Ukrainian language the status of the state language. On January 21, 1990, the anniversary of the 1919 Act on the Unification of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the West Ukrainian People’s Republic, a “human chain” was organized between Kyiv and Lviv, in which, according to various estimates, from 400,000 to 3 million people participated. See Jarosław Hrycak, *Historia Ukrainy 1772–1999*, Lublin 2000, p. 316.

¹² *Ibidem*.

symbolic capital on which the participants of this “Ukrainian movement” could build their identity. It was shaped in opposition to the existing Soviet heritage. Negative stereotypes about the UGCC and Sheptytsky himself were key elements of this legacy, hence the great interest in the conference.

During the conference, not only could one hear the “true word” about Sheptytsky, but the participants also unintentionally reproduced or created new myths about the Halych metropolitan—only this time, they were positive. One of the sources of these myths, which have been quite popular for a long time, especially in the Ukrainian diaspora, was an epistolary novel by the emigrant writer Hryhor Meriam-Luzhnytskyi entitled *Twelve Letters of Father Andrey Sheptytsky to his Mother*.¹³ The artistic device used by the author was so suggestive that many readers of the novel believed that they were dealing with real correspondence between the metropolitan and his mother.

This is also how the main organizer of the aforementioned 1990 conference, Yurii Turkeyvych, treated this piece. He decided to reconstruct the most important character traits of Sheptytsky based on the novel. The speaker explained to the audience that he chose this “source” because “no person, whatever his character, can hide his thoughts from his own mother, so that the mother’s heart does not recognize their sincerity.”¹⁴ Of particular importance in the symbolic

¹³ Григор Меріям-Лужницький, *Дванадцять листів о. Андрея Шептицького до матері*, Філадельфія 1982.

¹⁴ *Матеріали конференції присвяченої...*, p. 19. In 1994, another edition of this work was published in Lviv. Although Luzhnytskyi’s novel as a fictional work and has already been the subject of literary studies (Наталія Вівчарик, “Художні особливості епістолярної повісті Григора Лужницького «Дванадцять листів о. Андрея Шептицького до матері»,” *Філологічні науки. Літературознавство* 3 (2013), pp. 18–22), many authors still treat it as source material in research on Sheptytsky. See Володимир Сергійчук, *Українські державники: Митрополит Андрей Шептицький*, Вишгород 2015, pp. 14–16, 26–27; Андрій Маслюк, “Аналіз психологічного портрету Андрея Шептицького,” *Психологічні перспективи*, 32 (2018), pp. 193–204; Микола Вегеш, “Державотворчі процеси в Україні. Методичні рекомендації для аспірантів Ужгородського національного університету,” <https://dspace.uzhnu.edu.ua/jspui/bitstream/lib/44006/1/Vegesh%20M.%20Державотворчі%20процеси%20в%20Україні%20202%20%281%29.pdf>.

capital associated with Sheptytsky is the issue of his relationship with the Jews. This concerns both the pre-war period and, of course, above all, the attitude of the Metropolitan of Halych during the Holocaust. It was therefore no coincidence that the deputy of the Shalom Alejkhem Society of Jewish Culture, Benzion Kotlyk, was among the participants of the Lviv conference. In his speech, he informed the audience that in Tel-Aviv, "a monument to Sheptytsky was erected, a memorial plaque was built in" and a tree was planted in his memory in the "Alley of the Righteous."¹⁵ It was, of course, a collection of pious wishes. As we know, the figure of Sheptytsky in the context of the Holocaust remains controversial to this day, and the Yad Vashem Institute has still not decided to award Sheptytsky the title of "Righteous Among the Nations."

The topic of the conference concerned the past, and its essence was closely related to what today is called "the politics of memory." However, Iryna Kalynets aptly noted at the beginning of her speech that "there is something very symptomatic and symbolic in the fact that the first legally organized evening dedicated to the memory of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky, 46 years after his death, was launched mainly by medics."¹⁶ Among the organizers and speakers there was only one representative of what was then Soviet Ukrainian historiography—Yevhen Hryniv.¹⁷ Thus, the solemn conference dedicated to Sheptytsky

¹⁵ *Матеріали конференції присвяченої...*, p. 36.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 51.

¹⁷ During Gorbachev's *perestroika*, Hryniv belonged to a small group of humanities and social sciences scholars who attempted to create structures that would operate in the field of remembrance of the past, outside the still valid model of "partisan culture." At the end of 1989, he was among the co-founders of the Lviv branch of the organization "Memorial" (Олександр Луцький, "Інститут суспільних наук АН УРСР у другій половині 80-х – на початку 90-х років ХХ століття: пошуки нових орієнтирів," *Україна: культурна спадщина, національна свідомість, державність* (2013), no. 23, p. 662). In early 1990, he officially announced that he was leaving the Communist Party (<https://who-is-who.ua/main/page/galichina2006/30/162>). On the one hand, it is not surprising that Hryniv took part in the above-mentioned conference devoted to Sheptytsky. On the other hand, it is worth noting that he published a scientific publication shortly beforehand, in 1988, in the then leading Kyiv scientific publishing house "Kyivska dumka." Its title is very characteristic: *The Struggle of*

was part of the process of rediscovering the aborted legacy. An important point of reference for its participants was the Polish field of memory at the time and the related historical culture. It was no accident when Oleksandr Kitsera noted in a speech from 1990 that “one of the most conscientious contemporary researchers of Andrey Sheptytsky’s life and work” is the Polish historian Ryszard Torzecki.¹⁸

In the sphere of historical culture, *perestroika* and *glasnost* meant restoring various elements of the “aborted legacy.” In the narrative of the time, they were referred to as “blank spots.” The history of the UGCC and Sheptytsky’s legacy were one of the most important “stains” in Ukraine. These events show how great the need was to restore this heritage to the Ukrainian historical culture. Why were the actors who created the “hardware” of this culture missing in the implementation of this task?

2.2. *Perestroika* and the pre(non)communist legacy of the former Galicia

Orest Subtelny, in his diagnosis of the condition of Ukrainian Soviet historiography, stated on the eve of the USSR’s collapse that “the fact that there is only one purely historical journal in all of Ukraine, *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, which, until very recently was co-published by the Academy of Science of Ukraine, Institute of History and the Institute of Party History of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, is an indication of both the pyramidal organization of Ukraine’s historians and the low priority that Ukrainian history was accorded in the final decades of Soviet rule.”¹⁹ Subtelny’s conclusion concerned two issues that were of fundamental importance for the functioning of the memory field in Ukraine, not only

South-Western Russia and Ukraine Against the Expansion of the Vatican and the Union (10th to Early 17th Centuries) [Боротьба Південно-Західної Русі проти експансії Ватикану та унії (X-початок XVII ст.)].

¹⁸ *Матеріали конференції присвяченої...*, p. 13.

¹⁹ Orest Subtelny, “The Current State of Ukrainian Historiography,” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 18 (1993), no. 1–2, p. 50

during the Soviet period, but also after it ended, i.e. after the independent Ukrainian nation was created. The first is the special status of historical sciences and historians as elements and participants of social life. The second issue raised by Subtelny was the set of internal rules by which Ukrainian historiography functioned during the Soviet period and which was then somehow inherited by historians in Ukraine after regaining independence. Both the particular understanding of the status and mission that historians have to fulfill in society and the set of rules mentioned above, which can be described as the “culture of the party leadership,” significantly influenced the prospects of including the memory of Sheptytsky in the Ukrainian legacy after the collapse of the USSR. Therefore, these two issues will be more broadly discussed below.

Even if one were to assume that—as Subtelny argued—Ukrainian historiography in the Soviet period had a low priority, the same may not be said of the profession of historian as such. Yaroslav Dashkevych noted that in the Soviet Union, graduating with a history degree could be a very good ticket to a career in the structures of Soviet power in Ukraine—especially in the communist party or in the security organs.²⁰

People with an education in Soviet history were predestined to operate on the ideological front, i.e. to participate in the structures responsible for generating symbolic violence and symbolic capital that legitimized the Soviet social order and the ruling regime. Thus, according to Dashkevych, in the Soviet system the profession of historian was a privileged one, provided that the person who performed it agreed to assume the role of “well-paid eulogist of the existing order.”²¹ However, attempting to undertake research on the history of Ukraine, free from ideological dogmas, was very dangerous for historians, as it could result in a ban on practicing, a ban on printing, and other forms of repression.

However, it seems that it was not about an authentic dedication of scientists to certain ideals, but about the readiness to submit to the directives of the communist party and to meet the expectations of its

²⁰ Ярослав Дашкевич, “Дорогами української Клію (про становище історичної науки в Україні),” in: *Україна в минулому*, vol. 8, Київ–Lviv 1996, p. 55.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 54.

leadership concerning the “scientific” justification of the Soviet social order. Indeed, it was about the willingness to give up one’s independence and to accept the totalitarian model of society, all spheres of which (including scientific activity) were controlled and steered by the regime.

Dashkevych emphasized that when selecting research teams in the field of history, particular attention was paid to the political right-mindedness of the candidates.²² This is just another argument that seems to contradict the thesis that history had a low status in Soviet society. However, the problem consisted in its extreme instrumentalization of the profession of historian and the closely related lack of autonomy between the spheres of science and politics.

From the point of view of an observer accustomed to open discourse, independent research, and reliable research based on access to sources, the state of historiography in Soviet Ukraine might have indeed looked catastrophic. “The dogmatism, vulgar sociologism, and primitive economism”²³ characterized historiography throughout the Soviet Union. Interestingly, however, in Ukraine, these phenomena were more deeply entrenched than in other Soviet republics.

It seems that the official and institutionalized intellectual elite of Soviet Ukraine had internalized the rules on which the “culture of the party leadership” was particularly strongly based. There was a specific set of norms, behaviors, and rituals that were obligatory in Soviet scientific life. This was reconstructed by Alexander Gordon,²⁴ according to whom the key role in this unique Soviet paradigm of scientific activity was played by the “authoritarian supra-scientific body,”²⁵ i.e. the communist party.

In the case of the social sciences and humanities, it was not only about establishing the direction of research for scientists and formulating expectations as to their results. Due to the close dependence on the party as a kind of “directive structure,” the scientific community

²² Ibidem, p. 55.

²³ Orest Subtelny, “The Current State...,” p. 35.

²⁴ Ірина Колесник, “Український історик та Влада: точка неповернення,” in: *Історик і влада*, eds. Валерій Смолій, Ірина Колесник, Київ 2016, pp. 44–48.

²⁵ Ibidem, p. 47.

internalized the norms and rules of the party's organizational culture. Its key components were "hierarchical science ('center-periphery' relations); corporate hermeticity; striving to establish a monopoly of one theory, school, and leader; recognition of the party leadership as the highest authority; [and] a nomenklatura model of personnel/staff selection. In this paradigm, ideology became an 'inspiration to act' and played the role of a 'universal methodology.'²⁶ As noted by Subtelny, the circles of historians in Soviet Ukraine reacted particularly reluctantly to new trends and re-evaluations initiated by Gorbachev's *perestroika*.²⁷ Yurii Kondufor, one of the most important representatives of Soviet historiography in Ukraine, wrote about it quite openly in 1988 in the *Ukrainian Historical Journal* (*Український історичний журнал*). The long-time director of the Institute of History of the Academy of Science of Ukraine stated that at the institutional level, resolutions were adopted which, according to the spirit of the times, addressed such challenges as the "sense of responsibility for entrusted matters," "developing an atmosphere of creative criticism and self-criticism," and "striving for discussion, a departure from 'pseudoscientific disputes.'" The heads of research departments were also encouraged to take up new or previously neglected topics. However, all these appeals went unanswered. "Many of us are in agreement that we should boldly and bravely put forward new ideas, strongly renounce scholasticism and schematism, and yet we remain on the well-beaten paths out of habit," said Kondufor.²⁸ He also observed that searching for original works written "in a new way" among the majority of manuscripts submitted for print was in vain. The vast majority of them repeated the usual stereotypes and had the "character of a bygone era."²⁹

²⁶ Ibidem, pp. 46–47.

²⁷ Orest Subtelny, "The Current State...", p. 35.

²⁸ Юрій Кондуфор, "Завдання дальшого розвитку історичних досліджень в Українській РСР у світлі рішень XXVII з'їзду КПРС," *Український історичний журнал* (1988), no. 4(325), p. 7; For more on this issue, see Ірина Колесник, *Інститут історії України: Нове українське відродження*, Київ 2016, pp. 11–70.

²⁹ Юрій Кондуфор, "Завдання дальшого розвитку...", p. 7.

Kondufor concluded that this was because the milieu of historians was “made inert by yesterday’s psychology, outdated views, and dogmas.” Undoubtedly, it was an accurate diagnosis and all the more valuable because the diagnostician was in the very center of the milieu he criticized.

Kondufor’s voice was one of the many of the leading representatives of the official Soviet humanities in Ukraine who tried to formulate a program of action and identify new research areas that would be appropriate to the time of Gorbachev’s *perestroika*.³⁰ All speeches began and ended with quotations and references to the resolutions of the communist party congresses and program speeches by Gorbachev. They confirm the hypothesis that, in the case of Ukraine, the rules that constituted the “culture of the party leadership” until the collapse of the USSR, which had been shaped in previous decades, had a serious impact on the entire historical culture.

This is evidenced by the story of an unpublished monograph in which employees of the Academy of Science of Ukraine History Institute attempted to characterize and “critically analyze” the historiography of a history of Ukraine written by researchers from outside the Soviet Union. The work was to be published in 1989. A report on its content was provided by Yaroslav Dashkevych, who received the manuscript of the monograph for review.³¹

According to the title, the paper was to deal with the works of “non-Marxist” historians. However, this term may be confusing to someone who reads it literally. As Dashkevych noted, the authors took on the research of many different scholars, including those who openly referred to Marxism as the theoretical foundation of their work.³²

³⁰ Іван Курас, “Перебудова та актуальні проблеми вивчення історичного досвіду Компартії України,” *Український історичний журнал* (1989), no. 7(340), pp. 3–17; “Історична наука і сучасність (Матеріали «круглого столу»),” *Український історичний журнал* (1988), no. 8(329), pp. 5–93; Василь Юрчук, “Перебудова і переосмислення історичного досвіду Компартії України,” *Український історичний журнал* (1988), no. 7(328), pp. 9–17.

³¹ Ярослав Дашкевич, “До «перебудови» в українській радянській історіографії (1989 рік),” in: *Україна в минулому*, vol. 9, Kyiv–Lviv 1996, pp. 217–236.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 222.

As it turned out, in this case, the term “non-Marxist” contained a number of encoded additional hidden meanings. First of all, it referred to authors for whom the main point of reference was not “the views standardized for decades by Ukrainian Soviet historiography” and who tried to conduct “their own scientific research.”³³ In other words, these were researchers operating outside the “culture of the party leadership” paradigm. In this context, the Marxist–non-Marxist dichotomy can also be translated as a distinction between “my own” and “foreign.”

It was about a cultural identity, not related to their geographical place of residence. Dashkevych also noted that all historians of Ukrainian origin whose work went beyond the boundaries and patterns set by Soviet historiography were at the same time labeled as “nationalists.”³⁴ It can be assumed that this was not only to disavow the researchers subjected to “critical analysis,” but also to further emphasize their “strangeness.”

Judging by the review, the manuscript fully confirmed all the critical remarks made by the above-mentioned Kondufor about Soviet historians in Ukraine. At the same time, it should be noted that this work was written at the institute in which Kondufor was the director. So, in a sense, he also endorsed it indirectly. On this basis, it could be concluded that in the wider sphere of historical culture, the changes related to *perestroika* and “new thinking” were superficial. Under their influence, the phraseology of public speeches changed somewhat, which played the role of a kind of environmental ritual within the framework of the “culture of the party leadership.” However, there were no deeper, universal re-evaluations of the methodology, researchers skill requirements, or conceptual foundations of the research being conducted.

On the other hand, it is worth noting that the review of this manuscript was entrusted to Dashkevych, who at that time was one of the few “scientific dissidents” and who belonged to the group of “non-Marxist” (in the sense of “foreign”) historians. The work of the Soviet “historiographic mainstream” was to be assessed by a researcher

³³ Ibidem.

³⁴ Ibidem.

of recognized achievements, but for whom there had been no place in any scientific institution in Ukraine for 11 years.³⁵

Dashkevych ruthlessly pointed out the elementary lack of substance with which the work was burdened.³⁶ In conclusion, he stated that “such things in our times clearly cannot be issued anymore.”³⁷ The important thing is that this work did not actually see the light of day. It happened as a result of the review procedure, but this time the criterion of evaluation was neither party directives nor ideological imperatives, but scholarly diligence. On this basis, it can be concluded that within the structure of historical culture in Ukraine on the eve of the collapse of the USSR, some symptoms of the erosion of the “party” paradigm had appeared.

Kondufor, encouraging the community of historians to renew itself from within, referred to the documents from the 26th CPSU Congress in 1986. They contained specific guidelines and expectations of representatives of the Soviet government at the central level. They mentioned the need for “responsible analysis of the past.”³⁸

Moreover, it was noted that “a half-truth which shamefully avoids difficult issues slows down the shaping of real [proper] politics [and hinders] our movement forward.”³⁹ However, it is worth paying attention to how the directives and instructions coming from the center were understood or interpreted by the lower “rung” in the leadership of the communist party in the USSR. In particular, it is about how this “responsible analysis of the past” was imagined.

During the 1988 discussion of *perestroika* in Soviet historiography in Ukraine, the then secretary of the Central Committee of the KPU, Yurii Yelchenko, outlined the tasks facing scientists in history and the social sciences at the time. Among other things, he indicated that “one of the main directions of the historical sciences was and remains

³⁵ Ibidem, p. 220.

³⁶ Ibidem, pp. 221–234.

³⁷ Ibidem, p. 219.

³⁸ Юрій Кондуфор, “Завдання дальшого розвитку...” р. 5.

³⁹ Ibidem.

the fight against the ideologues of anti-communism.” Another challenge, according to Yelchenko, was “the growing ideological struggle on religious and nationalist grounds,”⁴⁰ which could be observed in connection with the millennium of the baptism of Kyivan Rus in 1988. Therefore, according to the secretary of the Central Committee of the KPU, special attention should be paid to “educating young people in a materialistic spirit.”⁴¹

It can be presumed that the phrase “struggle on religious and nationalist grounds” directly referred to the situation where the Greek Catholic Church had been operating underground. However, Yelchenko’s statement should be interpreted somewhat more broadly as an example of how representatives of the Soviet nomenklatura establishment perceived the pre(non)communist legacy as it related to Western Ukraine. From their perspective, it was a threat to the Soviet order.

This view was also shared by Soviet historiographers during this period. Another participant in the aforementioned 1988 discussion and professor of the Institute of History of the USSR was Rem Symonenko, who expressed “concern” in his speech over the tendency to “blur party and class criteria,”⁴² for example, during attempts to redeem the achievements and personality of Mykhailo Hrushevskyyi. As Symonenko noted, Hrushevskyyi’s work contains a wealth of factual material “which should be more widely used by Soviet historians.”⁴³

At the same time, however, he strongly opposed the suggestions to treat the work of the author of *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* as “the foundation for the edifice of a native history”⁴⁴ because, according to him, it was based on “a nationalist concept, a militant desire to separate and contrast the history of the Ukrainian and Russian people, and to prove that they developed in separate ways.” He also found unacceptable

⁴⁰ “Історична наука і сучасність...,” p. 9.

⁴¹ Ibidem.

⁴² Ibidem, p. 34.

⁴³ Ibidem, p. 35.

⁴⁴ Ibidem.

Hrushevski's assumption that "Ukraine has always oriented toward the West."⁴⁵

In support of his criticism of Hrushevskyyi, Symonenko cited the opinion of Yaroslav Halan, an "eminent historian and classic example of Ukrainian Soviet journalism," who said that "the road from Hrushevskyyi to Bandera rezunas is long, but it is the same path."⁴⁶ According to Symonenko, Halan meant to accurately punctuate the meaning of Hrushevski's assertions. It was to be organically linked to the "ideological and political baggage of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism."⁴⁷ This obviously disqualified him, even under the conditions of *perestroika*.

It is worth paying attention to three elements in Symonenko's speech. Firstly, he disagreed with the article printed by the Moscow-wide newspaper *Izvestia*. Symonenko dismissed the article devoted to Hrushevskyyi as "an uncritical panegyric."⁴⁸ Undoubtedly, the redemption of the figure and oeuvre of the author of *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy* meant the violation of a certain intellectual taboo. It can be seen, however, that at least on some issues related to *perestroika* in Ukraine, the Moscow center presented a more liberal approach than the Ukrainian Soviet establishment at the republic level.

Secondly, Symonenko referred to Halan as an expert on "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism." His journalism was an important element of Soviet propaganda against the Ukrainian nationalist underground. Moreover, Halan contributed greatly to the dissemination of negative myths and stereotypes about Sheptytsky. He became one of the main "stars" of the Soviet anti-Greek Catholic propaganda. He was murdered in 1949, allegedly by two UPA fighters.

The memory of this writer, and especially of his mysterious death in 1949, was specifically and consistently exploited by Soviet propaganda. It became one of the key founding myths for Soviet power in

⁴⁵ Ibidem.

⁴⁶ Ibidem.

⁴⁷ Ibidem.

⁴⁸ Ibidem.

former Galicia. It is summarized in the training brochure published by the KGB's Dzerzhinsky Academy in 1963. According to that publication, the "well-known journalist and social activist" who repeatedly stigmatized "the hostile activity of Ukrainian nationalists and the ignorance of the Uniates" was "brutally murdered" by these nationalists "at the direct order of the Vatican."⁴⁹ And thirdly, in the discussions regarding *perestroika* in Ukrainian Soviet historiography, a clear line of changes and re-evaluations was drawn, establishing a kind of insurmountable Rubicon. It ran through all those points in Ukrainian history that were related to real or alleged members of the Ukrainian nationalist movement.

The then director of the Party History Institute at the Central Committee of the KPU, Vasyl Yurchuk, in reference to the need to fill the "blank spots" of the policy of *glasnost*, wrote that "the issues related to the post-war situation in the Western Ukrainian region and the constant struggle with bourgeois-nationalist banditism remain insufficiently explored."⁵⁰

The author emphasized that he meant "a more complete presentation of the sacrifice" with which this fight with the "fierce enemy" was carried out by activists of "the party, Soviet and Komsomol organizations ..., and activists from the local population."⁵¹ A year later, another employee of the aforementioned Institute, Ivan Kuras, again pointed to the need for researchers to focus on "the difficulties associated with establishing Soviet power and the fight against bourgeois-nationalist banditry in the western regions of Ukraine."⁵² At the same time, in his opinion, this topic became particularly relevant in the context of "attempts by some eulogists of the past to rehabilitate the OUN and Banderytes."⁵³ It is clearly visible that the representatives of Ukrainian Soviet

⁴⁹ *Українські буржуазні націоналісти*, eds. Б. Шульженко, І. Хамазюк, В. Данько, Moscow 1963, p. 101.

⁵⁰ Василь Юрчук, "Перебудова і переосмислення...", p. 15.

⁵¹ Ibidem.

⁵² Іван Курас, "Перебудова та актуальні...", p. 13.

⁵³ Ibidem.

historiography were determined to once again update and reproduce the patterns and paradigms that had been used to date in propaganda with regard to such key elements of historical memory as the armed underground and the resistance to Sovietization.

This pre(non)communist legacy was eliminated using various strategies. Initially, i.e., during the Stalinist period, this part of the Ukrainian legacy was attacked by Soviet propaganda, a symbol of which is the figure and journalism of Halan. Subsequently, these issues became a taboo subject. However, in the late 1970s, the stage of calumniating the UPA began.⁵⁴

Trevor Erlacher linked this “dramatic (re)appearance” of the issue of the OUN/UPA in the early 1980s with the growing internal crisis and the sense of helplessness among the Soviet elites, who were unable to adapt “to the new circumstances and revising the increasingly untenable Friendship of the Peoples myth. Instead, the discourse sought to counteract the centrifugal pull of national identity politics by reasserting old tropes.”⁵⁵ In this “traditional” paradigm of the Soviet discourse on Western Ukraine, “UPA veterans were not true Ukrainians because Ukrainians, by definition, were loyal to the Soviet state and their Russian brethren.”⁵⁶ On the other hand, “the UPA posed a posthumous threat to the Soviet order as an alternative, antithetical mythology.”⁵⁷ In the second half of the 1980s, not only UPA veterans, but also all those who operated outside the control of the Soviet government apparatus, including dissident groups, i.e., human rights defenders, were referred to as “Ukrainian nationalists.” This term became a tool of verbally disqualifying opponents of Soviet totalitarianism. It was used widely, not only in debates among Soviet historians.

⁵⁴ Trevor Erlacher, “Denationalizing Treachery: The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Late Soviet Discourse, 1945–85,” *Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia*, 2 (2013), no. 2, p. 291.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem* p. 315.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*.

In July 1989, when the *Ukrainian Historical Journal* was discussing *perestroika* in historiography, a secret KGB internal bulletin was published, called *Ukrainian Nationalists Change Tactics*. It assessed the “operational situation” in the Lviv region at the time.⁵⁸ In the opinion of the authors, it was increasingly influenced by “the influx of ethnic tourism from the USA, Canada, and Germany” and “the proximity of neighboring Poland, where many emigrants from Ukraine lived, sharing the views of the leaders of ‘Solidarity’ and supporting the clerical plans of the Vatican.”⁵⁹

The authors referred to the transformation initiated in Poland, which resulted from a compromise between the communist authorities and representatives of Solidarity, concluded with the so-called Round Table and the Greek Catholic Church’s exodus from the underground, which continued gaining momentum after 1988. KGB analysts published this report at the same time that the dismissed “extremist Ukrainian nationalist leaders” were returning to the Lviv region and engaging in “anti-social activities.” To this end, they united “with reactionary religious activists, who demanded the restoration of the Uniate church in the western regions of Ukraine.”⁶⁰ The context shows that what the authors meant was the dissident community—human rights defenders. At that time, the “Ukrainian Helsinki Union” was being formed among them. In the opinion of KGB analysts, its goal was to “establish Ukrainian statehood by uniting forces on the basis of nationalism and creating an alternative party to the CPSU.” The members of the group were to “speculate with the processes of *glasnost* and democratization” and to use them to “whitewash the Bandera underground” and to promote “bourgeois-nationalist slogans” under the pretext of “protecting cultural heritage, language, and spiritual life.”⁶¹

The authors also listed a number of actions that were taken by various structures of Soviet power in connection with the growing

⁵⁸ И. Самойленко, В. Литвин, “Украинские националисты меняют тактику,” *Сборник КГБ СССР* (1989), no. 134, pp. 31–34.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, p. 32.

popularity of the dissident milieu around the former “Helsinki group.” It is quite characteristic that in addition to the prosecutor’s office, the KGB, and party organizations, “a number of journalists, writers, and historians” were also involved in the action, and “having at their disposal the materials possessed by the KGB, prepared a number of publications characterizing the essence of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, the bestialities of the Bandera underground, etc.”⁶² Interestingly, the *Ukrainian Historical Journal* shortly thereafter presented several previously unknown documents related to the life and work of the most famous critic of Ukrainian nationalists and their alleged victim: Yaroslav Halan. The publication devoted to him appeared under the evocative title: “Yaroslav Halan – a fighter for truth and justice.”⁶³ In the introduction to these source materials, we read that Halan’s work is one of the “greatest treasures of national journalism.”⁶⁴ Once again, this time under the conditions of *perestroika*, this figure was used in the propaganda fight against Ukrainian “bourgeois nationalism.” Importantly, with his publications, Halan also actively supported the struggle that the Soviet authorities undertook against the Catholic Church, and especially against the Greek Catholic Church in the territories incorporated into the USSR in 1945. On this occasion, it is enough to mention his pamphlet, “Father of Darkness and Bier,”⁶⁵ which was to serve the “ideological struggle against the Vatican gangsters,”⁶⁶ or the text, “I spit on the Pope.”⁶⁷ Halan claimed that the Greek Catholic Church was established by the Vatican “as an instrument of the struggle against Orthodoxy and Russianness.”⁶⁸

⁶² Ibidem, p. 34.

⁶³ “Ярослав Галан – борець за правду і справедливість,” *Український історичний журнал* (1990), no. 2(347), pp. 100–107 and *Український історичний журнал* (1990), no. 3(348), pp. 120–123.

⁶⁴ “Ярослав Галан – борець за правду і справедливість,” *Український історичний журнал* (1990), no. 2(347), p. 101.

⁶⁵ “Отець тьми і присні,” in: Ярослав Галан, *Вибрані твори*, Lviv 1976.

⁶⁶ “Ярослав Галан – борець за правду і справедливість,” *Український історичний журнал* (1990), no. 3(348), p. 121.

⁶⁷ “Плюю на папу,” in: Ярослав Галан, *Вибрані твори*, Lviv 1976.

⁶⁸ Paulina Byzdra-Kusz, “Obraz metropolity Andrzeja Szeptyckiego...,” p. 460.

The memory of Metropolitan Sheptytsky was specifically targeted in Halan's journalistic attacks. The accusations he formulated, of having exploited the Ukrainian people and having formed an alliance with Nazi Germany, the OUN, and the UPA in the name of realizing his own personal ambitions, will be repeated for decades by Soviet propaganda and historiography.⁶⁹

It should be noted that exactly at the time when UIZh published texts devoted to the "fighter for truth and justice," Halan, several thousand people gathered in Lviv to hear "for the first time the real word" about Metropolitan Sheptytsky. These two events illustrate quite well two separate and opposing models of historical culture: Soviet and national Ukrainian. As for the memory of Sheptytsky, it is clear that the two could models not be reconciled. Firstly, this is because they created completely contradictory images of the past. Secondly, in the Soviet model, the recipients of the narrative generated by the "hardware" of historical culture were still reduced to the role of passive addressees. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian national model assumed that they were active participants.

In the discourse imposed by the Soviet propaganda, religion and nationalism were seen "as two sides of the same 'reactionary coin.'"⁷⁰ As Trevor Erlacher noted, "the postwar Soviet meta-narrative conflated the OUN with the Ukrainian Catholic Uniate Church in the same way that it conflated Zionism with Judaism." Many texts published in the USSR convinced readers that "OUNites possessed the same 'reactionary worldview' and 'socio-psychological aspect' as the 'clericalism' of the Uniate Church."⁷¹ Erlacher, based on his research on the official Soviet discourse on the Ukrainian independence underground, stated that "historically and discursively, the excision of the UPA went hand-in-hand with the destruction of the Uniate Church. In the Soviet mindset, the Uniates and the 'banderites' were fellow travelers under the 'black banner' of 'international reaction,' beholden to Rome and Washington, the implacable enemies of all

⁶⁹ For more on this topic, see *Ibidem*, pp. 455–480.

⁷⁰ Trevor Erlacher, "Denationalizing Treachery..." p. 309.

⁷¹ *Ibidem*, p. 310.

working people and of Soviet Ukrainians in particular. In this way, the postwar Soviet metanarrative equated the Uniate Church and the OUN/UPA as pernicious manifestations of 'antiscientific irrationalism' while adamantly de-Ukrainizing both through association with malevolent foreign plots."⁷² Erlacher researched the Soviet propaganda discourse based on sources dated from 1945 to 1985. However, in the light of the above-mentioned facts, it can be concluded that the subsequent *perestroika* and *glasnost* did not change much. Under these conditions, the possible rehabilitation of Sheptytsky's legacy would mean the need to verify not only the existing narrative about the metropolitan himself, but would also turn upside down the key paradigms on which the entire Soviet historiography was based, in which Halan still—as it turns out—played the role of an authority. It concerns both the binding "methodological" dogmas, such as the theory of class struggle, and the well-known patterns regarding specific empirical problems (the genesis and course of World War II, the mechanisms of the Sovietization of Western Ukraine and its cultural and social consequences, Ukrainian–Polish and Ukrainian–Jewish relations, and the liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church).

Representatives of the Soviet power structures in Ukraine were determined to prevent this from happening. As it turns out, control over the memory of Sheptytsky was also of practical importance and was directly related to the social and political processes which unfolded during the *perestroika* period. This was the case, for example, during the celebration of the millennium of the baptism of Rus in 1988. At that time, the Holy See intensified its efforts to re-legalize the Greek Catholic Church in the Soviet Union.

In the political dimension, in connection with the exodus of the Greek Catholic Church from the underground, the then position of the party's nomenklatura in the regions of Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil would be undermined. This also applies to the symbolic sphere related to the legitimacy of Soviet power in this area. The so-called pseudo-council of Lviv from 1946 and the liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church by "cancelling" the provisions of the Union

⁷² Ibidem.

of Brest from 1596 were among the most important myths used by the beneficiaries of the new Soviet sociopolitical order in these lands.

The KGB interpreted the efforts to legalize the Greek Catholic Church in terms of the ideological war waged against the USSR by “the enemy’s special services and related clerical-subversive centers.”⁷³ As a result, the KGB initiated a propaganda campaign aimed at dividing the enemy’s camp, that is, “between the leaders of the Uniate and other clerical groups abroad.” This was to be achieved through “an information campaign on the treacherous role of the head of the Uniate Church, Sheptytsky, during the Great Patriotic War.” As part of it, “partly through the channels of the Moscow Patriarchate, documentary materials were delivered to the Vatican, which showed Sheptytsky as the accomplice of fascists.”⁷⁴ In the opinion of the KGB, the action carried out achieved the desired results. It was supposed to provoke “fierce polemics in clerical circles” and to disrupt the émigré circles.⁷⁵ Moreover, in connection with the action taken by the KGB, part of which was discrediting the memory of Sheptytsky, the supremacy of the Catholic Church was to “resign from official support for the disruptive activities of the Uniate Church” in Soviet Ukraine.⁷⁶ The whole matter was described in a secret internal KGB bulletin and, based on the affiliation of its authors (Kyiv), it can be concluded that the “information campaign” about Sheptytsky was carried out at the level of the republican KGB structures.

The decision to re-legalize the Greek Catholic Church had to be made at the highest, central level in Moscow. It happened after Mikhail Gorbachev met Pope John Paul II in December 1989. From the perspective of the Soviet apparatus of power in Ukraine, the decision made in Moscow to re-legalize this Church was as surprising for party historians as the article rehabilitating Hrushevskiy’s image, which appeared in the pages of the Moscow newspaper *Izvestiia*.

⁷³ Н. Василенко, В. Яценко, “Активная контрпропаганда сыграла свою роль,” *Сборник КГБ СССР* (1989), no. 131, p. 15.

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 20.

However, the Soviet authorities consenting to the Greek Catholic Church's emergence from the underground did not mean that the stereotypes about it, shaped by Soviet propaganda and historiography, had become obsolete. The same applied to the figure of Sheptytsky himself. This would require a profound re-evaluation of the hitherto achievements of Ukrainian Soviet historiography, which was formed within the framework of the "culture of the party leadership."

2.3. Pre(non)communist legacy of former Galicia in independent Ukraine

In the political sphere, the emergence of an independent Ukraine was associated with maintaining the continuity of power exercised through the nomenklatura. This also translated into the structure of the Ukrainian memory field after 1991. Admittedly, new constraints appeared within it, among the followers of the "three great ways of writing history." Some tried to continue the previous Soviet patterns (adapting them to new realities), while others remained under the influence of the Soviet national paradigm. Others still tried to write history "in a new way." The first group included "party historians" who renamed themselves "historians of Ukraine."⁷⁷ This circle would control the key institutions related to Ukrainian memory field (e.g., the National Academy of Science of Ukraine [NASU]) for a long time and would retain its influence at the interface between the field of science and the field of power.

Also, Petro Tolochko, the vice-president of the NASU from 1993 to 1998, tried to combine the "old" elements of Soviet historiography with the "new" ones taken from the "national" school. Following these patterns, Tolochko criticized the dogmatism and stereotypical simplifications that could be noted in the "national historical school." At the same time, however, as noted by Tomasz Stryjek, this peculiar pragmatism itself was burdened with "hidden prejudices against representatives

⁷⁷ Ярослав Грицак, "Українська історіографія 1991–2001: десятиліття змін," *Україна Модерна* 9 (2005), p. 46.

of the ‘Galician’ intelligentsia or ‘diaspora patriots.’ Above all, they were considered incapable of going beyond the ethnic understanding of the national idea.”⁷⁸ Therefore, the critical words addressed to Tolochko by one of the leading members of the “Galician intelligentsia,” Dashkevych, should not be surprising.

In the mid-1990s, he pointed out to Tolochko, then vice-president of the NASU, that he kept repeating that “there was no World War II in Ukraine, only the Great Patriotic War,”⁷⁹ and had recently updated Ukrainian history textbooks to disavow being “Galician.”⁸⁰ Moreover, according to Dashkevych, Tolochko was still supposed to portray Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky “as a servant of Hitler.”⁸¹ It can be assumed that although Dashkevych referred to the statements of one specific post-Soviet historiographer, they should be treated as a representative example of a broader phenomenon of the characteristic tension between the historical culture shaped in the Kyiv center and that which functioned on the Galician periphery. On this occasion, one can learn that one source of these tensions was the memory of Metropolitan Sheptytsky.

One more thread is worth quoting among Dashkevych’s critical remarks on Ukrainian post-Soviet historiography. He accused the vice president of the NASU of wanting to institute some kind of “censorship over historians.” Tolochko allegedly demanded that “some authorized commission be established at the Council of Ministers, Verkhovna Rada or with the President, which would control what is happening in the field of historical sciences.”⁸² From the perspective of what has been said so far, the meaning of Tolochko’s postulate can be clarified. It was probably not so much about introducing classical censorship, but about adapting the mechanisms specific to the “culture

⁷⁸ Tomasz Stryjek, *Jakiej przeszłości potrzebuje przyszłość? Interpretacje dziejów narodowych w historiografii i debacie publicznej na Ukrainie 1991–2004*, Warszawa 2007, p. 492.

⁷⁹ Ярослав Дашкевич, “Дорогами української Кліо...,” p. 63.

⁸⁰ Ibidem, p. 63.

⁸¹ Ibidem.

⁸² Ibidem.

of the party leadership” to new conditions. After the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of an independent state, there was no entity that had previously held a managerial role and determined the desired paths of research. There was also no specific process that allowed historians to distinguish between what is “ours” and what is “foreign.” It can be presumed that this lack was particularly felt by the so-called “CPSU historians,” i.e., those whose activities were “most ideologized” and at the lowest level of “professionalism.”⁸³ However, as a medievalist, Tolochko himself did not belong to this group. He is proof that the conviction of the need to maintain harmony between the published results of scientific work and the expectations of the authorities, which is of key importance to the “culture of the party leadership,” was quite common among post-Soviet Ukrainian historiographers.

The establishment of an independent state in 1991 opened a new stage in the development of historical culture in Ukraine, largely determined by the starting conditions that formed in the declining period of the Soviet Union’s existence. Yaroslav Hrytsak stated that if the “starting conditions” of historiography in different post-communist countries were compared, the Ukrainian case “would look quite unique.”⁸⁴ In his opinion, “such a mixture of isolation, provincialism, and numerous taboos, which concerned not only contemporary but also past history, cannot be found in any other historiography, perhaps except for that of Belarus.”⁸⁵ Obviously, it was the legacy left behind after the Soviet period which was determined by the “culture of the party leadership.” It can be assumed that the rules and patterns contained therein remained valid after 1991 as well. After all, the “hardware” of the Ukrainian historical culture and public discourse on the past were dominated by researchers who combined elements of the “old” Soviet and “new” national paradigm (or new national phraseology), and thus adapted to the new situation.⁸⁶ In this way, they responded to the needs

⁸³ Ярослав Грицак, “Українська історіографія...,” p. 46.

⁸⁴ Ibidem, p. 63.

⁸⁵ Ibidem.

⁸⁶ Вадим Бондар, “Сучасна українська історіографія: підсумки і виклики,” *Історіографічні дослідження в Україні* 25 (2014), p. 97.

of the new government officials in Ukraine, who also had to reconcile their nomenklatura past and related experience with the new role as leaders of an independent state.

The source of the privileged position of these particular researchers, who developed their position in Ukrainian historiography during the Soviet period, was not so much the real value of their achievements as the experiences and interests they had in common with the new ruling elites. As it turned out, it was not enough to monopolize one's influence over the shape of historical culture in post-Soviet Ukraine.

As Yaroslav Hrytsak wrote, a “critical mass of independent historians, independent institutions, and independent publishers” was forming at the same time. They became an important element of the civil society that was taking shape in Ukraine and one which the authorities evolving toward authoritarianism had to account for. Hrytsak assessed in 2004—probably on the eve of the Orange Revolution—that as a result, in addition to the members of the “official establishment” dependent on this power, “a significant number of historians” appeared, thanks to whom “the opposition is penetrating into state academic institutions, creating enclaves of intellectual freedom there.”⁸⁷ This independent segment, which in Ukrainian conditions simultaneously means non-governmental, includes agents such as the Research Center for the Ukrainian Liberation Movement (Lviv) and the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies. From the point of view of the topic under consideration, the most important of these actors were the Ukrainian Catholic University and the milieu of historians, archivists, and publishing houses related to the Greek Catholic Church.

On the surface, it might seem that the conditions which arose should have favored the democratization of memory in Ukraine. However, the price for the independence of non-governmental actors was alienation from the official historiographic mainstream and opposition from the ruling elite. Consequently, the pluralism that could be observed in the discourse on the past and the memory of the past was only apparent. In general, if there was any memory policy of the Ukrainian

⁸⁷ Ярослав Грицак, “Українська історіографія...” р. 67.

state between 1991 and 2005, it was created mainly by agents implementing a strategy of “mnemonic abnegator.” A kind of special “pragmatism” prevailed at that time. According to its patterns, the problems posed by the tensions between the communist and pre(non)communist legacies were ignored.

It is worth noting that “Kuchma made some concessions to national democrats,” since he sought their support in domestic politics. Therefore, it was during his term that “Holodomor commemorations were added to the official calendar.”⁸⁸ Moreover, Kuchma erected a “special governmental commission for examination and assessment of the history of the OUN-UPA.” Although it might seem to be another example of the vitality of “the culture of the party leadership,” in the end the “concluding report of the commission addressed controversial issues such as the situational alliance with Nazi Germany, and strove to do so in a non-partisan manner, avoiding the stereotypes and biases of the standard Soviet and heroic narratives alike.”⁸⁹ Thanks to this, as Yurchuk aptly noted, “the commission’s work constituted an important step toward contemporary European practices of coming to terms with the past and set clear limits on the reclamation of the past paradigm within which the national democrats operated.”⁹⁰ However, at the same time, Kuchma’s activities “did not touch the foundations of the Soviet commemorative culture.”⁹¹ After the Orange Revolution, President Yushchenko dropped the ambivalent memory policy of his predecessor and more openly turned toward the pre(non)communist legacy and to a strategy of mnemonic warrior.

One of the elements of this strategy was the commemoration of Roman Shukhevych and Stepan Bandera. Moreover, Yushchenko’s historical policy was in line with the process of defining the true

⁸⁸ Yuliya Yurchuk, “Reclaiming the Past, Confronting the Past: OUN–UPA Memory Politics and Nation Building in Ukraine (1991–2016),” in: *War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus*, eds. Julie Fedor, Markku Kangaspuro, Jussi Lassila, Tatiana Zhurzhenko, London 2017, p. 116.

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 117.

⁹⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁹¹ *Ibidem*.

meaning of Ukrainian independence and sovereignty. It might seem after 1991 that it was initially a simple consequence of the collapse of the USSR. The events related to the Orange Revolution showed that Ukraine's sovereignty is not a straightforward matter. It has rather become a challenge in the face of Russia's neo-imperial policy. It was during Yushchenko's term in office that the Kremlin began to promote the concept of "Russkiy mir" as a justification for its ambitions to regain control over the post-Soviet area.⁹² One of the main elements of this concept was the dogma of unity between Russian and Ukrainian civilization and culture. In practice, this meant contesting Ukrainian sovereignty.

Yushchenko's turn toward the heritage associated with the figures of Shukhevych and Bandera can be read as a reaction to the symbolic violence connected to the propaganda of the "Russkiy mir" in Ukraine. It is also worth noting because it was the first politically motivated attempt to include significant "Galician" elements of historical memory in the structure of the all-Ukrainian memory field. In effect, however, it actualized constraints inside the Ukrainian memory that reflected the new dividing line running through the power elite and separating the supporters from the opponents of "Russkiy mir's" claim to Ukraine. It was partially correlated with the existing cultural divisions in Ukrainian society. The propaganda of the "Russkiy mir" addressed that part of Ukrainian society that was more Russified and Sovietized.

After the defeat in the presidential election of 2004, supporters of the pro-Russian option gradually regained their lost positions. The culmination of this process was the victory of the formal leader of this camp, Victor Yanukovich, in the presidential election of 2010. It is no coincidence that soon afterward, his predecessor's acts on the commemoration of Shukhevych and Bandera were rescinded.⁹³ Soon afterward, an initiative appeared at the Verkhovna Rada forum to commemorate Halan at the state level. The draft of the relevant resolution was

⁹² Valentina Feklyunina, "Soft Power and Identity: Russia, Ukraine and the 'Russian World(s)'" *European Journal of International Relations*, 22 (2016), no. 4, pp. 781–783.

⁹³ "У Бандери остаточно відібрали героя," <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2011/01/12/5774855/>.

submitted by Oleksandr Holub—a member of the Communist Party of Ukraine.⁹⁴ The Verkhovna Rada and the Parliamentary Committee for Culture and Spirituality issued a negative opinion on the proposal.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, it was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on July 5, 2012. In connection with the 110th anniversary of his birth, Halan was to be commemorated as an “anti-fascist writer” who “exposed the bourgeois-nationalist and clerical reaction.”⁹⁶ It was assumed that the Ministry of Education and Science and the State Radio and Television Committee, among others, would be involved in commemorating Halan. However, there were no commemorative actions significant to Ukrainian mnemonic field. In fact, the adopted document was nothing special in and of itself. Every year, the Verkhovna Rada adopts many resolutions concerning the commemoration of various anniversaries and jubilees. It was a ritual rather than a manifestation of some coordinated politics of remembrance.

However, this resolution had its own, very specific context. It was part of the key political conflict in Ukraine between the supporters of the pro-independence and the pro-Russian factions. Both sides of the dispute referred to different symbolic capital. Representatives of the independence faction more and more openly addressed the heritage of the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Thus, when the law awarding Stephan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych the title of “hero of Ukraine” was revoked, protests against the decision emerged from a number of local self-government bodies in western Ukraine.⁹⁷ The resolution to commemorate the fighter of “fascism and Ukrainian

⁹⁴ “Постанова Верховної ради України «Про відзначення 110-річчя з дня народження видатного українського письменника-антифашиста Ярослава Олександровича Галана,” <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5109-VI#Text>.

⁹⁵ “Про проект Постанови Про відзначення 110-річчя з дня народження видатного українського письменника-антифашиста Ярослава Олександровича Галана,” http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_2?pf3516=10277&skl=7.

⁹⁶ “Пояснювальна записка,” http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_2?pf3516=10277&skl=7.

⁹⁷ “Депутати Львівщини: ‘Бандера та Шухевич є і будуть Героями,” <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2011/01/13/5779784/>; “Бандера став почесним громадянином Луцька,” <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2010/12/18/5689649/>.

bourgeois nationalism,” Yaroslav Halan, adopted by the Verkhovna Rada by deputies from the pro-Russian factions of the Party of Regions and the CPU was a specific response to these protests.

This example shows how extensively and how easily the problems related to the past and its memory can be exploited to achieve short-term political goals. There is no doubt that across the different regions of Ukraine, there are different paradigms of thinking about the past. This results in various constraints within Ukrainian memory field. However, this does not mean that these differences in themselves must lead to conflicts that will have a negative impact on relations within the Ukrainian political community. However, this certainly happens when these differences are exploited as part of the processes taking place in the structures of power (for example, as a tool to combat political opponents or a means of legitimizing power).

Oleksandr Udod pointed to the key importance of academic autonomy, the deficit of which in Ukraine results not only from “administrative pressures,” but also from “the readiness of the collective body of professional historians to cooperate on an opportunistic basis at the expense of academic freedom and contrary to moral principles and academic solidarity.”⁹⁸ Undoubtedly, a very good point of reference for a discussion about the possible consequences of state interference on academic freedom was the issue of the so-called decommunization laws from 2015. However, the way in which Udod cited specific regulations of these laws leads to the conclusion that, in fact, he did not know them very well. For example, he claims that the Law “On condemning the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes and Prohibiting the Propagation of their Symbols” includes a catalog of entities recognized as fighters for Ukraine’s independence.⁹⁹ In fact, they are included in a separate act devoted to these issues (Law “On the Legal Status and Honoring of the Memory of the Fighters for the Independence of Ukraine in the 20th Century”).

⁹⁸ Олександр УДОД, “Історична політика та академічна свобода істориків: вітчизняні стереотипи і світовий досвід,” *Історіографічні дослідження в Україні* 28 (2018), p. 234.

⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 236.

Also contrary to the content of this legal act, Udod stated that the legislature had established a closed list of fighters for independence.¹⁰⁰ Meanwhile, the act clearly states that this catalog “may also include” other organizations, structures, and formations that existed during the 20th century (until August 24, 1991) whose purpose was to win (regain) or defend the independence of Ukraine.”¹⁰¹ Therefore, it is an open catalog. Indeed, the Ukrainian legislature stipulated that the list of these additional entities was approved by the Council of Ministers of Ukraine. This provision fits quite well into the characteristic post-communist model of a vertical relationship, with state authority at the top. However, the formal and legal provisions are not as important to its functionality in practice as the informal rules that organize the “collective body of professional historians” from the inside. As Udod himself stated, one of them is opportunism. Under these conditions, it can be assumed that the lack of further, in-depth research on the history of the Ukrainian independence movement results from the absence of a clear demand on the part of the authorities, and not from some legally sanctioned restrictions.

The specific way of understanding the relationship between the sphere of science (especially in historiography) and the sphere of politics (power structures) inherited from the “culture of the party leadership” remains valid. This hypothesis is confirmed by the introductory remarks in the monograph *The Historian and the Government*, which was published in 2016 by the Institute of History of the NASU. It was written by Valerii Smolii, who has been the director of the Institute of History of the NASU since 1993. Due to his position and his seniority in it, his voice can be considered representative of at least some Ukrainian historians.

Valerii Smolii argues that “the historian and the authority ... cannot exist separately or independently without influencing each other.”¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Ibidem, p. 237.

¹⁰¹ “Закон України ‘Про правовий статус та вшанування пам’яті борців за незалежність України у XX столітті,’” article 1, point 20, <http://www.golos.com.ua/article/254977>.

¹⁰² Валерій Смолій, “Вступне слово Редактора,” in: *Історик і влада*, eds. Валерій Смолій, Ірина Колесник, Київ 2016, p. 6.

Moreover, “power cannot exist without a historian, chronicler, and translator of its actions.” Smolii delivered an unequivocally negative assessment of the conditions in which historians had to function during the Soviet period.¹⁰³ He also emphasized the positive impact of the *perestroika* period, when the restrictions began to disappear and, most importantly, “new ideas, thoughts, and methods were introduced, thanks to which the historian gained freedom of choice and freedom in his professional activity.”¹⁰⁴ All this was supposed to bring about fundamental changes “in the relations between the historian and the authorities.”¹⁰⁵ According to Smolii, “the most important achievement of our times is that when working with the authorities, the contemporary Ukrainian historian does not feel the former oppression, be it ideological or administrative.”¹⁰⁶ As it turns out, this is quite a unique understanding of academic freedom. Admittedly, the historian is completely free to choose what he wants to offer to “the authority.” However, the relationship with this “authority” is still an important context for his work. Moreover, freedom of choice understood in this way also has its limitations, because “contemporary historians have a responsibility and a mission to outline the past and present of Ukraine as a developed and worthy European state, an independent player in the international arena, equal to others in the realm of geopolitics.” According to Smolii, the task of the historian is to “shape new images of the homeland’s past, create a pantheon of national heroes, and verify the assessments of events related to both the recent and distant past.”¹⁰⁷ Smolii notes that under the present conditions of “political instability, hybrid and information warfare, and memory wars,” a new field for cooperation between the historian and “power structures” has been created.¹⁰⁸ However, in Ukraine, this cooperation is particularly asymmetrical. The historian

¹⁰³ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁵ Ibidem, p. 7.

¹⁰⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁷ Ibidem, p. 8.

¹⁰⁸ Ibidem, p. 7.

should guess what the authority expects (and what is not desired) and should treat these expectations as a determinant for scholarly work. Perhaps this is why Udod came to the conclusion that because one of the “decommunization laws” included a catalog of freedom fighters, “the possibility of further scientific research and publishing activities and the existence of different points of view” in this field had been ruled out.¹⁰⁹ Such an interpretation may testify to the persistence of certain elements of unarticulated knowledge having been inherited by Ukrainian historiographers from the “culture of the party leadership.”

¹⁰⁹ Олександр УДОД, “Історична політика...,” р. 237.

CHAPTER 3

SHEPTYTSKY'S LEGACY AND MEMORY OF THE HOLOCAUST

The first part of this chapter is devoted to Sheptytsky's relations with members of the Jewish community in Galicia before World War II. In general, Ukrainian–Jewish relations are an important part of Ukrainian cultural memory. This is especially true of the memory of Sheptytsky. The subsequent part of the chapter covers the attitude of the Metropolitan of Halych during the Holocaust. The bulk of this part of the book is devoted to contemporary assessments of this attitude. This thread is of particular importance for the development of the collective memory of Sheptytsky, not only in Ukraine.

Many agents took action to commemorate the role that Sheptytsky played during the Holocaust. These activities were studied in order to reconstruct the main strategies on which they were based. The agents can be grouped into three levels: the individual non-state level, the non-state institution level, and the state institution level. Agents and their strategies at each level are assessed separately.

3.1. Before and during the Holocaust

Metropolitan Sheptytsky was an outstanding figure who established Ukrainian–Jewish relations in Eastern Galicia before the disaster of World War II.¹ As the supreme hierarch of the Ukrainian Greek

¹ For more on the issue of Ukrainian–Jewish relations in Galicia, see John-Paul Himka, “Ukrainian–Jewish Antagonism in the Galician Countryside During

Catholic Church in the years 1901–1944, he maintained and initiated contact with the Ukrainian Jewish community in Lviv, letters to which were found by David Kahane in Metropolitan Sheptytsky's archives. For instance, the Greek Catholic Archbishop supported poor Jews financially so that they could have matzo before Passover.²

In September 1936, a long interview with Bishop Ivan Buchko appeared in the Jewish journal *Chwila*. Since he was one of Sheptytsky's close associates, their views on relations with Jews in everyday social life were obviously similar. Bishop Buchko was very critical of anti-Semitism. He even referred to himself as a supporter of Jews and expressed his admiration for Talmud and Jewish culture. Bishop Buchko rejected stereotypes concerning Jewish mass participation in the communist movement that were fostered by anti-Semitic circles. On the contrary, the bishop emphasized that communist ideas did not suit the "individualistic character" of the Jewish identity and might attract only a few individuals from the underclass. However, Father Buchko stated that in these cases the involvement of Jews in the communist movement stemmed from their hopeless social situation and not from any extraordinary features of the Jewish mentality. With regard to boycotting goods sold by Jews, Father Buchko said that everyone had the right to buy products where they wanted, but he condemned acts of violence against merchants. He concluded that fighting anti-Semitism is like fighting anti-Christianity. The interview with the Greek Catholic clergyman Ivan Buchko focused on his pro-Semitic attitude and opinions, which were well received by the editor.³ After the outbreak of

the Late Nineteenth Century Ukrainian," in: *Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, eds. Howard Aster, Peter J. Potichnyj, Edmonton 1990, pp. 111–159; Yaroslav Tynchenko, "The Jewish Formations of Western Ukraine in the Civil War," in: *Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry*, vol. 26: *Jews and Ukrainians*, eds. Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, Antony Polonsky, Oxford–Portland 2014, pp. 197–212; Taras Kurylo, "The 'Jewish Question' in the Nationalist Discourse of the Inter-War Period," in: *Ibidem*, pp. 233–258; Alezander J. Motyl, "The Ukrainian Nationalist Movement and the Jews: Theoretical Reflections on Nationalism, Fascism, Rationality, Primordialism and History," in: *Ibidem*, pp. 275–296.

² David Kahane, *Lvov Ghetto Diary*, Amherst 1990, pp. 122–123.

³ "Єпископ І. Бучко проти антисемітизму," *Діло* (1936), no. 14.459, pp. 5–6, <https://libraria.ua/numbers/192/19593/>.

World War II in 1939, Eastern Galicia and Lviv together with Northern Bukovina and Trans-Carpathia became part of the Ukrainian SSR. The Soviet authorities started closing down Greek Catholic monasteries and imprisoning clergymen, monks and nuns. The Greek Catholic Church was strange for the Soviet soldiers. The representatives of two large denominations, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky and Rabbi Jecheskiel Lewin, exchanged secret correspondence and discussed the issue of protecting their communities against the anti-religious campaign.⁴

After the German attack on the USSR of 22 June 1941, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists led by Stepan Bandera proclaimed “the renewal of the Ukrainian state”⁵ and the establishment of a Ukrainian government in Lviv; this was opposed by the Germans. Sheptytsky supported this initiative. However, he was not conscious of all circumstances related to this event.⁶ With the German occupation came pogroms against Jews. According to J.-P. Himka “the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Stepan Bandera provided the engine of the pogrom”⁷ in Lviv. However, it was the Germans who created favorable conditions for the outbreak of publicly mistreating Jews and who “lined them up and shot them, both during and after the pogrom.”⁸ According to the survivors, four to ten thousand Lviv Jews were killed between 30 June and 10 July 1941.⁹

⁴ Юліан Бусганг, *Митрополит Шептицький. Ще один погляд на життя і діяльність*, Lviv 2009, p. 25.

⁵ *ОУН у 1941 році. Документи в 2-х ч.*, vol. 1, ed. Станіслав Кульчицький, Kyiv 2006, pp. 250–251.

⁶ John-Paul Himka, “Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky and the Holocaust...” p. 340.

⁷ John-Paul Himka, “The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crown,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 53 (2011), no. 2–4, p. 243.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ Юліан Бусганг, *Митрополит Шептицький...*, p. 26. For more on this issue, see Kai Struve, *Deutsche Herrschaft, ukrainischer Nationalismus, antijüdische Gewalt. Der Sommer 1941 in der Westukraine*, Berlin–Boston–Oldenbourg 2015.

On 1 July 1941, Archbishop Sheptytsky was visited by Rabbi Jecheskiel Lewin, who was the grandson of Isaac Schmelkes, a rabbi respected by orthodox Jewish milieus. They were indignant with Jecheskiel Lewin when he took over the rabbinate of the Reform Synagogue in Lviv in 1928, which was presided over by him until his death in 1941.¹⁰ During the meeting, Rabbi Lewin told the metropolitan about the pogroms in the streets and asked him to convince the Ukrainians to stop the violence. The rabbi declined the metropolitan's offer to hide in his palace as he wanted to be with his people. On his way back from the palace, he was captured and killed by Germans on the same day.¹¹

However, in this context it is worth to recall the letter Andrey Sheptytsky wrote to Apostolic Nuncio Angelo Rotta in Budapest in 1941 about the consequences of Soviet occupation, one could see that he considered communists and Jews to have close relations. He thought young communists and Jews immigrating from Russia had a bad influence on Ukrainian schoolchildren, who nonetheless grew strong in Greek Catholic faith and religion. "Instances of apostasy among the youth have been rare, regardless of the bad example set by young communists and Jews immigrating from Russia." According to the metropolitan's Eparchy, the effects of implementing communist ideology there had been "systematic demoralization of children" and "cruel hostility towards everything related to Christian morality."¹² The metropolitan's opinion demonstrated the popular view that the Jews participated in the creation of communist system.

Soon after Lviv was occupied, the metropolitan's attitude towards the German occupation changed drastically. At first, he invested his hope in the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state with the approval of the Germans, who were not ideologically against religion.

¹⁰ "Lewin Jecheskiel," in: *Polski Słownik Judaistyczny*, http://www.jhi.pl/psj/Lewin_Jecheskiel.

¹¹ Юліан Бусганг, *Митрополит Шептицький...*, pp. 26–27.

¹² "Лист митр. Андрея Шептицького до нунція Ротти в Будапешті про наслідки більшовицької окупації," in: *Митрополит Андрей Шептицький. Життя і діяльність. Документи і Матеріали 1899–1944*, vol. 2, part 2, ed. Андрій Кравчук, Lviv 1999, p. 939.

He changed his mind after observing how a German-occupied country functioned. Metropolitan Sheptytsky wrote a letter to Pope Pius XII in August 1942, in which he described the transition from Soviet to German occupation, which, in his opinion, had only initially seemed like an improvement.¹³ Metropolitan Sheptytsky opposed crime, violence, and killing Jews, as is indicated by his letters to worshippers: “About Mercy”¹⁴ of July 1942 and “Do Not Kill”¹⁵ of November 1942. However, instead of referring to the Jewish minority specifically, he spoke generally about mercy and not hurting one’s fellow men.¹⁶ Moreover, metropolitan Sheptytsky organized and coordinated an underground structure that saved Lviv Jews. This network was able to save about one hundred and fifty people by hiding them in St. George’s Cathedral and the Monastery of the Studite Order in Lviv.¹⁷

3.2. Memory of the Holocaust and commemoration of Sheptytsky

It is no coincidence that commemorative activities related to Sheptytsky gained new dynamics in connection with “Euromaidan.” The Holocaust thread in Sheptytsky’s legacy was of particular importance. It binds and integrates the activities of various actors—both institutionalized and non-institutionalized as well as from the non-governmental and governmental level. When it comes to the time of the breakthrough related to the “Revolution of Dignity,” first of all, the initiatives undertaken by the UGCC, the Ukrainian Jewish Encounter and state

¹³ Ibidem, pp. 982–986.

¹⁴ “Пастырське послання митр. Андрея Шептицького до духовенства і вірних ‘Про милосердя’” in: *Митрополит Андрей Шептицький. Життя і Дяльність. Документи і Матеріали 1899–1944*, vol. 2, part 2, ed. Андрій Кравчук, Lviv 1998, pp. 243–259.

¹⁵ “Пастырське послання митр. Андрея Шептицького ‘Не убий,’” in: Ibidem, pp. 259–268.

¹⁶ Юліан Бусганг, *Митрополит Шептицький...*, pp. 29–31.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 31.

authorities should be mentioned here. However, in order to better capture the place of the Holocaust with respect to the memory of Sheptytsky, this thread should be considered in a broader time perspective, not limited to events directly related to “Euromaidan.”

A central issue of the Ukrainian history policy “has been—ever since Yushchenko’s presidency, with a short regression during Yanukovych’s term, and a triumphant comeback in 2014—constructing a positive image of the UPA as an organization which fought for Ukraine’s independence, and the chief World War II indicator of Ukraine’s separation from Russia as the heir of the Soviet Union.”¹⁸ Thus, activities of the main domestic agents of the politics of memory did not facilitate a coming to terms with the memory of the Holocaust in Ukraine. The promoters of the positive myth of Ukrainian integral nationalism were accused of “a one-sided attempt to whitewash controversial aspects of history of Ukrainian nationalism.”¹⁹ On the one hand agents responsible for this direction of the memory politics “showed little interest in a more critical approach.” However, on the other hand this criticism was backed by the agents spreading pro-Russian and Soviet-nostalgic propaganda. Thus it “had little in common with European practices of ‘coming to terms with the past,’ which call for a non-ideological approach based on grounded historical research and education.”²⁰ Sheptytsky’s legacy offers an opportunity to find a way to deal with conflicts related to the memory of the Holocaust in Ukraine and in Eastern Europe. However, it does not provide easy solutions. This legacy is more of a challenge for mnemonic warriors from both warring sides to overcome.

¹⁸ Anna Wylęgała, “Managing the Difficult Past...,” p. 788. For more on this issue, see Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, “Debating, Obfuscating and Disciplining the Holocaust: Post-Soviet Historical Discourses on the OUN–UPA and Other Nationalist Movements,” *East European Jewish Affairs* 42 (2012), no. 3, pp. 199–241.

¹⁹ Yuliya Yurchuk, “Reclaiming the Past, Confronting the Past...,” p. 123.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 124.

3.2.1. Individual non-state level: the Holocaust survivors

Sheptytsky's role in saving Lviv Jews was considered major, both by the Ukrainians, as well as by a part of the Jewish community, particularly those who were saved and their families. However, certain discrepancies related to the perception this figure occur at the meeting point of the Yad Vashem Institute's historical remembrance and the circle of people interested in granting the title of "Righteous among the Nations" to Andrey Sheptytsky.

The correspondence between Boaz Apelbaum (the Director of the Prime Minister's Office in the State of Israel) and Yakov Suslensky²¹ (the president of the "Association for Jewish-Ukrainian Contacts") shows the former's ambivalent attitude towards Archbishop Andrey Sheptytsky and the issue of awarding him the title of "Righteous." On the one hand, he writes that the activity of the metropolitan is "renowned"²² and "deserves high praise"²³ and states that his "name will be eternally remembered among those 'Righteous Gentiles'"²⁴ (non-Jews), who opposed killing Israelites during the Holocaust and played an active role in saving them. On the other hand, Yad Vashem found the conduct of Greek Catholic believers, who "destroyed tens of thousands of Jews,"²⁵ contrary to Sheptytsky's attitude and considers him to blame. A dichotomous approach is also expressed in Boaz Apelbaum's letter, in which he writes that "On the one side there is the desire to recognize the renowned personal activity of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, and on the other hand—not to remove the blame from the murderers, the members of his church."²⁶

21 For more on this topic, see "Сусленський Яків Михайлович," <http://archive.khpg.org/index.php?id=1330355816>.

22 Boaz Apelbaum, in a copy of a letter to Y. Suslensky, written at the Office of the Prime Minister, related to his efforts of granting recognition to the Metropolitan 6/06/1985, File JKS-MA 3.36., Sheptytsky Family Archive.

23 Ibidem.

24 Ibidem.

25 Ibidem.

26 Ibidem.

Another letter related to the figure of Andrey Sheptytsky and his attitude towards the Jews during the Holocaust in former Eastern Galicia is Yad Vashem's reply to Yakov Suslensky, with a commentary on the latter's standing. The Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority presents the rightness of the Institute's standing, trying to reason him away from some concepts.²⁷

In the first paragraph of the letter, Yad Vashem stated that Sheptytsky had helped save many Jews, some of them directly, others through instructions given to Greek Catholic clergymen. However, the letter also said that some Jewish children who had been helped were under a lot of pressure to convert to Greek Catholicism, as had been discovered shortly before the letter was written (23.01.1986).²⁸

Furthermore, it was recalled that Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky welcomed Germans as Ukraine's liberators from Soviet rule. Yad Vashem presented the view that after witnessing German's brutality towards the Jews in 1943, the hierarch changed his attitude and saw Nazism as worse than Communism.²⁹ Another controversial issue for the Israeli party that was touched upon by the Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority is the Ukrainian national movement, for whom the metropolitan was a great figure. However, he was also associated with the figures of Melnyk and Bandera, who were referred to as Nazis' accomplices in murdering Jews.³⁰

Yad Vashem stated that Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky represented more than his name: he also represented a symbol—an important figure in the history of the Ukrainian national movement and the hero of Ukrainian emigrants in the West.³¹ Together with presenting its position on the issue of the Greek Catholic hierarchy, the Israeli Institute informed that the Commission for the Designation of the Righteous had debated the Sheptytsky candidature in detail and had

²⁷ Dr. Mordecai Paldiel, Yad Vashem, Letter to Jacob Suslensky, Jerusalem 23/01/1986, File JKS-MA 3.36., Sheptytsky Family Archive.

²⁸ *Ibidem.*

²⁹ *Ibidem.*

³⁰ *Ibidem.*

³¹ *Ibidem.*

so far decided not to grant him the title posthumously. Dr. Mordecai Paldiel, Director of the Department for the Righteous, writing on behalf of Yad Vashem, maintained that the issue of awarding Metropolitan Sheptytsky the title of Righteous was full of controversy and that it would be wiser to let future generations announce the final verdict.³² When discussing the issue of granting the Greek Catholic archbishop the title “Righteous Among the Nations” it is worth mentioning Kurt Levin’s opinion, found in his correspondence with Shimon Peres, the Prime Minister of the State of Israel, of 25 July 1986.³³ Kurt Levin was the son of Lviv rabbi Jecheskiel Lewin, who was executed by Germans in Brygidki prison on 1 July 1941. He and his brother Natan were given shelter in Greek Catholic monasteries under the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Sheptytsky and survived the war.³⁴

In his letter, Kurt Levin made a reference to the aforementioned correspondence between B. Apelbaum, and Y. Suslensky, suggesting that the formal investigation conducted by Yad Vashem in the case of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky had been subject to manipulation and the conclusions reached by the Commission for the Designation of the Righteous were surprising. The author of the letter presents himself as a Holocaust survivor, a veteran of the fight for Jerusalem, Bab al-Wad and Negev in 1947, organizer of illegal immigration of Holocaust survivors after World War II, and a person with broad knowledge of Israeli and Holocaust issues and the policy towards survivors. He expressed deep concern about the politicization of the Holocaust Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Authority. Kurt Levin states that the history of the Sheptytsky brothers—Andrey, the Metropolitan, and Klymentiy, who was a hegumen, is unique and well documented. In his opinion, treating this case superficially and drawing ill-considered conclusions is insulting for the survivors and raises questions about the principles of the Yad Vashem institution.³⁵

³² Ibidem.

³³ Kurt Levin, copy of a letter to Shimon Peres, New York 25/07/1986, File JKS-MA 3.36., Sheptytsky Family Archive.

³⁴ Курт Левін, *Мандрівка кризь ілюзій*, Lviv 2007.

³⁵ Kurt Levin, copy of a letter to Shimon Peres, op. cit.

As far as the discussion of granting the Greek Catholic Archbishop the title of Righteous is concerned, a firm statement was made by the “Association for Jewish–Ukrainian Contacts,” articulated in a collective letter from over 100 Jews entitled “To the most influential newspapers In the Word.” On behalf of the organization, which at that time comprised four hundred people, and many other supporters, the authors of the letter expressed the view that Andrey Sheptytsky, the primate of the Greek Catholic Church, should be granted the title “Righteous Among the Nations” for his “great humanity and courage demonstrated by saving many Jews during the period of Nazi terror in Ukraine.”³⁶ At the same time, they appealed to the addressees to influence their readers, the Israeli public, and the government, adding that the association had used all the avenues known to it in Israel to obtain a positive decision in that matter. These actions included gathering convincing testimonies and documentation that concerned saving a lot of Jews and were related to the metropolitan, his brother Klymentiy, and other members of Greek Catholic clergy that were subordinate to them. This was also achieved by way of meetings with Jews who had found refuge in the metropolitan’s palace and with those who had been researching his saving of Israelites. One thousand five hundred people expressed their support for Metropolitan Sheptytsky being granted the title “Righteous” for the action he took to save Israelites. The association appealed through public opinion, conducted discussions, and exchanged opinions with Yitzhak Arad, the Director of Yad Vashem, Moshe Beiski, the Chairman of the Commission for the Designation of the Righteous, Rabbi Dr. David Kahane, Dr. Arie Bauminger, as well as other members of the Commission and Yad Vashem employees the Director of the Department of the Righteous Among the Nations Dr. Mordecai Paldiel, Dr. Shmuel Spektor and Dr. Aharon Weiss, and even with renowned politicians, such as Prime Minister Shimon Peres and former President Itzhak Navon.³⁷

³⁶ “To the Most Influential Newspapers In the World,” collective letter from over 100 Jews, File JKS-MA 3.36., Sheptytsky Family Archive.

³⁷ *Ibidem*.

The association emphasized that it had not been their aim to discredit Yad Vashem and its country's government. Nevertheless, the members of the association felt offended by the way Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky had been treated, i.e. the fact that the application for granting him the title of Righteous Among the Nations had been under review for almost 25 years and the Commission had analyzed this issue about 20 times, which makes it a precedent in the history of Yad Vashem.³⁸ The aforementioned discussion between the Yad Vashem Institute, the Israeli government and people involved in the issue of granting Greek Catholic Archbishop the title "Righteous Among the Nations," including the representatives of the "Association for Jewish-Ukrainian Contacts," is complemented by the commentary of Yakov Suslensky, who played an active role in the case and wrote on behalf of the said organization. At the beginning, the Chairman of the association specified certain definitions and criteria to improve the dialogue between him and the Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority.

Dr. Paldiel, writing on behalf of the institute, put forward the following thesis: "Sheptytsky was instrumental in saving the lives of many Jews; some directly by him; most—through instructions he gave to the clergy of his church."³⁹ Yakov Suslensky stated that such a judgment and information should suffice to consider the Metropolitan as "Righteous" as the Yad Vashem criterion is as follows: "saved even one single Jew during the years of Nazi German rule at the risk one's life and without material reward."⁴⁰ He continues that Sheptytsky's case meets this criterion and even exceeds it, as the Archbishop saved not one, but many Jews, endangering his own life, as well as the lives of his subordinates and the whole church institution, as he was the head of the Greek Catholic Church. Suslensky also thinks that Yad Vashem's committee ignored the difficult circumstances Sheptytsky had to work in and refused to take them into consideration when discussing

³⁸ Ibidem.

³⁹ Yakov Suslensky, "Association for Jewish-Ukrainian Contacts, explanatory statement," File JKS-MA 3.36., Sheptytsky Family Archive.

⁴⁰ Ibidem.

the issue of granting the Metropolitan the title of the “Righteous.” The chairman of the association addressed the accusations against Sheptytsky and the Greek Catholic clergy that they allegedly persuaded Jewish Children to convert to Christianity. The main doubt is related to the fact that this information emerged after forty years, having been unknown till then. Suslensky, according to Shimon Redlich,⁴¹ stated that the Metropolitan certainly had not given any orders to make children convert to Christianity and considered such claims as efforts to discredit him. He also asked if it had been inappropriate behavior to persuade Jews to change religion, with the intention of saving their lives during the war.

According to the testimony of Zvi Barnea, saved thanks to a bishop, after the liberation of 1944 “the metropolitan returned the Jewish children to the remnants of the Jewish community in Lvov as soon as foster families for them could be found.” It seems that most of them survived living in the USSR, but there was no contact on their part. However, we know of Jews who lived in the West and were saved thanks to Andrey Sheptytsky: the family of Rabbi David Kahane, Kurt and Natan Levin, Leon Chameides and his brother Zvi Barnea, the Fink family, and the family of Joseph Fodoshyn and D. Amarnt. Yakov Suslensky described the activity of the Greek Catholic Archbishop as an example of great humanitarianism, stating that Yad Vashem presented itself as Ukrainophobic and tried to blame Sheptytsky for other peoples’ crimes. To sum up, the representative of the “Association for Jewish–Ukrainian Contacts” found it necessary to make the discussed case known internationally, to help Israeli institution make a decision related to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, as the fact that he had not been awarded the title of the “Righteous Gentile” was falsification.⁴² These activities were launched without any political purpose, though they did have a political context, because at that time, UGCC was illegal and the legacy of Sheptytsky was perceived as

⁴¹ Shimon Redlich, “Konteksty: Moralność i rzeczywistość: metropolita Andriej Szeptycki i Żydzi w czasach Holocaustu i II wojny światowej,” *Zagłada Żydów. Studia i Materiały* (2008), no. 4, p. 253.

⁴² Yakov Suslensky, “Association for Jewish-Ukrainian Contacts, explanatory statement,” File JKS-MA 3.36., Sheptytsky Family Archive.

a threat to the Soviet order in Ukraine. Seemingly, the adherents of the idea of granting Sheptytsky the title “Righteous Among the Nations” applied a strategy relevant to the mnemonic pluralists. The core of their strategy was dialogue. They aimed for a pluralization of the memory of World War II in Ukraine.

3.2.2. Level of the non-state institutions: Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian Jewish Encounter

UGCC concurred with commemorative events related to Sheptytsky in various ways. In August 2013, it launched its own attempt to commemorate its former superior. The Synod of the UGCC bishops adopted a resolution on celebrating the “Remembrance Year of God’s Servant Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky” from the 1st November 2014 until the 1st November 2015.⁴³

Attempts to decide upon the content which the UGCC would include in events commemorating Sheptytsky during the “Remembrance Year” declared on August 2013 were unsuccessful. In other words, it is hard to say which elements of the symbolic capital related to Metropolitan Sheptytsky would be actualized and put in motion. However, it is worth recalling a passage from the address of the current UGCC superior, Metropolitan Sviatoslav Shevchuk, at a public appearance that might be considered an opening speech of the “Remembrance Year”: “Due to some unfathomable verdict of God’s Providence, Ukraine has again become an object of aggression of the dark barbarians who pretend to be a new ‘word’ in global politics. The old topics came back to our life: the issue of the historical injury from Russia, of the heroism of justified struggle, of the need for national consolidation and defense. Thus, this time we choose from the whole pastoral legacy of Metropolitan Andrey first of all thoughts related to the current state of war, which was not declared but is real and noticeable.”⁴⁴

⁴³ “Постанови Синоду Єпископів УГКЦ 2013 року,” <https://docs.ugcc.ua/170/>.

⁴⁴ “«Нехай Божа мудрість поведе нас!» Пастирське послання Глави УГКЦ з нагоди Року митрополита Андрія Шептицького,” <https://docs.ugcc.ua/1378/>.

It is remarkable that this opening speech was published only on 13th December 2014—a month and a half after the beginning of the commemorative activities. This fact—as well as the sense of the cited passage from Metropolitan Shevchuk's address—seems to imply that the ideas related to the celebration of the 150th anniversary of Metropolitan Sheptytsky's birth had been changed in 2014 and adapted to the then-current political and social situation in Ukraine (the dramatic events during Euromaidan, Russian aggression and hybrid warfare).

Under these circumstances the second agent involved in commemoration of Metropolitan Sheptytsky on the level of non-state organizations (civil society institutions) appeared. It was The Ukrainian Jewish Encounter (UJE).⁴⁵ In some sense UGCC and UJE joined their forces. However, in the activities of UJE the symbolic capital related to the legacy of Sheptytsky occurred in a slightly distinct context and was employed to a little bit different goal. The most important events related to their commemorative activities held by UJE were the Canadian parliament's motion recognizing the metropolitan's deeds in 2012⁴⁶ and establishing of the "Sheptytsky Award."

The issue of commemorating Sheptytsky's involvement in the action of saving Jews during World War II returned in April 2012 with the visit to Canada of representatives of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (AUCCRO). It is worth highlighting the very particular background of this episode. AUCCRO was established at the initiative of president Kuchma in 1996.⁴⁷ Apparently, it was thought to be a "consultative-advisory body," though in fact state authorities used or at least attempted to use it as a means of influence and control over the activities of religious communities in social life.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ "Public Awareness and Communal Events," <https://ukrainianjewishencounter.org/en/about-us/what-we-do/public-awareness-communal-events/>.

⁴⁶ "Canadian Parliament Unanimously Honours Metropolitan Sheptytsky," https://risu.ua/en/canadian-parliament-honours-metropolitan-sheptytskyi_n56248.

⁴⁷ "All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations," https://risu.org.ua/en/index/reference/major_religions/33306/.

⁴⁸ Michał Wawrzonek, *The Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches as Elements of Ukraine's Political System*, Newcastle upon Tyne 2014, pp. 182–190.

However, AUCCRO gradually started to gain its own agency in relationships with the authorities, probably as a consequence of the events which members of AUCCRO experienced during the Orange Revolution in 2004. Moreover, contrary to the authorities (president, government, parliament, justice), religious institutions in Ukraine enjoy a high level of social trust,⁴⁹ therefore the role played by AUCCRO in social life evolved from a tool of so-called “administrative resource” to an institution supporting the development of civic society in Ukraine.

The events from the beginning of 2012 are quite indicative of this evolution. It became increasingly obvious that President Yanukovych’s administration did not intend to continue the policy of integrating Ukraine into the political Western structures like the EU or NATO. Moreover, patterns relevant to the post-Soviet Russian political culture were consolidated. There were, for example, corruption, subordination of the judiciary to the executive power, expropriation of the state’s institutions with the purpose of private particular interests of the oligarchic groups and a policy of subservience to Russia. There were no prospects for Ukrainian membership in NATO. Relations between Ukraine and the EU turned sour. On 9th March 2012, Ukraine’s foreign minister, Kostiantyn Hryshchenko, stated that he saw “a subjective disinclination and an objective lack of resources” for further enlargement of the EU.⁵⁰ Indeed, EU members were divided regarding their opinions on future policy towards Ukraine, but the true background of the cited statement of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry was a response to justified accusations relating to the politicization of the judiciary system (the case of Yulia Tymoshenko) and emerging authoritarian tendencies.⁵¹ At the same time, according to

⁴⁹ “Довіра соціальним інституціям,” <http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&cid=678&page=1&t=3>.

⁵⁰ Tadeusz Iwański, “Ukraine in Search of a ‘Third Way’ in Foreign Policy,” <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-03-14/ukraine-search-a-third-way-foreign-policy>.

⁵¹ Tadeusz Iwański, Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, Rafał Sadowski, “The Crisis in EU/Ukraine Relations Surrounding Tymoshenko,” <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-05-09/crisis-eu/ukraine-relations-surrounding-tymoshenko>.

the survey conducted by The Razumkov Centre, 43.1% of respondents believed that Ukraine would benefit if it joined the EU.⁵² A couple of days after the publication of the Ukrainian foreign minister's article, a visit of AUCCRO members to Brussels was scheduled with the primary goal of meeting EU officials. Under these circumstances this journey gained a unique symbolic sense since the members of the Ukrainian delegation would appear in a double role as representatives of religious communities and as real advocates of Ukrainian society. Moreover, this visit was probably planned without consultation with state institutions.

The EU hosts probably did not realize the entire complex context of this visit and President Yanukovich in turn reacted very decisively. As a result of the measures which were taken, the scheduled journey to Brussels was canceled.⁵³ Why the Ukrainian president risked another scandal in his relations with the EU instead of ignoring this visit is hard to understand. It is possible that his associates considered relations between authority and society according to the neopatrimonial paradigm, and from this perspective such an unconsulted visit would indicate weakness in the state's apparatus.

However, AUCCRO did not give up on attempts to undertake independent international activities. In order to achieve this, it turned to the symbolic capital related to Sheptytsky's attitude during the Holocaust. Soon after AUCCRO's aborted journey to Brussels in April 2012, some of its members visited Canada and the USA. The main organizer and founder of this tour was UJE.⁵⁴ The main official purpose of the visit was "honoring Metropolitan Sheptytsky and his legacy."⁵⁵ Essentially, this goal was achieved on the 24th April 2012, when the Canadian parliament unanimously approved a motion

⁵² National Security & Defence (2012), no. 4–5, p. 120, https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/journal/eng/NSD133-134_2012_eng.pdf.

⁵³ Michał Wawrzonek, Nelly Bekus, Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska, *Orthodoxy Versus Post-Communism? Belarus, Serbia, Ukraine and the Russkiy Mir*, Newcastle upon Tyne 2016, pp. 296–302.

⁵⁴ "Public Awareness and Communal Events," <https://ukrainianjewishencounter.org/en/about-us/what-we-do/public-awareness-communal-events>.

⁵⁵ "Honouring Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky and His Legacy," https://ukrainianjewishencounter.org/media/Sheptytsky_Tour_English.pdf.

recognizing the metropolitan's deeds.⁵⁶ This solemn declaration was proclaimed in the presence of members of AUCCRO. Canadian MPs commemorated "Andrey Sheptytsky's courageous actions, compassion for his oppressed Jewish Ukrainian countrymen, and this enduring example of commitment to fundamental human rights as humankind's highest obligation."⁵⁷ In his letter to the Ukrainian delegation, the Canadian Prime Minister stated that Sheptytsky's compassion and courage made him a role model and an exemplar of the values that Ukrainian and Jewish people aspire to uphold to this day.⁵⁸ After the members of AUCCRO had visited Canada, they went to the USA to meet representatives of various American–Jewish organizations and Thomas O. Melia, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.⁵⁹ No other attempt to commemorate A. Sheptytsky before 2012 was organized with such panache or was executed at such a high political level. The source of the success of this visit stemmed from the very skillful association of the commemoration of Sheptytsky with the symbolic capital related to memories of the Holocaust in the West.⁶⁰ In some sense, Sheptytsky was used by Ukrainian non-governmental organizations as a tool of soft power to develop positive relations with the Euro-Atlantic zone.⁶¹ At the same time,

⁵⁶ "Canadian Parliament Unanimously Honours Metropolitan Sheptytsky," https://risu.ua/en/canadian-parliament-honours-metropolitan-sheptytsky_n56248.

⁵⁷ Ibidem.

⁵⁸ "Honouring Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky and His Legacy," https://ukrainianjewishencounter.org/media/Sheptytsky_Tour_English.pdf.

⁵⁹ "Представники українських конфесій зустрілись із високопосадовцями Держдепартаменту США," <https://credo.pro/2012/05/62647>.

⁶⁰ Анна Медведовська, *Голокост в Україні в суспільній думці кінця XX – початку XXI ст.*, Дніпро 2016, pp. 98–110, https://shron1.chtyvo.org.ua/Medvedovska_Anna/Holokost_v_Ukraini_v_suspilnii_dumtsi_kintsia_KhKh_pochatku_KhKhI_st.pdf.

⁶¹ For more on the issue of the memory of the Holocaust and its importance for the Ukrainian pro-Western aspirations, see Jakub Bornio, "Israeli–Ukrainian Relations after 'the Euromaidan Revolution' – the Holocaust and the New Ukrainian Identity in the Context of the European Aspirations of Ukraine," *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, 47 (2018), no. 2, pp. 331–345.

the official Ukrainian state was drifting away from the West due to the policy of president Yanukovich.

In 2013, the Sheptytsky Award was founded on the initiative of UJE with the intention of honoring those particularly involved with “the cause of Ukrainian–Jewish understanding and cooperation.”⁶² The first laureate of this award was a cofounder of UJE, James Temerty, a Canadian businessman of Ukrainian origin, a philanthropist and sponsor of numerous projects in both Canada and Ukraine. The award ceremony was held in Kyiv in June 2013. In his speech Temerty emphasized that “the history of Israel is not complete without the history of Ukraine, and the history of Ukraine is not complete without the history of Israel.” However, he also remarked “that the road to rapprochement between Ukrainian and Jewish people will be long.” Temerty indicated an interrelation between “the problem of preserving the memory of the Holocaust” and the prospects for Ukraine’s attempts “to draw closer to the European Union.”⁶³ In November 2014, the second ceremony of the Sheptytsky Award took place. This time, Victor Pinchuk, a major Ukrainian oligarch, received the award.⁶⁴ In subsequent years the Sheptytsky Award was granted to the Ukrainian dissident, Ivan Dzyuba, in 2016⁶⁵ and to the president of the World Jewish Congress, Ronald Lauder, in 2018.⁶⁶ For the time

⁶² “UCU Benefactor Awarded Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky Medal,” <https://ukrainianjewishencounter.org/en/ucu-benefactor-awarded-metropolitan-andrey-sheptytsky-medal/>.

⁶³ “The First Laureate of the Medal in Honor of Andrei Sheptytsky Became a Canadian Businessman of Ukrainian Descent Originally from Donbass,” <https://ukrainianjewishencounter.org/en/the-first-laureate-of-the-medal-in-honor-of-andrei-sheptytski-became-a-canadian-businessman-of-ukrainian-descent-originally-from-donbass/>.

⁶⁴ “Victor Pinchuk at the Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky Award Ceremony,” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PkJ0jsB6l10>.

⁶⁵ “Ivan Dzyuba Receives the Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky Award for 2016,” <https://ukrainianjewishencounter.org/en/ivan-dzyuba-receives-metropolitan-andrey-sheptytsky-award-2016/>.

⁶⁶ “The Honorable Ronald S. Lauder receives Sheptytsky Award at ceremony in New York,” <https://ukrainianjewishencounter.org/en/the-honorable-ronald-s-lauder-receives-sheptytsky-award-at-ceremony-in-new-york/>.

being, the 2014 edition of the award was probably the most glamorous and remarkable event related to the commemoration of Sheptytsky launched by UJE.

In 2014 Adrian Karatnycky, a member of the Board of Directors of the Ukrainian Jewish Encounter Initiative, underlined that Pinchuk was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, organizers of the Sheptytsky Award wanted to promote the idea of “the integration of Ukraine with the external world.”⁶⁷ In other words, UJE aimed at “renovating and contemporizing the international community’s perception of these complex processes and the war.”⁶⁸ The other reason was the similarity of Pinchuk’s charitable activity to that of Temerty.

Pinchuk was probably recognized as a suitable person for this task because he was trying to develop an image as a “pro-Western” Ukrainian oligarch after the Orange Revolution. He launched the Yalta European Strategy. This is only one of the projects of the Victor Pinchuk Foundation. Officially the main tasks of this project are connecting Ukraine “to international partners,” supporting “forces for change in the country” and building “networks of supporters for a new Ukraine worldwide.”⁶⁹ Through his foundation, Pinchuk invested in establishing relations with some Western intellectuals and politicians.

Thus, at the aforementioned press conference, Karatnycky asserted that when Ukraine experienced “very complicated conditions” after the overthrow of Yanukovych “we thought it worth taking advantage of this opportunity ... to invite some lobbyists of Ukrainian interests to Ukraine.” These lobbyists included Aleksander Kwaśniewski, the ex-president of Poland, Timothy Snyder, the US scholar, and Bernard-Henri Levy, the French philosopher and writer.⁷⁰

The second reason Pinchuk was honored with the Sheptytsky Award was his charitable activity. However, it turned out that this

⁶⁷ “Andrey Sheptytsky Award. Ukraine Crisis Media Center, 18th of November 2014,” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z8FUjJYCC20>.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁹ “About Yes,” <https://yes-ukraine.org/en/about>.

⁷⁰ “Andrey Sheptytsky Award. Ukraine Crisis Media Center, 18th of November 2014,” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z8FUjJYCC20>.

issue is quite problematic. Significantly, the UGCC did not take part in nominating Pinchuk for the Sheptytsky Award as they had the previous year. It seems that the superior of UGCC was quite surprised with this nomination and commented that “our Church has never cooperated with Pinchuk in charitable projects but probably the Jewish community cooperated with him if they decided to honor him with such an award.”⁷¹ Moreover, with regard to the initiative of honoring this Ukrainian oligarch with the Sheptytsky Award, Shevchuk stated that “everyone who today calls himself a patron has yet to grow in virtue and benevolence of her/his deeds to the style and zealousness of the great philanthropist who was Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky.”⁷² Metropolitan Shevchuk’s reaction might be interpreted as a diplomatically expressed objection regarding the attempts to relativize meaning of the legacy of Sheptytsky. Decision to nominate Pinchuk had ambiguous purport regardless of original intentions of UJE. Seemingly, the consecutive edition of Sheptytsky Award contributed to promotion of the highest humanitarian values in social life. However, members of the board of this award risked devaluating symbolic capital related to the Sheptytsky’s legacy for interim political purposes (legitimization of the informal oligarchical structures of power under the new circumstances after the Dignity Revolution).

It seems that both UGCC and UJE had primarily the same goals and applied the same strategy as the participants of the action in favor of granting Sheptytsky the title “Righteous among the Nations” in the mid 80’s. However, UJE started to apply the patterns appropriate to the mnemonic warrior. Or at least it exploited these patterns as was the case of the motion in the Canadian parliament. Then the authority of the state institution was employed with the purpose of legitimizing a positive approach to the legacy related to metropolitan Sheptytsky. In other words, Canadian parliament was involved in attempts to

71 “Єврейська громада цього річ обрала Віктора Пінчука для нагородження медаллю Митрополита Андрея Шептицького,” https://risu.ua/jevreyska-gromada-cogorich-obrala-viktora-pinchuka-dlya-nagorodzhennya-medallyu-mitropolita-andreya-sheptickogo_n71663.

72 Ibidem.

make others accept UJE's "true" vision of the past. Moreover, activities of UJE in reference to the commemoration of Sheptytsky were entangled in the issue of the future geopolitical position of Ukraine (i.e., the problem of integration with the West) and with current conflicts in the Ukrainian political field.

First of all, commemoration of Sheptytsky became an arm in the struggle with Russia. This external agent attempted to interfere in a very harsh way in the Ukrainian mnemonic field after Euromaidan. In that case "game of memory" turned into a part of hybrid warfare. Secondly, activities of UJE referred to the challenge of "Europeanization" of the Ukrainian mnemonic field. Thirdly, symbolic capital related to Sheptytsky and his attitude during Holocaust became a tool of legitimization of informal oligarchical structures involved in the state power system after Yanukovich's overthrow. Thus, UJE adapted its own strategy to the new circumstances and took a position of mnemonic warrior. The mnemonic strategy of UGCC evolved too. Previously it was more appropriate to the mnemonic pluralist. In terms of the post-Maidan circumstances, it got more "warrior" features. However, UGCC was determined to protect its freedom from neopatrimonial rules of the Ukrainian political field.

3.2.3. Level of state institutions

On 17 June 2014, the Verkhovna Rada voted on the "Bill of the celebrations of the 150th anniversary of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky's birth." After the first vote, the bill was not placed on the agenda. Apart from the insufficient number of members from all parties, it was significant that the Party of Regions, which was at that time represented by 77 deputies, did not support the bill: only one of them voted in favor. Likewise, none of the 34 deputies from the Communist Party of Ukraine voted to include the bill on the agenda.⁷³

After the first vote on the bill, two deputies spoke: Volodymyr Yavorivskyi encouraged all MPs, regardless of their political affiliations and coalitions, to support the bill; he said that this hierarch was

⁷³ "Засідання 51," <https://www.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/5633.html>.

“a unique figure in Ukrainian history, who hid about one thousand Jewish people during the war.”⁷⁴ Yavorivskyi exaggerated the number of people helped by Metropolitan Sheptytsky during the Holocaust, but his argument was effective. This was a very interesting moment as it became apparent that the memory of Shoah belongs to an aborted legacy or non-legacy in Ukraine. However in that case it turned out to be a very efficient tool for achieving political goals.

Another person who spoke was Hanna Herman, a Ukrainian politician very close to Viktor Yanukovych and a member of the Party of Regions in the years 2004–2014. She had held high political office and became Yanukovych’s advisor in 2013. Herman was this one deputy from Party of Regions who voted to include the bill on the agenda.⁷⁵ Taking her career into consideration, Ms. Herman’s speech seems particularly significant. She stated that the necessary documents for the metropolitan’s beatification existed in Rome and it would have been a shame for the Ukrainian Parliament not to adopt this bill. The short but powerful point made by Ms. Herman seems at odds with the fact that only one member of her party supported the bill. In the second vote, the bill was accepted and applauded.⁷⁶ Sheptytsky was recognized as “a public leader” (*hromadskyi diiach*) and “patron” (*met-senat*).⁷⁷ Ms. Herman managed to convince two other MPs from the Party of Regions to support the resolution. However, the other members of this faction, like the deputies from the CPU, did not take part in the vote. It is worth recalling that two years earlier, in the previous term, with the votes of these parties, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a similar resolution in relation to Yaroslav Halan. The behavior of MPs

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁵ “Поіменне голосування про включення до порядку денного проекту Постанови про відзначення 150-річчя з дня народження митрополита Української Греко-Католицької Церкви Андрея Шептицького (№ 4233),” http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ns_arh_golos?g_id=550707&cn_skl=7.

⁷⁶ “Засідання 51,” <https://www.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/5633.html>.

⁷⁷ “Постанова Верховної Ради України «Про відзначення 150-річчя з дня народження митрополита Української Греко-Католицької Церкви Андрея Шептицького»,” <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1330-18#Text>.

from the Party of Regions and the CPU during the vote on the resolution commemorating Sheptytsky shows the characteristic continuity of memory politics promoted by these political forces.

With the adoption of the bill, the Council decided to celebrate the metropolitan's birth anniversary at state level. The Ukrainian Council of Ministers was given the task of establishing an organizational committee responsible for the preparation and conduct of events related to the celebrations.⁷⁸ It is worth noting that the Ukrainian government, headed by Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, approved the "schedule of preparations and celebrations of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Greek Catholic Church Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky in 2015" only on the 29th April 2015. Vice-Prime Minister Viacheslav Kyrylenko highlighted that Sheptytsky should be presented like "historical personality" of "all-national significance." The main goal he set was "to break the stereotypical perception of the Metropolitan's person shaped by the Soviet propaganda."⁷⁹ In July 2015 a monument to Andrey Sheptytsky was unveiled in Lviv. This event was left off of the official governmental schedule of commemorative activities devoted to Sheptytsky. The monument was established on the initiative of UGCC and with the support of the municipal authorities of Lviv. However the opening ceremony was attended by president Poroshenko. He asserted in his speech that "the best monument to the metropolitan is the independent Ukraine that moves toward the family of European nations."⁸⁰ The next day, Poroshenko gave an opening speech during a solemn concert at the Lviv Opera Theater. Although he touched on Sheptytsky's contribution to rescuing Jews, his attention was mainly on the issues of consolidating the Ukrainian nation and struggling

⁷⁸ Ibidem.

⁷⁹ "Відзначення 150-річчя від дня народження Андрея Шептицького має представити Митрополита як постать національного значення – Вячеслав Кириленко," <http://ruporzt.com.ua/ukraina/61653-vdznachennya-150-rchchya-vd-dnya-narodzheniya-andreya-sheptickogo-maye-predstaviti-mitropolita-yak-postat-naconalnogo-znachennya-vyacheslav-kirilenko.html>.

⁸⁰ "UGCC Patriarch and Ukraine's President Unveil Metropolitan Sheptytsky's Monument," https://risu.ua/en/ugcc-patriarch-and-ukraine-s-president-unveil-metropolitan-sheptytsky-s-monument_n75418.

against Russian aggression.⁸¹ According to the governmental schedule, a conference devoted to the relations between the Greek Catholic Archbishop and the Jewish community during World War II was projected for the 4th quarter of 2015, with the participation of the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities and the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture.⁸² This international conference was entitled “Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky and the Jewish community during World War II. World War II and the civilians in Eastern Europe.” It took place on 30 November and 1 December 2015.⁸³ Following the conference, a work entitled “World War II and civilian people in Eastern Europe. Materials of the international conference devoted to Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky’s remembrance” was published.

Although most of the conference’s papers dealt with World War II or war memory in general, their authors did not mention Sheptytsky at all. Only the first two articles out of a total of twenty-four pertain directly to the archbishop’s activity. The issue of relations between Metropolitan Sheptytsky and Jews during World War II was definitely not exhausted by these two articles in this publication. Apart from one paper written by a Belorussian, all the articles were written by Ukrainians, although the conference was described as international.⁸⁴ On the one hand, it seems that commemorative activities related to Sheptytsky contributed to progress in emancipating the issue of the Holocaust

81 “Президент подякував на урочистій академії у Львові церкві за її роль у єднанні країни,” <https://dailylviv.com/news/kultura/prezydent-podyakuvav-na-urochystii-akademiyi-u-lvovi-tserkvi-za-yiyi-rol-u-iednanni-krayiny-21396>.

82 “Розпорядження Про утворення Організаційного комітету та затвердження плану заходів з підготовки та відзначення у 2015 році 150-річчя від дня народження митрополита Української греко-католицької церкви Андрея Шептицького,” https://zakononline.com.ua/documents/show/349669___648124.

83 “Конференція ‘Митрополит Андрей Шептицький та єврейські громади в часи Другої світової війни. Друга світова війна та долі мирного населення у Східній Європі. Прес-реліз конференції,” <http://www.vaadua.org/news/konferenciya-mitropolit-andrey-sheptickiy-ta-ievreyski-gromadi-v-chasi-drugoyi-svitovoyi-viyuni>.

84 *Друга світова війна та долі мирного населення у Східній Європі. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції пам’яті Митрополита Андрея Шептицького, 30 листопада – 1 грудня 2015 року*, Київ 2016.

in Ukraine from its status as an aborted legacy, however, the actors of the Ukrainian mnemonic field were not interested in involving foreign agents in this process.

Undoubtedly, one of the most important of them is Yad Vashem. The attempts to encourage Yad Vashem to change its position on the issue of Andrey Sheptytsky that began in the mid-1980s continued during the following decades. The Israeli Holocaust Memorial Institute has received successive appeals from different mnemonic actors. On January 21, 2020, Moshe Reuven Azman, Chief Rabbi of Kyiv and Ukraine requested Yad Vashem to award Andrey Sheptytsky the title “Righteous Among the Nations.” President Volodymyr Zelenskyi joined this petition.⁸⁵ Yad Vashem’s stance remained unchanged.

In 1985, a representative of state authorities of Israel, Boaz Apelbaum, stated that Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky represented more than his name: he also represented a symbol—an important figure in the history of the Ukrainian national movement and a hero of Ukrainian emigrants in the West.⁸⁶ 35 years later the Chairman of the Directorate of the Israeli Holocaust Memorial Institute, Avner Shalev, responded that “there are Jewish survivors who attested to having been rescued by the Metropolitan.” However, “there are others,” wrote Shalev, “who are sure that it was his conduct that contributed to Ukrainians joining the ranks of murderers of their families.”⁸⁷ The position of Yad Vashem remained non-negotiable despite the claims of the witnesses and survivors. However, it is seemingly not an issue of Metropolitan Sheptytsky per se. From Yad Vashem’s point of view, recognizing Sheptytsky as “Righteous among the Nations” might call into question one “true” vision of the past related to the Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the Holocaust.

⁸⁵ “Zelensky Backs Appeal to Recognize Sheptytsky as ‘Righteous among Nations,’” <https://spzh.news/en/news/68199-zelenskij-podderzhal-obrashhenije-o-priznanii-sheptickogo-pravednikom-mira>.

⁸⁶ Boaz Apelbaum, copy of a letter to Y. Suslensky, written at the Office of the Prime Minister, 06.06.1985, File JKS-MA 3.36., Sheptytsky Family Archive.

⁸⁷ “‘Yad Vashem’ responds: Andrey Sheptytsky welcomed the Nazi occupiers,” <https://spzh.news/en/news/68677-otvet-jad-vashem-andrej-sheptickij-privetstvoval-nacistskih-okkupantov>.

In fact, Yad Vashem declared in its mission statement that it strives to maintain “the authentic individual voice emanating from testimonies, diaries, artifacts and other documentation” in order to continue “to pave the way for a brighter future.” Thus its agenda covers some universal goals like inspiring “non-Jewish” visitors of the Museum Complex “to join the drive towards a more ethical future for humanity as a whole” and “encouraging every visitor to consider the Holocaust’s universal dimensions.”⁸⁸

Apparently such an approach suits the type of agent classified as “mnemonic prospective” in Kubik and Bernhard’s typology. Such an actor is supposed to “focus political energy on building a ‘brighter’ future.”⁸⁹ However, authors of the theory of the politics of memory expect that this type of agent would strive to “build a ‘brighter’ future” by “challenging competing visions of the past.”⁹⁰ Yad Vashem in turn attempts to meet its target by promoting “the history of the Holocaust from a Jewish perspective” and by evoking “a greater empathy for the fate of the Jewish people” among “non-Jewish visitors.”⁹¹ Such an approach seems to be more akin to the mnemonic warrior’s strategy.

⁸⁸ “Vision and Mission Yad Vashem,” <https://www.yadvashem.org/about/mission-statement.html>.

⁸⁹ Jan Kubik, Michael Bernhard, “A Theory of the Politics of Memory...,” p. 15.

⁹⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁹¹ “Vision and Mission Yad Vashem,” <https://www.yadvashem.org/about/mission-statement.html>.

CHAPTER 4

SHEPTYTSKY'S LEGACY AND THE POLISH MNEMONIC FIELD

The fourth chapter describes activities related to the memory of Sheptytsky in Polish mnemonic field. Two periods have been selected. The first is the late 1980s and early 1990s. As in Ukraine, the process of bringing the memory of the Metropolitan of Halych back from the realm of aborted legacy began in Poland at that time. The second period begins in 2015, when Sheptytsky's legacy became part of a coordinated memory policy in Ukraine. The main differences between the Polish and Ukrainian mnemonic field which influenced the course and effects of commemoration of Sheptytsky just after the fall of communism are presented. They resulted primarily from the different state of hardware of historical cultures in these two countries. Unlike in Ukraine, professional historians in Poland were involved in these activities from the very beginning.

Next, the reactions of the agents of Polish mnemonic field after Sheptytsky was included in the pantheon of national heroes are presented. The main focus is on the events related to the publication and promotion of the book *Two Kingdoms*, allegedly written by the Greek Catholic Bishop, Hryhorij Khomyshyn. These agents attempted to create a new narrative that should shape the cultural memory of the Metropolitan of Halych in the the Polish field of memory. It is based on the scheme of contrasting images of the "good" Khomyshyn and the "bad" Sheptytsky. In addition, the methods used to create such a narrative have been reconstructed. This case study provides interesting insight into the interconnections and dependencies between the hardware of historical culture and the political field in Poland.

4.1. Before and immediately after the fall of communism

From June 22 to June 24, 1990, or less than two months after the Lviv conference, a similar seminar devoted to Sheptytsky was held in Krakow. It was also the first official conference in Poland since 1946, during which it was possible to legally, “without official or environmental permits or approvals, without censorship restrictions or political and ideological tutelage,”¹ talk about the Metropolitan of Halych. The conference was organized by a historian from the Jagiellonian University, Andrzej A. Zięba, and held under the patronage of the Polish Academy of Science and its special Commission of Slavic Studies.

As one of its participants, Ryszard Łużny, wrote, the organizers of the conference set themselves the goal of “demythologizing” and opposing “stereotypes.” It was supposed to be “a breakthrough in the treatment by both sides, Polish and Ukrainian, of the most dramatic pages” from the common past.² It was not the first initiative of its type to come from the circle of Krakow intellectuals. One of its adherents was the monthly *Znak*, published legally under the auspices of the Catholic Church. In 1988, when the processes launched by *perestroika* were gaining momentum in the USSR and Poland, and in the context of the millennium of the baptism of Kyivan Rus, the editors of *Znak* attempted to publish a thematic issue that would be devoted to Polish–Ukrainian relations. The publication was supposed to contain texts on matters that had hitherto either been passed over in silence or mythologized by communist propaganda.

The “Ukrainian” issue of *Znak* was a kind of test for the actual degree of liberalization of social and intellectual life in communist Poland. It turned out that the special “Ukrainian” issue of the magazine “met with the firm opposition of censorship.” After “dramatic negotiations,” some of the articles were able to be published “in installments” in various subsequent issues of the journal. The exception was

¹ Ryszard Łużny, “Przedmowa,” in: *Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki. Studia i materiały*, ed. Andrzej A. Zięba, Kraków 1994, p. 5.

² *Ibidem*, p. 6.

the texts related to Sheptytsky. The ban on their publication was in force until the Central Press Control Office was closed in April 1990.³ Due to these circumstances, both the Krakow seminar and the aforementioned Lviv conference had similar groundbreaking significance in the context of native historical cultures. At the same time, an analysis of both events reveals the significant differences between them. Historians definitely formed the majority of the Krakow conference participants. A significant proportion of the speakers came from the Ukrainian diaspora. In addition, among the Polish participants at the conference, there were scientists who had already dealt with the issues of the Greek Catholic Church and the figure of Sheptytsky independently, or even against the official narrative of communist propaganda. As noted by Zięba, “a special event was the arrival of guests from Ukraine, still Soviet at that time. Their appearance at the conference was a signal of changes that Gorbachev’s perestroika had introduced to the scientific and archival policy of the Soviet Union.”⁴ When it comes to extracting the memory of Sheptytsky from the “aborted legacy,” mnemonic field in Poland and Ukraine were in similar places at the time of the fall of communism. Fragments of Sheptytsky’s heritage, taken out of context, were used as communist propaganda. Various myths and stereotypes promoted on the Soviet side were reproduced in the Polish field of memory. The problem went beyond a lack of access to source materials to include blocking any debate with administrative measures (censorship) and a kind of privilege for those actors who propagated the “black legend” of Sheptytsky. The publications used for this purpose had a disastrous impact on the level of historiography as such and on the entirety of the historical culture.

In the case of Poland, this primarily concerns the work of Edward Prus. His book on Sheptytsky received deserved criticism from the scientific community. In fact, this work is an example of historiographic scribbling. As noted by Zięba, it preyed on a number of “negligences”

³ Ibidem, p. 7.

⁴ Andrzej A. Zięba, “Krakowska konferencja na temat metropolity Szeptyckiego na tle dotychczasowego dorobku naukowego,” in: *Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki...*, p. 242.

in Polish historiography, which “have a negative impact on the historical awareness of Polish society and which enable the reproduction of various lies about Sheptytsky in school textbooks.”⁵ In the sphere of historical culture, the fall of communism was associated with the need for significant re-evaluation within the field of memory in Poland. Some elements of the heritage that formed it became obsolete, while others required a new approach and still others had to be practically rescued from oblivion. One such element was the memory of Metropolitan Andrzej Sheptytsky. Both the Lviv and Krakow conferences of 1990 responded to this challenge. At the same time, however, it is not difficult to notice the difference in when this re-evaluation process began within the Polish and Ukrainian historical cultures. In the case of Poland, there was a fairly well-developed institutional base. It was not limited to academia alone. It also included a number of structures that were co-created either by the Catholic Church or the democratic opposition. As far as the field of science itself is concerned, the “culture of the party’s leadership” described above had not led to such havoc in the humanities as it had in the case of Ukraine. In addition, Polish scientists had much greater opportunities to establish and maintain contacts with the outside world (behind the “Iron Curtain”) than their colleagues from Soviet Ukraine.

4.2. After 2015

The activities undertaken to commemorate Metropolitan Sheptytsky in 2015 in Ukraine became one of the first indicators that a new coordinated memory policy had formed after the Revolution of Dignity. They also provoked a reaction from actors in Polish mnemonic field. In 2016 in Lublin, the notes of Bishop Hryhorij Khomyshyn were published in Ukrainian under the title *Two Kingdoms*.⁶ A year later,

⁵ Ibidem, p. 240.

⁶ Григорій Хомишин, *Два Царства*, eds. Ігор Перехатий, Володимир Осадчий, Lublin 2016. The book is available at: https://isgi.ru/sites/isgi.ru/files/dva_tsarstva.pdf.

a Polish translation was published.⁷ The author of the foreword, Bishop Marian Buczek, clearly signaled the purpose of the publication: “In the celebrations of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Archbishop Sheptytsky, this publication gives us further interesting information about the complicated and pertinent activity of the shepherd of the Greek Catholic Church to the Church and the nation.”⁸ In fact, the text of *Two Kingdoms* contains an extremely critical assessment of the activities of Metropolitan Sheptytsky.

“By the wonderful ordinance of Providence,” the notes of Bishop Khomyshyn can be found in these records. With their help, the publishers are able to “unmask” the true face of Metropolitan Sheptytsky⁹ and to discredit the contrived results of historical research devoted to him.¹⁰ As the editor of the book assures, it is “primarily” a “thorough analysis” of the activities of Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky in the period 1918–1943. The publication caused indignation, primarily among the community of historians associated with the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, i.e., in the academic center that is most involved in researching and popularizing the memory and activities of Metropolitan Sheptytsky. UKU professor Ihor Skochylias stated that *Two Kingdoms* is an element of the “systemic” action to discredit the memory of Sheptytsky and is used to “torpedo this good and positive image of Ukraine and Ukrainians, and especially of the UCGK, which was formed after the Revolution of

⁷ Grzegorz Chomyszyn, *Dwa Królestwa. Błogosławiony męczennik Grzegorz Chomyszyn Biskup Stanisławowski*, eds. Ihor Pelekhatyi, Włodzimierz Osadczy, Kraków 2017.

⁸ Григорій Хомишин, *Два Царства...*, p. 9.

⁹ Ibidem, pp. 57–58.

¹⁰ “Відкритий лист Блаженнішому Святославу Шевчуку, Верховному Архієпископу УГКЦ, Преосв. Мечиславу Мокшицькому, Митрополиту Львівському РКЦ Преосв. Архієпископу Клаудіо Гуджеротті, Апостольському Нунцію в Україні,” http://www.rkc.lviv.ua/news_view-Vidkrutuj_lust_Blzhennishomu_Svyatoslavu_SHevchuku_Verhovnomu_Arxiyepuskopu_UGKC_Preosv_Mechuslavu_Mokshuckomu_Mutropolutu_Lvivskomu_RKC_Preosv_Arxiyepuskopu_Klaudio_Gudzherotti_Apostolskomu_Nunciyu_v_Ukraini-ua.

Dignity.”¹¹ Liliana Hentosh also concluded that the primary purpose of the publication was “slandering Metropolitan Andrey.”¹² The UCGK hierarchy also reacted to the publication of the book. After 25 years Father Ihor Pelekhatyi was removed from managing the publishing house “Nowa Zorya.” In response, he sent an open letter to the head of the UCGK, Archbishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk, the Ordinary of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Lviv, Mieczysław Mokrzycki, and the Apostolic Nuncio to Ukraine.¹³ The letter was spread through the websites of the Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine and Polish websites that deal with the “borderlands” and the Polish diaspora or position themselves as “conservative” and “right-wing.”¹⁴ Generally, it can be said that Father Pelekhatyi’s public speech was aimed at further escalating the conflict and putting the UCGK and the intellectual circles associated with it in a very negative light.

It is worth outlining the broader background of activities to commemorate Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky which were undertaken in connection with this anniversary. Firstly, after the Revolution of Dignity and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine (i.e., after the annexation of Crimea and in connection with the military activities of the so-called separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions), the authorities in the Kremlin intensified their disinformation campaign, which was intended to discredit Ukraine as a “failed state,” which has been ruled by “fascists” since Viktor Yanukovich was overthrown. As part of this narrative, the authorities in Kyiv supposedly stimulated and

11 “У Польщі знову запускають механізм дискримінації митрополита УГКЦ Андрія Шептицького – Скочиляс,” <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/28063681.html>.

12 Тарас Антошевський, “Видавцям книжки «Два Царства» не вдається очорнити митрополита Шептицького – др. Ліліана Гентош,” <http://www.patriarkhat.org.ua/vydavtsyam-knyzhky-dva-tsarstva-ne-vdastsya-ochornuty-mitropolyta-sheptytskoho-d-r-liliana-hentosh/>.

13 “Відкритий лист Блаженнішому Святославу...”

14 <https://kresy.pl/wydarzenia,spoleczenstwo?zobacz/list-otwarty-ojca-ihora-pelehatyjego-redaktora-i-wydawcy-wspomnien-bl-grzegorza-chomyszyna->
<https://niepoprawni.pl/blog/slalomir-tomasz-roch/o-ihor-pelehatyj-swoim-poswieceniem-zdarl-maske-milosci-i-prawdy-z;> <http://isakowicz.pl/przesladowanie-ks-ihora-pelechatego-przez-cerkiew-ciag-dalszy/>.

fueled radical nationalist sentiments in order to pacify the Russian-speaking population.¹⁵ This narrative was a hybrid war replay and then a Russian tool against Ukraine after the Euromaidan. As part of the “post-revolutionary” defense activities, Kyiv began its own historical activity, which was to dispute the image of Ukraine created by Russian propaganda. The aim of this policy was to de-Sovietize and de-Russify Ukrainian historical culture. For this purpose, obtaining symbolic capital began with western Ukraine, especially in the area of former Galicia.¹⁶ In 2015, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Poland. Their results were significant to the evolution of Polish historical culture. Law and Justice party (PiS) and the circles associated with it took control of historical policy. As a consequence, the tendency to “idealize the heritage of the Republic of Poland intensified, the most outstanding representation of which became the ‘Eastern Borderlands,’ i.e., what was irretrievably lost.”¹⁷ At the same time, the policy of remembrance has clearly focused on promoting a positive image of Poles by highlighting the cases of heroism and sacrifice they showed in the past.¹⁸ Moreover, references to “historical memory resources symbolizing the heroism and martyrdom of the nation” became a tool to generate voter support.¹⁹ As a consequence, public life and public discourse on issues related to current political life has become much more “immersed in history” than it was between 1989 and 2015. In this context, Tomasz Stryjek and Volodymyr Sklokin pointed to two actors

¹⁵ Stephen Hutchings, Joanna Szostek, “Dominant Narratives in Russian Political and Media Discourse During the Ukraine Crisis,” in: *Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives*, eds. Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Richard Sakwa, Bristol 2015, pp. 173–185; Taras Kuzio, *Crisis in Russian Studies? Nationalism (Imperialism), Racism and War*, Bristol 2020, p. 101; Michał Marek, *Operacja Ukraina. Kampanie dezinformacyjne, narracje, sposoby działania rosyjskich ośrodków propagandowych przeciwko państwu ukraińskiemu w okresie 2013–2019*, Warszawa 2020, pp. 61–71.

¹⁶ See “Закон України ‘Про правовий статус та вшанування пам’яті борців за незалежність України у XX столітті,’” <http://www.golos.com.ua/article/254977>.

¹⁷ *Kultury historyczne Polski i Ukrainy...*, p. 550.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 34.

on the political stage who contributed to this: “Law and Justice party and nationalists from the Confederation party.”²⁰ One of the important elements of this “immersion in history,” both in the 2015 election campaign and later in the Sejm forum, were references to themes from the past that cause tension and controversy in Polish–Ukrainian relations. As an example, we can cite the resolution of the Sejm of July 22, 2016 “on paying homage to the victims of the genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists on the citizens of the Second Polish Republic in the years 1943–1945.” Separate, similar draft bills were submitted by two political parties: Law and Justice party (PiS) and the Polish People’s Party (PSL). During the vote, the resolution was overwhelmingly supported by all MPs, regardless of their party affiliation (432 out of 442 votes cast).²¹ The voting process thus showed that all the actors present in the parliamentary arena contributed to some extent to the aforementioned “immersion in history.”

Since 2015, the parliamentary faction Kukiz’15 has been specially involved in creating the policy of remembrance for Polish–Ukrainian relations in the 20th century. The slogan “fight against banderism” has become one of the essential elements of this group and its leader, Paweł Kukiz.²² The Kukiz’15 party launched initiatives in the Sejm that directly related to the symbolic capital associated with Bl. Bishop Hryhorij Khomyshyn. They were a resolution “on the celebration of the memory of Bl. Bishop Hryhorij Khomyshyn on the 150th anniversary

²⁰ Ibidem.

²¹ “Głosowanie nr 60 na 23. posiedzeniu Sejmu,” <https://sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/agent.xsp?symbol=glosowania&nrkadencji=8&nropsiedzenia=23&nrglosowania=60>.

²² Bartosz Grodziński, “Kukiz straszy Ukraińcami. Jeszcze jeden krok, a Ukraińcy będą mogli jeździć po Polsce w mundurach SS-Galizien,” <https://natemat.pl/210905,kukiz-straszy-ukraincami-banderyzm-gorszy-niz-komunizm>; “Paweł Kukiz: Ukraińcy hołdują SS Galizien, Rząd płaci im 500+,” <https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art2326441-pawel-kukiz-ukraincy-holduja-ss-galizien-rzad-placi-im-500>; “Sejm przegłosował ustawę zakazującą propagowania banderyzmu! Kukiz: ‘Czekaliśmy od 6 lipca 2016, ale się doczekaliśmy! Nareszcie!’,” <https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/378455-sejm-przeglosowal-ustawe-zakazujaca-propagowania-banderyzmu-kukiz-czekalismy-od-6-lipca-2016-ale-sie-doczekalismy-nareszcie>.

of his birth” from March 23, 2017²³ and a parliamentary bill amending the act on the Institute of National Remembrance.²⁴ Under the circumstances outlined above, if the manuscript retrieved from almost total obscurity was to constitute a counterpoint to the efforts to commemorate Metropolitan Sheptytsky, then its authorship had to be authenticated. The foreword and the two forewords quoted earlier were intended to serve this purpose. It was all the more necessary because, in Ukraine, Khomyshyn remained firmly in the shadow of Metropolitan Sheptytsky. In Poland, as stated above, he was virtually unknown. Thus, the authors of the introductory texts try to create an extremely suggestive image of Bishop Khomyshyn—a great pastor and “Prophet of Ukraine,”²⁵ who during his lifetime “was criticized and misunderstood”²⁶ and is still “slandered” by “his alleged brothers in faith.”²⁷ The Bishop of Stanislaviv was introduced to the discourse on past and present Polish–Ukrainian relations by linking it with its most important and most controversial threads: the issue of the Volhynia massacre and the attitude toward the initiative to create an independent Ukrainian state after the Third Reich’s invasion of the USSR.

A few months before the release of *Two Kingdoms*, the Sejm adopted a resolution in which the crimes of Ukrainian nationalists were defined as “genocide.”²⁸ It is therefore no coincidence that in its preface, the author tries to adapt the image of Khomyshyn to the current narrative about past Polish–Ukrainian relations. Thus, it turns out

²³ “Poselski projekt uchwały w sprawie uczczenia pamięci błogosławionego biskupa Grzegorza Chomyszyna w 150. rocznicę jego urodzin,” <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/druk.xsp?documentId=006BB9F0CEF8CFBFC12580EB0037DB95>.

²⁴ “Druk nr 771,” <https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki8ka.nsf/0/AC4F1A377ED89A68C1257FF8003272B2/%24File/771.pdf>.

²⁵ Григорій Хомишин, *Два Царства...*, p. 67.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 9.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 11.

²⁸ “Uchwała Sejmu w sprawie oddania hołdu ofiarom ludobójstwa dokonanego przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na obywatelach II RP w latach 1943–1945,” <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/komunikat.xsp?documentId=2D76E3019FA691C3C1257FF800303676>.

that in view of the general erosion of morality within Ukrainian society during World War II, to which the Ukrainian nationalist underground also contributed, Khomyshyn allegedly had been persuading Sheptytsky to send a joint letter of Greek Catholic bishops regarding the “decline of morality in our nation.”²⁹ This fact has already been described in the literature on the subject. The author of the foreword himself mentioned it in an article published in 2009.³⁰ In fact, he quoted an excerpt from Oleh Yehreshii’s monograph published in 2006 on the Bishop of Stanislaviv.³¹ However, while in 2009 Osadczy reported that Khomyshyn made the appeal to Sheptytsky on November 8, 1943 (as stated by Yehreshii), in the preface to *Two Kingdoms* the date was changed to July 8, 1943.³² This is quite a significant difference, because the escalation of crimes against the Polish population in Volhynia took place on July 11, 1943, so-called “Bloody Sunday.” On its anniversary, pursuant to a resolution of the Sejm, the “National Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Genocide Committed by Ukrainian Nationalists on the Citizens of the Second Polish Republic” is celebrated. Thanks to this change of the date, it was possible to create the image of Khomyshyn as a “prophet” who predicted a tragedy on the eve of “Bloody Sunday.”

Another thread used to create the image of Khomyshyn as a prophet who was resistant to the temptations of the “earthly kingdom” was the proclamation of Ukrainian independence on June 30, 1941. The author of the preface to *Two Kingdoms* rightly noted that this action, taken on the initiative of the OUN-B faction on June 30, 1941 in Lviv, “turned out to be an adventurous step” and “misled Ukrainian patriots.”³³ Osadczy also assessed it as a “special

²⁹ Григорій Хомишин, *Два Царства...*, p. 96.

³⁰ Włodzimierz Osadczy, “Kościoły wobec konfliktu polsko-ukraińskiego w czasie II wojny światowej,” *Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej* (2009), no. 1–2 (96–97), p. 76.

³¹ Олег Єгрешій, *Єпископ Григорій Хомишин: портрет релігійно-церковного і громадсько-політичного діяча*, Івано-Франківськ 2006, p. 132.

³² Григорій Хомишин, *Два Царства...*, p. 96.

³³ Ibidem, p. 94.

misunderstanding” that Sheptytsky allegedly gave his “enthusiastic support” to this initiative.³⁴

Indeed, on July 1, 1941, Metropolitan Sheptytsky issued a special message “on the occasion of the proclamation of the Ukrainian State.” In it, he welcomed the “victorious German army” and declared obedience to the new authorities, which he identified with the government of Yaroslav Stetsko, appointed by the OUN-B. However, this by no means meant that the head of the Greek Catholic Church identified himself with the radical nationalist ideology promoted by the direct initiators of the proclamation of independence. In this message, Sheptytsky clearly formulated his expectations toward the new authorities: “wise and fair leadership of citizens, which will take into account the needs and welfare of all citizens living in our country, regardless of their religion, nationality, or social background.”³⁵ As a consequence, the structures of the state, which was proclaimed in Lviv, began to also form in the field. At the same time, rallies supporting the idea of creating a Ukrainian state were held in various places. This was the case in the vicinity of Ternopil, among other places, where the participants “issued resolutions, statements, and declarations. Most often, they were accompanied by solemn services and prayers.” Bandera and Sheptytsky were mentioned in 19 resolutions from 21 towns.³⁶ Around the time when Ukrainian independence was announced, pogroms against the Jewish population began in Lviv, in which members of the militia established by the OUN also participated.³⁷ In addition, shortly before June 30, 1941, there was a split within the OUN

³⁴ Ibidem.

³⁵ *Пастирське послання митр. Андрея Шептицького з нагоди проголошення Української Держави* in: *Митрополит Андрей Шептицький. Життя і діяльність. Документи і Матеріали 1899–1944*, vol. 2, part 1, ed. Андрій Кравчук, Lviv 1998, p. 517.

³⁶ Олександр Є. Лисенко, “Релігійне питання у теорії та практиці українського націоналізму в першій половині ХХ ст.,” *Український історичний журнал* (2000), no. 6, p. 41.

³⁷ John-Paul Himka, “The Lviv Pogrom of 1941: The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 53 (2011), no. 2–4, pp. 209–243.

and the government of Yaroslav Stetsko, formed after the proclamation of independence, in fact represented only one of the factions—the so-called OUN-B. Its members concealed this fact from Sheptytsky.³⁸ In practice, the factions of the OUN, Bandera's and Melnyk's, which were at odds with each other, operated separately and competed with each other. As a result, "party controversies prevailed and prevented cooperation."³⁹ Local Greek Catholic priests were involved in various initiatives at the local level.⁴⁰ Inevitably, knowingly or unknowingly, these priests became hostages of competition and fighting between OUN factions.

³⁸ John-Paul Himka, "Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky and the Holocaust..." p. 340. Andrii Mykhailenko is of a different opinion. According to him, "it can be said with high probability that the metropolitan was well aware of the disputes and splits within the OUN." On the other hand, the initiators of the proclamation of Ukrainian independence on June 30, 1941 allegedly misled Sheptytsky as to the Germans' position on this matter. Sheptytsky was to be convinced that the OUN-B agreed with them, and that they were accepted by the Germans. See Андрій Михалейко, *Митрополит Андрій Шептицький...*, pp. 117–139. It is worth briefly noting the role played by Hans Koch in this matter. This former officer of the Ukrainian Army of Halych, and then professor at the University of Wrocław, specialized in Eastern European issues and had had good relations with Sheptytsky since the interwar period. See Ліліана Гентош, "Про ставлення митрополита Шептицького до німецького окупаційного режиму в контексті документа з канцелярії Альфреда Розенберга," *Україна Модерна* 20 (2013), p. 298. During World War II, on behalf of the Abwehr, he liaised with representatives of the OUN and acted as an intermediary between the Abwehr and the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Alfred Rosenberg. Based on the research conducted by Hansjakob Stehle, it can be concluded that Koch, by exceeding his powers, was likely to have led Sheptytsky to believe that Germany would eventually agree to the creation of a Ukrainian state. See Hansjakob Stehle, "Der Lemberger Metropolitan Šeptičkyj und die Nationalsozialistische Politik in der Ukraine," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 34 (1986), no. 3, p. 411. Father Johannes Peters was one of those who helped Sheptytsky free himself from the illusions associated with the Third Reich. Peters, a German, entered the Studite convent in 1934. After the war broke out, Sheptytsky sent him to Germany. Father Peters returned to Lviv in the summer of 1941 and helped the Metropolitan of Halych become immune to intrigues and daydreams related to the German policy in the occupied territories (Ibidem, p. 415).

³⁹ Jarosław Hrycak, *Historia Ukrainy. 1772–1999*, Lublin 2000, p. 229.

⁴⁰ Олександр Є. Лисенко, "Релігійне питання..." p. 41.

The policy that the OUN-B faction introduced after the German troops entered Eastern Galicia began to deviate more and more from the program and goals formulated by Sheptytsky in his message from July 1, 1941. The aim of eliminating “the enemies of Ukraine indicated by the nationalists, including Poles” was one example. According to the findings of Ewa Siemaszko, the largest number of Polish victims of the Ukrainian terror of 1941 was recorded in the province of Ternopil.⁴¹ On July 15, 1941, Sheptytsky received a representative of OUN-B. According to the information possessed by the metropolitan, the leadership of the OUN was to adopt a strategy of terror against the Polish population. During the meeting, there was talk of the related order to “kill priests and Poles.”⁴² Sheptytsky allegedly expressed his opposition to such actions, as “they put the Greek Catholic Church in a difficult position.”⁴³ In addition, the entire initiative related to the declaration of Ukrainian independence was carried out without the knowledge of the Germans entering Galicia. Stetsko’s government was dissolved after a few days by the new occupation authorities, and its leaders were arrested.

In order to understand the reasons why Sheptytsky decided to support the proclamation of Ukrainian independence and the government of Yaroslav Stetsko with his authority, one must take into account the broader context of events. In the occupied territories, the Germans created “temporary statelessness,” in which all previous rules of society were “suspended.” The vacuum that was created after the “annulment of statehood” led to the suspension of the rules that had previously governed society in the occupied territories. As Timothy Snyder pointed out, “the true Nazi revolution had begun.”⁴⁴ This meant “the nullification of statehood and law,” which was “a matter of life and death.” Snyder aptly concluded that “citizenship is meaningful only

⁴¹ Ewa Siemaszko, “Bilans zbrodni,” *Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej* (2010), no. 7–8, p. 81.

⁴² Олександр Є. Лисенко, “Релігійне питання...,” p. 46.

⁴³ Ibidem.

⁴⁴ Timothy Snyder, *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning*, New York 2013, p. 105.

when recognized reciprocally; Hitler was destroying the principle of citizenship when he destroyed a neighboring civitas, moving Germany along with Europe towards lawlessness. ... Coordinating this utopian colonial image with twentieth-century political reality in the middle of Europe required not just the subjugation of people, but also the destruction of the institutions that were, in fact present.”⁴⁵ One of the consequences of this state of affairs was the pogroms that took place in various places in former Galicia. It is worth mentioning that the process of destroying these institutions did not begin when the German army entered Galicia. It had begun in September 1939 under Soviet rule. Potentially, the formation of Stetsko’s government could have been expected to end the state of chaos that had arisen under the conditions of this “interim statelessness.” Sheptytsky supported this government, but, as mentioned above, he attached his support to clear conditions. It soon turned out that the hopes he had placed in the OUN initiative were in vain. Sheptytsky, who legitimized the proclamation of Ukrainian statehood with his authority, unsuccessfully tried to persuade the feuding OUN leaders to reconcile and consolidate.⁴⁶ When the whole initiative ended in a fiasco, Sheptytsky acted independently within his capabilities to fill the resulting vacuum and control the chaos. These steps taken by the head of the Greek Catholic Church were also intended to neutralize the intentions of the OUN-B leadership. Its goal was to take control over local administrative structures under German occupation. On the other hand, the nationalists intended to transform the Church itself “into an obedient tool for implementing the OUN’s platform.”⁴⁷ On July 10, 1941,

⁴⁵ Ibidem, p. 106.

⁴⁶ “Лист митр. Андрея Шептицького до полковника Андрія Мельника з вимогою порозуміння зі Степаном Бандерою та ліквідації роздору в ОУН,” in: *Митрополит Андрей Шептицький. Життя і Дяльність. Документи і Матеріали 1899–1944*, vol. 2, part 2, ed. Андрій Кравчук, Lviv 1999, p. 925.

⁴⁷ Олександр Є. Лисенко, “Релігійне питання...,” p. 40; For more on this issue, see John-Paul Himka, “Christianity and Radical Nationalism: Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky and the Bandera Movement,” in: *State Secularism and Lived Religion in Soviet Russia and Ukraine*, ed. Catherine Wanner, New York 2012, pp. 93–116.

the head of the Greek Catholic Church issued a “Message to the Clergy” in which he stated that “we must start working hard to bring order to parishes and communities as soon as possible.”⁴⁸ Therefore, the Metropolitan of Halych recommended that local priests take the initiative in organizing the election of local authorities. If this could not be achieved “without party conflicts, which are a ruin and a misfortune for our cause,” the local pastor was supposed to appoint “the mayor, councilors, and the head of the militia” himself.

At the same time, Greek Catholic priests were to call for “obedience to the German military authority, and perhaps, in time, also to civil authority.”⁴⁹ Metropolitan Sheptytsky stated that the period of the Bolshevik occupation could have been conducive to “revolutionary” moods. However, in the current situation, “a revolution is no longer needed” and instead, it is necessary to “order and establish what depends on us and what we consider necessary and good for our nation and for the future of our state.” Sheptytsky considered “internal divisions and mutual struggle” to be the “greatest danger.”⁵⁰ “Whoever brings us a civil war harms the national cause, even if he also had great merit for it.”⁵¹ In this way, Sheptytsky expressed his critical assessment of the actions taken by both factions of the OUN.

The metropolitan of Halych was particularly concerned about the fate of young people. He urged priests working in parishes to constantly make young people aware that “no human judgments and no oaths taken can justify sin against God’s commandments.”⁵² This is an unambiguous allusion to the moral relativism on which the ideology of Ukrainian integral nationalism was based. Sheptytsky appealed through the clergy under his authority to warn young people that “there may be times” when they will be encouraged to act in ways that will be

⁴⁸ “Посланіє до Духовенства про організацію парохії і громади,” in: *Митрополит Андрей Шептицький. Документи і Матеріали 1941–1944*, ed. Жанна Ковба, Kyiv 2003, p. 10.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 12.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

⁵² *Ibidem*.

contrary to their conscience and God's law. In such situations, Sheptytsky exhorted the people to always act "as a Christian and obedient to God's law."⁵³ At the end of the message to his flock, the Metropolitan of Halych outlined the main goal of pastoral work: "to teach and set such an example that among our faithful there will be no one who will remain in God's disfavor and anger." Sheptytsky emphasized that a Christian "may fall into sin, but he should not remain in sin."⁵⁴ Therefore, as we read in the Message to the Clergy, "as long as there are people among your faithful who do not know this and do not know how to live like this, you, reverend fathers, have not fulfilled the most important part of your pastoral mission."⁵⁵ Critics of Sheptytsky accuse him of collaborating with the Germans during World War II and of supporting Ukrainian nationalist radicals. The proclamation of July 1, 1941, in which the metropolitan welcomed the German army and expressed his support for the government of Yaroslav Stetsko established by the OUN, would be the crowning proof in this matter.

How did Bishop Khomyshyn behave in these circumstances? It seems that his attitude basically was the same as that of Sheptytsky. On July 6, 1941, he sent his pastoral letter on the occasion of the proclamation of Ukrainian independence. In addition, on July 12, 1941, Khomyshyn performed at a special meeting convened for the occasion in Stanislaviv. Apart from him, the representative from the OUN-B, Bohdan Rybchuk, took the floor.⁵⁶ Meanwhile, the preface to *Two Kingdoms* reveals a slightly different picture of Khomyshyn's actions in those difficult and dramatic days. The author claims that "Bishop Khomyshyn refrained from sending a congratulatory letter" on the announcement of the creation of the Ukrainian state, while "the text of the proclamation was prepared by a monk." Moreover, the reader learns from the preface that the bishop of Stanislaviv "never had any illusions concerning proper German intentions regarding

⁵³ Ibidem.

⁵⁴ Ibidem.

⁵⁵ Ibidem, p. 14.

⁵⁶ Олег Єгрешій, *Єпископ Григорій...*, p. 129.

Ukraine. He had acquainted himself with Hitler's work, *Mein Kampf*, and knew what the plans of the German leader regarding eastern policy were.⁵⁷ At this point, reference is made to the notes from the interrogation of Bishop Khomyshyn during the investigation before the NKVD authorities.

It turns out that there are quite significant discrepancies between the actual content of Khomyshyn's testimony and the way they were related in the preface to *Two Kingdoms*. According to the source text, the Bishop of Stanislaviv testified that "from the accounts of people who visited me, I knew that the Germans promised the Ukrainians that they would make a decision to create an 'Independent Ukraine,' which I was a supporter of. That is why I was glad that the Germans came, although I did not fully believe in their promises, because even in the times of Poland I read Hitler's book, *Mein Kampf*, in which he laid out his idea of pushing to the East."⁵⁸ On the other hand, to the investigator's question about his attitude toward the "Independent Ukraine" established by the OUN, Khomyshyn replied unequivocally: "I am a supporter of creating 'Independent Ukraine' and whoever would do it, I would be happy that it happened."⁵⁹ As mentioned above, in the case of the "Volhynia massacre" thread in the preface to *Two Kingdoms*, the date when Khomyshyn supposedly appealed to Sheptytsky for a public reaction to the escalation of Ukrainian terror was changed. According to the original version, established in the literature on the subject, it was November 8, 1943, after the apogee of the massacre of the Polish population in Volhynia. By changing the date to July 8, 1943, it was possible to perpetuate a specific narrative about the Bishop of Stanislaviv (an ardent Ukrainian patriot and prophet).

Afterwards this manipulation was decreed by a parliamentary resolution commemorating the 150th anniversary of the birth of the Bishop

⁵⁷ Григорій Хомишин, *Два Царства...*, p. 94.

⁵⁸ "Протокол допиту заарештованого єпископа Григорія Хомишина (21 квітня 1945)," in: *Ліквідація УГКЦ (1939–1946). Документи радянських органів державної безпеки*, vol. 1, ed. Володимир Сергійчук, Kyiv 2006, p. 563.

⁵⁹ Ibidem.

of Stanislaviv.⁶⁰ His alleged attempts to persuade the remaining members of the Greek Catholic episcopate to condemn the Ukrainian nationalists on the eve of the massacre in Volhynia became a permanent element of this new image of the Bishop of Stanislaviv promoted in Poland. Simultaneously, a number of actors shaping the discourse of memory in Poland have made Sheptytsky co-responsible for the crimes committed by Ukrainian nationalists.

On the other hand, when it comes to the declaration of independence by the OUN-B on June 30, 1941, it seems that Khomyshyn thought and behaved in the same way as Sheptytsky. He was relieved when the German troops entered former Galicia. He supported the nationalists' initiative, but, like Sheptytsky, he did so under certain conditions. However, such a picture of events does not fit the paradigm adopted by the publishers of *Two Kingdoms*: the evil, fallible, and naive Sheptytsky versus the good prophet Khomyshyn. In this case, a predetermined opposition was created by omitting certain facts and "creatively interpreting" the source texts.

⁶⁰ The effect of this manipulation was particularly visible during the parliamentary debate on the resolution "on the celebration of the memory of Blessed Bishop Hryhorij Khomyshyn on the 150th anniversary of his birth" on March 23, 2017. Even in the justification to the draft resolution, its authors claimed that Khomyshyn "on the eve of Bloody Sunday, July 8, 1943, he addressed the Uniate bishops with a proposal for a joint letter from the hierarchs warning against the crime of genocide" (print 1402). This claim has already been repeated in the Sejm by the representative of the Kukiz'15 faction, Elżbieta Borowska, who was the deputy rapporteur in the debate on the resolution (38_b p. 243). Later, Piotr Babinetz from PiS also referred to this argument (38_b p. 244). For example, in December 2017, the book *Two Kingdoms* was presented at the headquarters of the Catholic Association "Civitas Christiana" in Zamość. According to an account of this event, "Khomyshyn condemned the murder of the Polish population in Volhynia" (Przemysław Koper, "*Two Kingdoms*—memories of the bishop-martyr," <http://www.zamosconline.pl/text.php?id=13486&rodz=kul&tt=-two-kingdoms-memories-bishop-martyr->). Four years later, the Institute of National Remembrance co-organized an exhibition entitled "Blessed Bishop Hryhorij Khomyshyn—Prophet of Ukraine." Information about the event appeared on the Institute's website, claiming that Khomyshyn "reacted unequivocally to the Volhynia massacre—he condemned the criminal actions of Ukrainian nationalists" ("Wystawa 'Błogosławiony biskup Grzegorz Chomyszyn – prorok Ukrainy' na Przystanku Historia IPN w Krakowie," <https://ipn.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/148030,Wystawa-Blogoslawiony-biskup-Grzegorz-Chomyszyn-prorok-Ukrainy-na-Przystanku-His.html>).

In the imposed narrative scheme, the uniqueness of Khomyshyn was supposed to stem from the fact that every time Sheptytsky made mistakes and erred—from the point of view of the authors of this scheme—the Bishop of Stanislaviv showed others the right path and followed it himself. This scheme uses a specific narrative (“Prophet of Ukraine”), which has been combined with skillful use of symbolic violence. It was generated by unverifiable claims about the scientific preparation of the manuscript and with the use of the authority of the Church (the fact of beatification) and the Sejm (special resolution).

Thanks to this, an extremely suggestive scheme of interpreting the past was created. It gives various actors contributing to memory on various levels a false sense of comfort when formulating judgments and assessments without discussion, verification, or confrontation with the facts concerning Sheptytsky. This can be seen in another controversial thread, which is associated with the creation of the SS-Galizien division. The support that Sheptytsky allegedly gave to this initiative is still one of the most serious allegations made by his critics.⁶¹ Indeed, the conduct of the head of the Greek Catholic Church in this matter may look morally ambiguous. On the one hand, Sheptytsky was reserved about the initiative to create this unit. His supporters emphasize that there was no original document to confirm that he blessed the division.⁶² At the same time, however, the Metropolitan of Galicia delegated Greek Catholic chaplains to the division created for fight at the side of the Third Reich.⁶³

However, Khomyshyn behaved in exactly the same morally ambiguous way in this matter. Several clergy from his diocese wanted to volunteer for the division and thus applied to their Ordinary for permission. Khomyshyn refused. On the other hand, at the request

⁶¹ “Sheptytsky Andrei,” https://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%206020.PDF.

⁶² “Chief Rabbi of Ukraine Asks Yad Vashem To Recognize Andrey Sheptytsky as Righteous Among the Nations,” https://risu.ua/en/chief-rabbi-of-ukraine-asks-yad-vashem-to-recognize-andrey-sheptytsky-as-righteous-among-the-nations_n102246.

⁶³ For more on this topic, see Андрій Михалейко, *Митрополит Андрій Шептицький...*, pp. 310–351.

of a representative of the German administration, the Bishop of Stanislaviv issued a “special proclamation” in which he called on the clergy to encourage their faithful to join the ranks of the division.⁶⁴ In the preface to *Two Kingdoms*, Włodzimierz Osadczy admitted that “the Germans required the Uniate clergy to engage in the process of recruiting volunteers for the SS-Galizien division” and that therefore Khomyshyn “was forced to comply with the orders of the occupation authorities.”⁶⁵ However, the actors building the myth of Khomyshyn as the Prophet of Ukraine later adapted the narrative with regards to the relationship of both hierarchs to the Ukrainian collaborationist unit created within the Waffen-SS—to the paradigm of “good Khomyshyn”—“bad Sheptytsky.” Thus, if Sheptytsky made a mistake about the SS-Galizien division again, regardless of what the facts were, Khomyshyn once again must have behaved correctly.

Therefore, messages began to appear in the public space that Khomyshyn “did not encourage” people to join the SS-Galizien,⁶⁶ that “he forbade his priests to perform functions in the SS-Galizien division being formed in Ukraine,”⁶⁷ or that he even “opposed the regulation of the German occupation authorities on the involvement of Greek Catholic priests in the formation of the SS-Galizien division.”⁶⁸ Of course, Sheptytsky’s attitude in this matter, in comparison with Khomyshyn, is assessed unequivocally negatively. That is, Sheptytsky “supported the German occupier very strongly” and “from the point of view of Polish law, he was simply a German collaborator.” Sheptytsky was to pursue “the line that the Germans dreamed of.” And this

⁶⁴ Олег Єгрешій, *Єпископ Григорій...*, p. 132.

⁶⁵ Григорій Хомишин, *Два Царства...*, p. 94.

⁶⁶ “Ks. Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski: bł. Grzegorz Chomyszyn był prorokiem ws. ukraińskiego nacjonalizmu,” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z4YIubvkNOE>.

⁶⁷ Stanisław Koper, “*Dwa Królestwa* – wspomnienia biskupa-męczennika,” <http://www.zamosconline.pl/text.php?id=13486&rodz=kul&tt=-dwa-krolestwa-wspomnienia-biskupa-meczennika->.

⁶⁸ “Wystawa ‘Błogosławiony biskup Grzegorz Chomyszyn – prorok Ukrainy,’” <https://ipn.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/148030,Wystawa-Blogoslawiony-biskup-Grzegorz-Chomyszyn-prorok-Ukrainy-na-Przystanku-His.html?search=7959206932254>.

happened because the head of the Greek Catholic Church was “an extremely naive man.”⁶⁹ Interestingly, based on the narrative imposed by *Two Kingdoms* and its publishers, the paradigm of “good Khomyshyn” – “bad Sheptytsky” has also been adopted in the field of science, i.e. in professional historiography. One example is Mieczysław Ryba’s book, *Church and State in the South-Eastern Borderlands of the Second Polish Republic*,⁷⁰ which was published by the Institute of National Remembrance in 2021. One of the aims of the publication was to analyze the relationship between the Polish state and the Catholic Churches of three rites (Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and Armenian) that operated in Eastern Galicia. It is therefore no coincidence that the figures of three Lviv metropolitans appeared on the cover of the book: the Roman Catholic Józef Bilczewski, the Armenian Józef Teodorowicz, and the Greek Catholic Andrey Sheptytsky. However, if the cover was to illustrate the content of the book, it should also have included an image of Hryhorij Khomyshyn. When the author discusses issues related to the Greek Catholic Church, he invokes both hierarchs Sheptytsky and Khomyshyn with the same frequency. As a result, the reader may get the false impression that the two figures played an equal role in the history of the Greek Catholic Church and in the national life of Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia in the interwar period.

In the introduction, Mieczysław Ryba pointed out the special meaning that *Two Kingdoms* had for him. He described it “as a particularly significant work.”⁷¹ Indeed there are plenty of references in Ryba’s book to *Two Kingdoms*. As a result, Khomyshyn started to play the role of a reviewer of Sheptytsky’s proceedings. Khomyshyn’s assessments are usually quoted uncritically in the monograph. Despite the clear infatuation with the text of *Two Kingdoms*, Ryba’s book does not directly fit into the black-and-white scheme of “good Khomyshyn” – “bad Sheptytsky.” This happened because the author limited himself to quoting and reporting negative opinions about the head of the Greek Catholic

⁶⁹ “Ks. Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski...”

⁷⁰ Mieczysław Ryba, *Kościół i państwo na kresach południowo-wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej*, Warszawa 2021.

⁷¹ Ibidem, p. 11.

Church, which were formulated by Khomyshyn himself, as well as other characters appearing on the pages of the monograph. It can therefore be said that the image of the “evil Sheptytsky” that emerges from this publication lacks a final conclusion in which the authenticity of this image could be confirmed by a scientific authority.

Nevertheless, the monograph published by the Institute of National Remembrance was to be another nail in the coffin for supporters of the positive memory of Sheptytsky. This can be seen perfectly by following the course of the panel discussion, which was to promote *Church and State in the South-Eastern Borderlands of the Second Polish Republic*. One of the participants, Andrzej Gil, praised the book by saying that “Professor Ryba showed a figure that is completely unknown in Poland—and I have the impression in Ukraine as well. We all know Andrey Sheptytsky, but it’s like the moon: we know the bright side of the moon, but we don’t know the other side.” The panelist argued that Mieczysław Ryba “showed the other side of Sheptytsky, and secondly, showed that there was another life besides Sheptytsky—this is Hryhoryj Khomyshyn.”⁷² From the further course of his statement, it becomes clear that Sheptytsky was the one who kept making mistakes and succumbing to various illusions, for example, in the case of turning toward the Eastern Christian tradition or accepting nationalism. Khomyshyn, on the other hand, acted properly and correctly on these issues; that is, he called for a turn toward the Latin tradition and “rejected nationalism and other ‘-isms.’”⁷³ In this narrative, Sheptytsky appears as a threat to the catholicity of his community, while Khomyshyn and the memory of him would allow this catholicity to be saved. At the same time, the very concept of “Catholicity” has been greatly mythologized here. It appears here not as a description of a specific kind of cultural or civilizational model, but as a synonym of culture and civilization as such.

Andrzej Gil also treated the monograph’s promotion as a pretext for diagnosing the situation in contemporary Ukraine. He stated emphatically that “today’s Ukraine is a strictly Soviet product ... and

⁷² “Kościoł i państwo na Kresach Południowo-Wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej;” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5i3nNVXR3Q>.

⁷³ Ibidem.

the Greek Catholic Church has gone astray and is looking for inspiration from the wrong sources.”⁷⁴ As it is not difficult to guess, the panelist was referring, among other things, to the efforts made by the UGCC to commemorate Sheptytsky.

The second of the discussion’s participants, Przemysław Czarnek, “to confirm the words” of Andrzej Gil, quoted an excerpt from Ryba’s book. It began in a very characteristic way: “Bishop Hryhorij Khomyshyn followed a different path than Metropolitan Sheptytsky. His gaze never turned to the East, his sober and realistic mind was not attracted by uncertain, though great, sometimes foggy, ideas of the union bordering on fantasy. Most of all, he wanted to feel at home on solid ground under his feet.”⁷⁵

These quotes show that the paradigm of “good Khomyshyn” – “bad Sheptytsky” has been successfully adapted, not only for the needs of journalistic statements, but also as an element of a specific interpretative canon in the scientific discourse, in the sphere of professional, academic historiography. It is also worth noting the close links between memory actors who also operate in the field of science and politics, which is visible on this occasion. Przemysław Czarnek, who participated in the panel, is not a historian and, as he admitted, “has not read the whole book.”⁷⁶ However, he is one of the “media faces” of the ruling United Right and serves as the minister of science and education. The author of the monograph, Mieczysław Ryba, was at that time a member of the team of advisers to Minister Czarnek. In addition, Ryba and Czarnek are the president and vice-president, respectively, of the Catholic Intelligentsia Club in Lublin. This club was partly responsible for publishing Khomyshyn’s *Two Kingdoms*.

⁷⁴ Ibidem.

⁷⁵ Ibidem.

⁷⁶ Ibidem.

CHAPTER 5

THE UNKNOWN SHEPTYTSKY

This chapter has two purposes. The first is to shed light on those parts of Sheptytsky's legacy that have still not been sufficiently explored. The second task of the chapter is to look again at the sociocultural and political context of Sheptytsky's work. It is a kind of invitation to further reassess his legacy as part of the process of shaping a new cultural memory in Ukraine. This legacy includes the peculiarities of Sheptytsky's relationship with the Vatican, especially during the two key pontificates of Benedict XV and Pius XI. In addition, the issue of Sheptytsky's relationship with people in the closest circle of associates is still poorly developed. The following paragraphs of the chapter are devoted to three such people: Cyrille Korolevskij, Leonid Fedorov, and Oleksandr Bachynskiy. Their joint activity and mutual relations also make up the heritage associated with the Metropolitan of Halych. This chapter also includes brief case studies that have been reconstructed from hitherto unknown empirical material. Firstly, they allow a better look at the specific organizational culture and social conditions in which the Greek Catholic Church functioned in the interwar period. Secondly, thanks to them, it will be possible to see how Sheptytsky dealt with this culture and conditions as a priest and administrator of the diocese.

5.1. Sheptytsky and the Vatican

According to some, Sheptytsky developed an "exceptionally strong position in the Vatican." This resulted from the plans to expand the influence of the Catholic Church in Orthodox-dominated Eastern

Europe—which involved a series of popes—and from the role played by the Metropolitan of Halych in these plans.¹ However, the real strength of Sheptytsky’s influence in the Holy See was not as obvious as it might seem. As noted by Athanasius McVay, “Andrei Sheptytsky served under five popes, three secretaries of state and seven heads of the Oriental dicasteries. His relationship with each differed according to the needs of his Church, the individual policies of each pontiff and those of his officials.”² Even if popes manifested “the generosity and solicitude” toward the Greek-Catholic Church, “sometimes they were limited by members of their Curia.”³ Thus, even if Sheptytsky managed to gain the understanding of the popes, he still had to reckon with various forms of resistance and obstacles from the Vatican bureaucracy.

Benedict XV received the Metropolitan of Galicia three times during his stay in Rome at the end of 1920 and early 1921.⁴ Thanks to this, the Metropolitan of Galicia managed to present the current situation of the Ukrainian population in Eastern Galicia. Soon, the Pope sent a special papal letter, in which he expressed his sympathy for the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia regarding the situation in which they found themselves after the lost confrontation with the Poles. In addition, the head of the Catholic Church allocated financial support “for the victims of the war in Eastern Galicia” and funds for the reactivation of the Collegium Ruthenum.⁵ One might get the impression from these gestures that Sheptytsky really had managed to gain special

¹ Maciej Mróz, *W kregu dyplomacji watykańskiej. Rosja, Polska, Ukraina w dyplomacji watykańskiej w latach 1917–1926*, Toruń 2004, p. 213.

² Athanasius D. McVay, “The Apostolic See and Ukrainians Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky and the Roman Curia,” in: *Le gouvernement pontifical sous Pie XI. Pratiques romaines et gestion de l’universel*, (ed.) Laura Pettinaroli, Rome 2013, p. 253.

³ Ibidem.

⁴ For more on this issue, see Ліліана Гентош, *Ватикан і виклики модерності: східноєвропейська політика Папи Венедикта XV та українсько-польський конфлікт у Галичині (1914–1922 роки)*, Lviv 2006.

⁵ Maria Klaczko, “Podróż metropolity Szeptyckiego do Zachodniej Europy i Ameryki w latach 1920–1923,” in: *Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki. Studia i materiały*, ed. Andrzej A. Zięba, Kraków 1994, p. 160.

favor from Benedict XV. It was not a coincidence that the Metropolitan of Galicia convinced his faithful “what a good and true father we have in this extraordinary man whom God appointed the Head of the entire Christ Universal Church.”⁶ However, for Sheptytsky, the issue of Benedict XV’s approval of his activities in Russia was of key importance. In 1917, based on secret authorization formulated orally by the pope Pius X, the Metropolitan of Halych established the Catholic Church of the Eastern Rite in Russia. Without the Pope’s official confirmation of the legality of this decision, the fate of the new community was in doubt, especially in light of the fact that various projects aiming to “Catholicize” Russia were competing for advocates in the Vatican Curia.⁷ Benedict XV actually ordered the release of documents that confirmed the often questioned powers of attorney for Sheptytsky to operate in Russia. At the same time, however, Leonid Fedorov, nominated by the Metropolitan of Halych as the head of the new Russian Catholic Church, did not receive the status of a bishop, but only the “insignificant title of protonotary apostolic.”⁸ Moreover, Benedict XV forbade Sheptytsky from appointing and ordaining bishops for Russia. As a result, along with the confirmation of his existing powers of attorney, Sheptytsky did not obtain “any authority or effective jurisdiction” for the future.⁹ Thus, in matters of key importance to the Metropolitan of Galicia, his audience with Benedict XV ended in defeat.¹⁰ Source materials in the Vatican archives seem to prove that during the pontificate of Benedict XV’s successor, Pius XI, Sheptytsky’s position weakened significantly. According to McVay, “the generosity and solicitude

⁶ “Письмо Святейшого Отця до українського народу,” *Львівсько-Архієпископальні Відомости*, 34 (1921), no. 2, p. 5.

⁷ For more on this issue, see Laura Pettinaroli, *La politique russe du Saint-Siège (1905–1939)*, Rome 2015 (especially pp. 503–522). The book is available at: <http://books.openedition.org/efr/2933>; Maciej Mróz, *Z dziejów rosyjskiego katolicyzmu. Kościół Greckokatolicki w Rosji w latach 1907–2007*, Toruń 2008, pp. 140–186.

⁸ Leon Tretjakewitsch, “Andrey Šeptyckyj, Michel d’Herbigny et la Russie,” *Logos* 34 (1993), p. 472.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

manifested by the Roman Pontiffs over centuries were sometimes limited by members of their Curia.”¹¹ This was to be particularly visible during the pontificate of Pius XI, “when the Ukrainian primate was issued instructions without regard for his position as head of a particular church and spiritual father of a nation whose name the Curial organs were forbidden to use.”¹² As an illustration of this situation, one can recall the clash that occurred at the very beginning of Pius XI’s pontificate between the representative of the Greek Catholic Church, the rector of the Ukrainian Pontifical College of Saint Josaphat, Father Lazar Blazheiovskiy, and the papal secretary of state, Cardinal Pietro Gasparri. A high-ranking representative of the Vatican curia allegedly communicated to Father Blazheiovskiy “that His Holiness no longer wants to hear the word ‘Ukrainians’ and instead we may only speak of Ruthenians.”¹³ In order to understand the meaning of this statement, it should be interpreted in the broader context, especially of the Polish–Ukrainian conflict in Eastern Galicia. Shortly before, the Ukrainians had suffered a defeat in a direct armed conflict with the Poles and had to come to terms with the actual incorporation of Eastern Galicia into the Polish state. In their domestic policy, the Polish authorities consistently used the term “Ruthenians” instead of “Ukrainians.” Undoubtedly, the position presented by Cardinal Gasparri on this matter reflected the Polish point of view regarding the situation in Eastern Galicia. This statement was met with strong disapproval from Blazheiovskiy.

It is worth noting that at the time, the fate of Eastern Galicia had not yet been formally settled. Starting in 1919, these areas remained under the administration of the Polish state. However, due to the Polish–Ukrainian conflict over these lands, the participants of the peace conference in Versailles postponed the final decision on Eastern Galicia. Intensive efforts were made by both sides of the dispute to obtain a mutually beneficial solution. The Ukrainians demanded some institutional

¹¹ Athanasius D. McVay, “The Apostolic See...,” p. 253.

¹² Ibidem.

¹³ Cyrille Korolevskij, *Kniga bytija moego*, ed. Giuseppe M. Croce, Vatican 2007, p. 248.

form of recognition of their right to self-determination (international recognition for the West Ukrainian People's Republic, or at least autonomy). In turn, the Polish diplomats made efforts to ensure that Eastern Galicia was finally annexed to the territory of the Polish state by the Council of Ambassadors in Paris.

Metropolitan Sheptytsky informally acted in the international arena as the representative of the Ukrainian nation and the emigrant "Ukrainian government agents." Thanks to various efforts, he managed to "skillfully raise, albeit briefly, the merits of the Ukrainian case in the arena of international politics and diplomacy."¹⁴ The aforementioned letter of Benedict XV to the Ukrainians could testify to this. The clash between Cardinal Gasparri and Father Blazheiovskyi over the use of the terms "Ruthenians" and "Ukrainians" showed that the Vatican was ambivalent about the Polish–Ukrainian dispute over the future of Eastern Galicia and that Sheptytsky's efforts were unable to change this fact.

At the same time, in some cases, the Holy See genuinely took Sheptytsky's opinion into account. This was the case, for example, with the concordat negotiations between the Vatican and the Polish state. One of the most sensitive problems in negotiations was the issue of regulations concerning the material remuneration of the clergy and land ownership, on which the Vatican conducted behind-the-scenes consultations with Sheptytsky. The Metropolitan of Halych developed detailed recommendations on this issue, most of which were eventually included in the signed text of the concordat.¹⁵ Sheptytsky's postulates concerned the broadest possible guarantees of the Church's autonomy with respect to the state, which is a matter of fundamental importance for the entire Catholic Church in Poland.

The above-mentioned incident involving Cardinal Gasparri and Father Blazheiovskyi shows how the political conflict between Poles and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia translated into a conflict between two church institutions: the Roman Catholic Church in Poland and the Greek Catholic Church. In the ecclesial dimension, the stake of

¹⁴ Maciej Mróz, *W kregu dyplomacji...*, p. 213.

¹⁵ Ліліана Гентош, *Митрополит Шептицький...*, p. 44.

this rivalry was to gain the influence and favor of the Pope and representatives of the Vatican dicastery.

Sheptytsky was also able to convince himself of this many times, and he was also not indifferent to the issue of granting political agency to Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia. At the same time, he was probably much more skillful in the sphere of diplomacy than various emissaries and official representatives of the Ukrainians on exile who tried to gain international recognition for Ukrainian national and state aspirations. It was no coincidence that Cyrille Korolevskij persuaded Sheptytsky: “Who knows if it wasn’t providence that Your Excellency managed to leave the borders of Poland? By saying this, I mean the political situation in Galicia, which needs to be worked on, and Your Excellency will be heard a hundred times better than all those famous representatives of the Petrushevych family, who may be brave people, but they are poor politicians and not diplomats.”¹⁶ Sheptytsky’s work to grant political autonomy to Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia caused “complications in political and diplomatic relations between Warsaw and the Vatican.” In connection with this, Polish diplomacy was forced to undertake “not always effective contractions,” the purpose of which was “to block Sheptytsky’s considerable activity in the field which was undoubtedly non-ecclesiastical.”¹⁷ Thus, both the Polish diplomatic service and the structures subordinate to the ministries of foreign and internal affairs of Poland collected all materials and information “that could compromise the metropolitan” and which would give a pretext for accusations of “conducting political activity and would incriminate the Greek Catholic clergy for committing various crimes.”¹⁸ Between 1920 and 1923, Sheptytsky traveled for several months to Western Europe and North and South America. One of the goals of this journey was to gain support for the “Ukrainian issue” in the international arena. It is no wonder that during the preparations for this expedition, Sheptytsky could once again convince himself of the effectiveness of the behind-the-scenes efforts from the Polish side,

¹⁶ Cyrille Korolevskij, *Kniga bytija...*, p. 191.

¹⁷ Maciej Mróz, *W kregu dyplomacji...*, p. 213.

¹⁸ Ліліана Гентош, *Митрополит Шептицький...*, p. 12.

which were to thwart his plans. In connection with the planned trip, Sheptytsky made efforts to be designated a visitor of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in South and North America. In this role, he would be entitled to receive a diplomatic passport as an official representative of the Vatican. It so happened that the Polish passport used by the Metropolitan expired on April 20, 1921. According to Sheptytsky's calculations, as the holder of a diplomatic passport, he would have the right to obtain a diplomatic visa from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Metropolitan of Halych assumed that the status of an official envoy of the Holy See and the aforementioned visa would "ensure him freedom of movement" and that if he wanted to return to Lviv, "the Polish authorities would have their hands tied" and would not be able to prevent him from entering the country.¹⁹ Although the Congregation for the Dissemination of the Faith granted Sheptytsky the status of visitor in South America, the case for a similar designation in North America "got bogged down" and the metropolitan did not get it in the end. It is no coincidence that Cyrille Korolevskij, when reporting on the issue of applying for a passport to Sheptytsky, wrote that due to "all the problems related to Poland," the Vatican "does not want to expose itself too much."²⁰ Sheptytsky's position in the Vatican was the result of his relationships with representatives of the Vatican dicastery and direct relationship with the Pope. In turn, both were influenced by external factors, including the dynamic international situation at the time, in which both Sheptytsky and the Vatican were trying to find their place.

In matters of Polish–Ukrainian relations, it was much more difficult for Sheptytsky to break through in the Vatican with his position. This was evident, for example, in connection with the so-called "pacification action" in Eastern Galicia.²¹ The repressions applied by the Polish authorities against the Ukrainian population sparked protests

¹⁹ Cyrille Korolevskij, *Kniga bytija...*, p. 186.

²⁰ Ibidem, p. 191.

²¹ Роман Скакун, «Пацифікація»: польські репресії 1930 року в Галичині, Lviv 2012; Grzegorz Mazur, "Problem pacyfikacji Małopolski Wschodniej," *Zeszyty Historyczne* (2001), no. 135, pp. 3–39.

from various circles, mainly Ukrainian. Efforts were made to publicize them on the international stage. One such voice made itself heard in a special letter to Pius XI of October 21, 1930, which, on the initiative of Sheptytsky, was sent by the episcopate of the Greek Catholic Church. The bishops extensively described examples of abuse by the Polish army and police against their faithful. They paid particular attention to the “special brutality” of the actions of the Polish authorities against women and children and to the systematic destruction of public property and cultural goods.²² According to Liliana Hentosh, it was mainly the influence of this letter that caused Pius XI to react to the Polish authorities’ brutal repression of the Ukrainian population.²³ He had a firm conversation with the Polish ambassador to the Holy See. However, contrary to initial fears, the Vatican did not take any other official actions on the international stage in connection with the events in Eastern Lesser Poland. According to Hentosh, “the pope’s pro-Polish attitude was so strong” that, despite everything, “he did not want to harm Poland in any way in the international arena.”²⁴ Pius XI, as the Apostolic Nuncio in Warsaw, could closely observe the Polish–Ukrainian conflict. Thus, he was aware that the Greek Catholic Church had become a key element of Ukrainian national life, and that for this reason it had been combated in various ways by the government in Warsaw. “He was convinced that the Polish government sought the annihilation of religious Ruthenianism, that is, the Greek Catholic Church, because of that church’s staunch support for ‘political Ruthenianism.’” Therefore, the future pope “was especially disturbed by the attitude of many of the Polish Catholic clergy toward the government’s plans. He shared with Cardinal Marini his observation that Polish bishops and priests would not shed a single tear if the government were to succeed in destroying the Greek Catholic Church.”²⁵ Admittedly,

²² Ліліана Гентош, *Митрополит Шептицький...*, p. 81.

²³ Ibidem, pp. 81–82.

²⁴ Ibidem, 83.

²⁵ Liliana Hentosh, “Vatican Policy on the Ukrainian–Polish War of 1918–1919 as an Example of the Catholic Church’s Response to National Conflicts,” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 37 (2012), p. 107.

in the first years after World War I, relations between the Vatican and the newly established Polish state were at times very tense. However, at the time when the “pacification” took place, the situation was completely different and “Poland did become the Vatican’s most important partner in East-Central Europe.”²⁶ Moreover, Pius XI was generally negative toward nationalist ideologies and organizations. Therefore, “numerous accusations of the metropolitan’s political involvement on the Ukrainian side found fertile ground in the Roman Curia.”²⁷ As far as political issues concerning Eastern Galicia are concerned, it can be seen that the Vatican’s policy changed with the change of the pope. While Sheptytsky managed to gain the understanding of Benedict XV on these matters, his successor adopted a more restrained and even pro-Polish attitude in this regard. However, the case of activities for the benefit of the Catholic Church among Orthodox believers looked a bit different.

It is worth remembering that the issue of “union with the East” became one of the main themes of Pius XI’s pontificate until 1928–29.²⁸ Pius XI expressed this in his encyclical *Ecclesiam Dei* of October 12, 1923,²⁹ in which the Pope presented his way of understanding the mission that the Catholic Church has to fulfill toward “separated” Orthodox Christians and the logic of action that should be followed to succeed in this mission. They are very similar to the concept for the Catholic Church implemented in Russia by Metropolitan Sheptytsky.

In the encyclical, Pius XI particularly emphasized the importance of the Eastern Christian tradition of Kyiv, on which Sheptytsky wanted to build the identity of the Greek Catholic Church, and from which he derived its special predispositions to work for the Catholic Church in the Orthodox East. The Pope, addressing the Eastern Orthodox Slavs, said that “they remained longer in communion with the Church than many of their neighbors. As is well known, they maintained relations of one kind or another with this Apostolic See even

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 110.

²⁷ Ліліана Гентош, *Митрополит Шептицький...*, p. 86.

²⁸ Laura Pettinaroli, *La politique russe...*, p. 504.

²⁹ *Ecclesiam Dei*, <https://www.papalencyclicals.net/pius11/p11eccl.htm>.

after the schism of Michael Caerularius—relations which, despite being interrupted by the invasions of the Tartars and Mongols, resumed and continued until they were brought to an end by the rebellious hard-headedness of their rulers.”³⁰ Moreover, the encyclical *Ecclesiam Dei* was promulgated on the 300th anniversary of the death of Josaphat Kuncewicz, whose figure is closely related to the Kyivan Eastern Christian tradition. It is no coincidence that the Pope pointed out that St. Josaphat “was quick to realize that the cause of unity would be greatly served by the return to the Catholic Church of those who followed the Eastern Slavic Rite and of the Basilian monks.”³¹ It is also clear from the text of the encyclical why the figure of St. Josaphat was such an important point of reference in Pius XI’s concept of promoting the Catholic Church in areas of Eastern Europe where Orthodoxy was traditionally dominant. It was about the saint’s readiness to make the highest sacrifices for the sake of Christian unity. After all, Kuncewicz was elevated to the altars as a martyr for this unity, as a priest who sacrificed his life for the cause of joining the Orthodox Church of Kyiv with Rome. Pius XI wrote that “thus, having first of all succeeded in spreading about widely the spirit of God, St. Josaphat was in a position to make secure the work for Christian unity to which he had dedicated his life. This work of consolidation, even of consecration, he achieved more through his martyrdom than by any other act, an ending to his life which he faced with enthusiasm and admirable greatness of soul. ... He was convinced that he would be martyred, and often spoke of the possibility of such an event occurring. In one of his famous sermons, he expressed a desire to be martyred; he prayed ardently to God for martyrdom as if it would be for him a singularly blessed gift.”³² In this context, it should be noted that it was Metropolitan Sheptytsky who placed the ethos of readiness for the highest sacrifices in the center of his action strategy for restoring communication between Orthodox believers and the Catholic Church. The reasoning that the Pope presented in his encyclical is strikingly consistent with

³⁰ Ibidem.

³¹ Ibidem.

³² Ibidem.

the content of the letter that Metropolitan Sheptytsky sent to Benedict XV in 1916. The Metropolitan of Halych was then in a very unique position. He had been imprisoned in the depths of Russia for two years. Sheptytsky began his letter to the Pope on September 29, 1916 with a description of a new place of seclusion in Suzdal. Then he addressed Benedict XV as follows: “With God’s grace and your blessing, Holy Father, Suzdal can become the center of the Union. If Your Holiness would not deny me your blessing by destining me to death, and should I receive from God the grace of shedding blood for the conversion of schismatics, I deeply trust that God will also hear my second prayer: *Domine trade eam (Russiam) in manus nostras* [Lord deliver her (Russia) in our hand] in a completely supra-political sense and Your Holiness will see the Russian Empire at your feet.” Sheptytsky then asked the pope not to jeopardize his authority and not to intervene in the matter of his release. “I am very, very well,” wrote the Metropolitan of Galicia, “too well, and I am satisfied with my position.”³³

According to the vision outlined by Pius XI in the encyclical *Ecclesiam Dei*, the union of Christians would be a gradual and universal process. That is, it was supposed to be the goal for which “all the faithful, following the teachings and in the footsteps of St. Josaphat, may strive, each according to his ability.”³⁴ At the same time, the pope emphasized that “unity is not so much promoted by discussions or by other artificial means, as by the example of a holy life and by good works.”³⁵

It is not difficult to notice that Andrey Sheptytsky understood the essence of his pastoral work in the same way, regardless of whether it was addressed to the faithful of his own Church or Orthodox believers.

It is worth paying attention to one more element of the strategy of achieving unity, which Pius XI outlined in his encyclical. It is about the need for the representatives of Eastern Christianity and the Western Christian tradition to get to know each other. He firmly held

³³ Suzdal, September 29, 1916. Sheptytsky to Pope Benedict XV, *Митрополит Андрей Шептицький і греко-католики в Росії*, vol. 1, eds. Юрій Аввакумов, Оксана Гайова, Lviv 2004, p. 706.

³⁴ *Ecclesiam Dei*, <https://www.papalencyclicals.net/pius11/p11eccl.htm>.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

the conviction that unity in the Catholic faith does not preclude the diversity of traditions. That is why the Pope said that “to achieve this end, as it is necessary on the one hand for the Schismatic Easterners to lay aside their ancient prejudices and seek to really to know the true life of the Church, not attributing to the Roman Church the faults of mere individuals, faults which she is the first to condemn and seeks as well to correct; so the Latins, on their side, must strive to understand better and more profoundly the history and customs of the Easterners.”³⁶ It can be said that Pius XI formulated the principles that Metropolitan Sheptytsky practiced and propagated from the very beginning of his work to reconstruct Christian unity, long before the encyclical *Ecclesiam Dei* was published. However, it can be assumed that for a large part of the Vatican administration, who managed church affairs in practice, these principles were difficult to accept. As an illustration, it is worth quoting a very characteristic statement by Cardinal Gaetano de Lai during the discussion on the reorganization of church structures in Russia, which took place on June 23, 1918 at the forum of the Congregation for Extraordinary Affairs of the Church. It concerned, among other things, the further fate of the Catholic Church of the Eastern Rite, which had been erected by Sheptytsky a little over a year earlier, and the question of which rite should be used to promote Catholicism in Russia. The dignitary did not hide his prejudice against the Eastern Christian tradition, stating emphatically: “It seems impossible at present to create a Russian Greek Catholic Church with its own hierarchy, especially since it is said that the upper and educated classes tend to Latinism: and this is understandable! The East is barbarism: the West, the Latin world, represents the culture, civilization, etc. to which the Russian world gravitates.”³⁷ It is no wonder that after the encyclical *Ecclesiam Dei* was published at the beginning of Pius XI’s pontificate, Sheptytsky became more optimistic about the prospects of his concept for the Catholic Church in the Christian East. However, this enthusiasm quickly faded. “The Metropolitan’s confidence in the Oriental Congregation began to wane when he

³⁶ Ibidem.

³⁷ Laura Pettinaroli, *La politique russe...*, p. 386.

found himself excluded from the unionistic mission for which he had been formed by previous Popes.”³⁸ The members of this dicastery were probably more concerned with the reactions that Sheptytsky’s persona and his activities aroused (or could arouse) on the Polish side than with his bold visions. And these were generally negative. The surviving archival documents clearly show that “Sheptytsky felt that his fidelity to Rome was being repaid with ‘brutal’ reprimands and ‘humiliations’ In constant fear of Polish reaction, the Congregation frequently interfered in smaller matters such as Sheptytsky’s title Metropolitan of Halych. Kyr Andrei, who had hitherto been very open with his apostolic plans, became guarded in his communications and waited for a change at the helm of this dicastery before revealing his mind on important questions.”³⁹ The implementation of the concepts proposed by Sheptytsky depended on the decisions and good will of the popes. As a consequence, he became a hostage to the changing and often ambivalent attitudes and decisions taken by the head of the Catholic Church, internal conflicts in the Vatican, and the organizational culture of the Vatican dicastery. Certainly, the issue of the position and authority that Sheptytsky managed to develop in relations with the popes and the Vatican dicastery influences today’s assessment of the Metropolitan of Halych. Depending on which pontificate or what documents from which archives we take, it will turn out that Sheptytsky was either a prophet of the future ecumenism or a utopian dreamer, an adventurer.⁴⁰ So where should we look for an alternative, more unambiguous determinant of the historical significance of Sheptytsky? In the search for an answer to this question, it can be assumed that a leader’s value is determined by the people who surround him. It is therefore about the characters with whom Sheptytsky collaborated, achieved successes, and experienced failures, in the matter of the Catholic Church.

³⁸ Athanasius D. McVay, “The Apostolic See...,” p. 245.

³⁹ Ibidem, p. 246.

⁴⁰ Hansjakob Stehle, “Ein heiliger Abenteurer. Andrej Graf Scheptickyj – Zwischen Moskau und Rom. Symbolfigur osteuropäischer Geschichte,” *Die Zeit* (1985), no. 28, p. 32.

5.2. Sheptytsky and “his” people

5.2.1. Cyrille Korolevskij

Jean Francois Joseph Charon was born in 1878 in Caen.⁴¹ In 1894, young Charon decided that he wanted to become an Eastern Rite priest. Six years later, he went to Beirut and became involved with the Melkite Greek-Catholic Church operating in the Middle East. To convert to the Eastern Rite, it was necessary to obtain the approval of the Congregation de Propaganda Fide. Charon received this in 1902 and was ordained a priest of the Melkite Church shortly thereafter. That is when he took the name Cyrille.⁴² Over time, Charon began to sign with a new surname: “Korolevskij.” Quite quickly it turned out that Father Cyrille did not feel at home in the Middle East. All the time, he felt “nostalgia for the Slavic countries, especially for Russia.”⁴³ In July 1906, Father Cyrille went on a journey through Central and Eastern Europe and Romania, which ended in Lviv. There he sought contact with Sheptytsky. The Metropolitan of Halych received him at his summer residence, where they spent 4 days. It was the beginning of a relationship that would last until Sheptytsky’s death. It began with a “quite risky plan” presented by the Metropolitan of Galicia. Father Cyrille would go to St. Petersburg “under the pretext of scientific research,” thanks to a passport in which he would be listed as a clergyman of the Antiochian patriarchate. According to the plan, Father Cyrille was to “wait for events in St. Petersburg that he felt were imminent”—in other words, a sociopolitical breakthrough that would open up new perspectives for the Catholic Church in Russia.⁴⁴ For this plan to be implemented, Father Cyrille would need to obtain “indefinite leave” from his superior at the Melkite Greek Catholic Church. However, the Melkite patriarch refused.⁴⁵ Therefore, Father Cyrille decided to transfer

⁴¹ Cyrille Korolevskij, *Metropolitane André Szeptyckyj. 1865–1944*, Rome 1964, p. VII.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. XI.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. XXVIII.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. XXIX.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. XXIX.

to the jurisdiction of Sheptytsky. The Galician metropolitan agreed, provided that the change of jurisdiction was formally approved. Finally, the case had a happy ending on October 20, 1909. From that day on, Father Cyrille was formally accepted under Sheptytsky's authority as a clergyman of the Kamenets Podilskiy diocese.⁴⁶ However, it turned out that the plan to send Father Cyrille to St. Petersburg was unrealistic. Therefore, Sheptytsky decided to delegate his new subordinate to Rome. There he was supposed to collect and compile documents concerning the "history of the Ruthenian Church in the Russian Empire at the end of the 18th century and the Uniate metropolitan of Kyiv from the first half of the 17th century, Joseph Velamin Rutski."⁴⁷ Sheptytsky was very interested in this character. He was seeking inspiration in Rutski's work for his ideas for the Catholic Church functioning among Orthodox believers in Ukraine.⁴⁸ Sheptytsky paid Korolevskij a salary every month, thanks to which he could support himself in Rome. From 1919, Korolevskij was employed at the Vatican Library and became an associate of the Congregation for the Oriental Churches. Over time, Father Korolevskij developed a position in the Vatican as one of the leading experts on the Christian East.

Father Cyrille maintained very close contact with Sheptytsky all the while. On the basis of an additional agreement written in 1912, Korolevskij was to be a kind of "Vatican informer" of the Metropolitan of Halych. Thanks to this, Sheptytsky had relatively up-to-date insight into the situation and moods of the Pope and the papal administration in matters that were important to Sheptytsky. It was not only about changes in attitudes toward the relationship with "non-conjoined" Christians, but also about the internal affairs of the Greek Catholic Church and the political conditions in which it functioned.

⁴⁶ Августин Баб'як, "Митрополит Шептицький у мемуарах Кирила Королевського," *Ковчег*, 7 (2015), p. 188.

⁴⁷ Ibidem, p. 189.

⁴⁸ For more on this issue, see Міхал Вавжонек, *Екуменічна діяльність митрополита Андрія Шептицького в Україні та Росії*, Рим 2006, pp. 63–67.

In 1964, Father Korolevskij's extensive memoirs about Metropolitan Sheptytsky were published in Rome.⁴⁹ The book was published in connection with the efforts undertaken in the late 1950s and early 1960s to initiate the beatification process of Metropolitan Sheptytsky.⁵⁰ After 50 years, in 2014, its translation into Ukrainian was published. During the presentation of this publication, Liliana Hentosh stated that "Korolevskij was a man whose life was changed by Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky."⁵¹ There is no doubt that this was indeed the case. However, reading the correspondence between the two clergymen, one might draw the conclusion that the relationship between them was not only one-sided, meaning that Korolevskij was also able to significantly influence Sheptytsky. It was not just about exchanging views and discussing abstract and conceptual issues, but about Sheptytsky's concrete actions.

This is evidenced by Korolevskij's letter to Sheptytsky from April 11, 1921, in which the sender devoted a lot of attention to the planned trip of the Metropolitan of Halych to North and South America. The letter shows that Korolevskij was directly involved in completing the formalities that would allow Sheptytsky to obtain the status of an official representative of the Holy See. Moreover, it seems that it was also Korolevskij who drew up a rather detailed plan of the entire expedition. He convinced Sheptytsky that although he had not received the status of a visitor of the Holy See in North America, he should not give up his original intention to raise money there for material aid for the Ukrainian population in war-torn Eastern Galicia. "There is nothing to prevent you from going there and raising funds as [Your Excellency] intended," Korolevskij suggested.⁵² Sheptytsky was apparently not convinced about the advisability of this trip, but Father Cyrille went so far as to insist that it was necessary "at all

⁴⁹ Cyrille Korolevskij, *Metropolite Andre Szeptyckyj*.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. V.

⁵¹ Гентош Ліліана, "Кирило Королевський був тією людиною, життя якого змінив Митрополит Андрей Шептицький," <http://www.ecumenicalstudies.org.ua/novini-institutu/2014/10/21/4856>.

⁵² Cyrille Korolevskij, *Kniga bytija...*, p. 190.

costs.”⁵³ Korolevskij suggested to Sheptytsky that he stop in Belgium and the Netherlands before leaving for America. Then, according to the plan, the Metropolitan of Halych would go to London to meet Prime Minister Lloyd George and representatives of the British government in order to present them with the political situation of the Polish–Ukrainian conflict in Eastern Galicia. Korolevskij explained that “there is no faction in England that is as strongly connected with Poland as it is in France.”⁵⁴ According to Father Cyrille’s plan, after his visit to London, Sheptytsky was to go to Canada, where he should focus only on “spiritual matters.” Alternatively, according to Father Cyrille, the time spent in Canada could also be devoted to searching for candidates for clergymen in the Eastern Rite for the local diaspora and to raising funds for the Ukrainian population in Galicia.

According to the plan laid out by Korolevskij, Sheptytsky would travel from Canada to the United States. In the absence of a proper delegation from the Vatican, Sheptytsky could not proceed with his visit as an official visitor of the Holy See. However, according to Father Cyrille, nothing stood in the way of the Metropolitan of Halych collecting information about the local church structures during his stay, so that upon his return he could report to the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith. Beyond that, however, Korolevskij recommended “acting as in London,” that is, meeting President Harding “and ministers.” According to the plan outlined by Father Cyrille, “that would be enough from the political side.”⁵⁵ All that remained was a visit to South America, after which Sheptytsky was to return to Rome. In summing up, Korolevskij stated, “I do not expect to see Your Excellency back sooner than in a year’s time” and argued that even though Sheptytsky will be absent from Lviv for so long, it will not have an impact on his diocese.⁵⁶ In planning the trip around Western Europe and North America, Sheptytsky had several goals in mind.

⁵³ Ibidem.

⁵⁴ Ibidem, p. 192.

⁵⁵ Ibidem.

⁵⁶ Ibidem.

First of all, he wanted to raise funds for the development of the Eastern Catholic Church in Russia. In addition, he intended to collect funds for orphans who were cared for by the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia. Moreover, he hoped that he would be able to reach the Western political leaders who were to decide on the further fate of Eastern Galicia and sensitize them to the aspirations of local Ukrainians for self-determination. Sheptytsky was very afraid of this escapade across the ocean. During the recently finished armed conflict over Eastern Galicia, he had taken the Ukrainian side. He believed that after the victory of the Poles in this battle and their occupation of the disputed lands, he should not return to Lviv for the time being. In any case, he was confirmed in this conviction by Father Korolevskij.⁵⁷ Sheptytsky visited Belgium and the Netherlands in April, during which he took a short break and went to London. He had hoped to meet Prime Minister Lloyd George, but it seems he waited for an invitation for several days without success. Stefan Tomashivskiy, who was the head of the diplomatic mission of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic in London, reported at the end of April that "in Downing Street they remembered about the audience" only five days after Sheptytsky left London.⁵⁸ It can be assumed that the Metropolitan of Halych had asked Tomashivskiy to try to organize a meeting with the British prime minister through his contacts. A few weeks later, Tomashivskiy reported in his next letter that, despite his best efforts, not only was it impossible to predict the possible date when the head of the British government would receive Sheptytsky, but it was even difficult to say whether it would happen at all.⁵⁹ As it turned out later, it was indeed impossible for the Metropolitan of Halych to meet

⁵⁷ Роман Дзюбан, Олена Канчалаба, "Листи Митрополита Андрея Графа Шептицького до Олександра Бачинського (з фондів відділу рукописів Львівської національної наукової бібліотеки України імені В. Стефаника)," *Записки Львівської національної наукової бібліотеки України імені В. Стефаника* (2017), no. 9, pp. 404, 406, 408.

⁵⁸ Letter from Stefan Tomashivskiy to Sheptytsky from May 11, 1921, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome.

⁵⁹ Letter from Stefan Tomashivskiy to Sheptytsky from June 17, 1921, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome.

Lloyd George in person. Sheptytsky made his last attempt on his way back from America at the end of December 1922. However, he only managed to talk to a low-ranking representative of the Foreign Office. According to a note drawn up after the meeting, the Metropolitan of Halych made an "extraordinarily good impression" on the British official.⁶⁰ However, no other measurable results were obtained from this meeting.

Sheptytsky's visit to Paris in July 1921 ended with a slightly better result. He managed to meet the French president, Aristide Briand. The Metropolitan of Halych handed his interlocutor a memorandum on a "fair solution" to the future of the Ukrainian population in Eastern Galicia. Sheptytsky's activities in France and their press echoes were closely followed by Polish diplomacy.⁶¹ At Korolevskij's suggestion, Sheptytsky also tried to lobby for Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia in government spheres in the United States. He managed to meet Secretary of State Charles Hughes twice in November 1921 and a year later, on his way back to Europe from South America. During the first meeting, Sheptytsky handed over the memorandum to the American representative. In it, he drew attention to the difficult situation of the Ukrainian population. He stated that "Polish authorities are using their Power, not for the benefit of the people, but adversely to their interests, by colonizing and Polonizing the country, thus artificially changing its ethnographic character."⁶² Sheptytsky also expressed in his letter on behalf of "Ukrainians of Galicia" the hope that the outcome of the Conference for the limitation of armaments will bring peace and restore order and settled conditions in their distracted country.⁶³ Shortly before returning to Europe, the Metropolitan of Galicia wrote bitterly to Korolevskij that the expedition to America had failed and he would bring with him "only a paltry amount of money." He consoled himself that perhaps "there will also be some traces of my

⁶⁰ Maria Klaczko, "Podróż metropolity Szeptyckiego..." p. 165.

⁶¹ Ibidem, p. 161.

⁶² Washington, November 23, 1921, "To the Honorable the Secretary of State," p. 1, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome.

⁶³ Ibidem, p. 2.

work in the consciousness of the clergy and bishops.” In conclusion, he wrote, “but what can I do, I bothered, I tried, I worked, I believe that it was not my fault that it failed.”⁶⁴ Quasi-diplomatic activities also failed. The political leaders on whose door Sheptytsky knocked were not very interested in what he had to say. In this regard, perhaps the Metropolitan of Galicia fell victim to Korolevskij’s naive ideas about the world of great “secular” politics.

5.2.2. Leonid Fiodorov

Leonid Fiodorov was born in 1879 in St. Petersburg. His father was a cook. His mother, Lyubov Dmytrivna, of Greek origin, had a special role in the spiritual formation of the future exarch. She was a very sensitive and deeply religious person. It was she who instilled in her son a devotion to and respect for everything with an element of Eastern tradition.⁶⁵ In 1908, Lyubov Fiodorova converted to Catholicism, and Sheptytsky, under his special powers obtained from Pope Pius X, granted him a dispensation, thanks to which he could participate in Orthodox services.⁶⁶ Fiodorov recognized in his early youth that his vocation would be in religious life. In 1901, he entered the Orthodox Theological Academy in St. Petersburg. In Russia, it was a time of spiritual ferment. This manifested itself in different ways and in different fields. The structure of the state, based on tsarist autocracy, was tottering, and the Russian Orthodox Church was suffering from turmoil. The philosopher Vladimir Solovyov undoubtedly contributed to this crisis to some extent. His ecumenical concepts resonated widely, both in the Catholic Church and in Byzantine spiritual circles.⁶⁷ As a young

⁶⁴ Cyrille Korolevskij, *Kniga bytija...*, p. 271.

⁶⁵ Диякон Василий, *Леонид Федоров. Жизнь и деятельность*, Рим 1966, p. 31.

⁶⁶ Laura Pettinaroli, *La politique russe...*, p. 177. The book is available at: <http://books.openedition.org/efr/2933>.

⁶⁷ Vladimir Solovyov, *La Russie et l’Eglise universelle*, Paris 1889; *Vladimir Solovyov: Reconciler and Polemicist*, eds. Wil vad den Bercken, Manon de Courten, Evert van der Zweerde, Louvain 2000; Catherine Evtuhov, “Vladimir Soloviev as a Religious Philosopher,” in: *The Oxford Handbook of Russian Religious Thought*, eds. Caryll Emerson, George Pattison, Randall A. Poole, Oxford 2020, pp. 205–219;

alumnus of the Orthodox Theological Academy, Leonid Fiodorov decided to go to Rome in search of the truth about the unity of the Universal Church. On the way to the Vatican, Fiodorov stopped for a few days in Lviv. The short time he spent in the capital of Galicia—and especially the meeting with Andrey Sheptytsky, the Greek Catholic Metropolitan of Lviv—influenced his entire life. Thanks to the help of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, he received a scholarship from the Pope, which helped him stay in exile.⁶⁸ In 1902, Fiodorov made a Catholic confession of faith in Rome. He entered the Jesuit seminary in Anagni. He was then educated in Rome (1907–1908) and Fribourg (1908–1911).⁶⁹ In 1911, he was ordained a priest by the Catholic Bishop of the Eastern Rite, Michail Mirov, who resided in Constantinople. Then in 1912, Fiodorov entered the Studite Monastery in Kamienica, Bosnia, founded on the initiative of Sheptytsky.⁷⁰ Also, in the period 1910–1914, he made annual trips to Russia, during which he visited Russian Catholics of the Eastern Rite on behalf of Sheptytsky.⁷¹ First of all, he believed that if Catholicism was to be a natural part of life in Russia, it must be instilled on the basis of the native, Byzantine-Russian tradition. In other words, according to him, the work for unity between Orthodox Russians and the Catholic Church should have started with the fundamental assumption that Orthodoxy can be Catholic.

Outwardly, this thesis sounds quite heretical. However, at the end of the 19th century, more and more Russians—faithful to the Orthodox Church—were coming to similar conclusions. As a rule, it was the result of a long and painstaking study of the history of the Church. In particular, they focused on the period of the Ecumenical Councils

Paul M. Allen, *Vladimir Soloviev: Russian Mystic*, New York 1978; Константин Мочулский, *Владимир Соловьев. Жизнь и учение*, Париж 1951.

⁶⁸ For more on Leonid Fiodorov, see Paul Mailleux, *Entre Rome et Moscou. L'Exarque Léonid Fédoroff*, Bruges 1966.

⁶⁹ Laura Pettinaroli, *La politique russe...*, p. 242.

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 243.

⁷¹ Léon Tretjakewitsch, "Andrey Šeptyckyj, Michel d'Herbigny et la Russie..." p. 467.

(until the 8th century). This path was followed not only by Fiodorov himself, but also by Ivan Gagarin,⁷² Vladimir Soloviev, and the Russians who had begun to use the Catholic Eastern Rite (or Orthodox-Catholics, as they often referred to themselves) shortly before the revolution in 1917.⁷³ In difficult times, Sheptytsky hurried to help Fiodorov. The Greek Catholic metropolitan was constantly present at all the most important moments in Fiodorov's life, becoming his spiritual guide in his work for the unity of Christianity. Raised to the altars by John Paul II, the Russian in fact implemented Sheptytsky's ecumenical concepts throughout his later life.

Fiodorov decided to return to Russia in 1914. At that time, a small community of Russians like him, Catholics of the Eastern Rite, existed in St. Petersburg for several years. Fiodorov's actions for the unity of Catholicism and Orthodoxy did not win the favor of the tsarist authorities—as was to be expected. Therefore, he soon found himself in exile in Siberia, in Tobolsk.

After the overthrow of tsarism, the Provisional Government restored his freedom. Fiodorov went to St. Petersburg. Another newly released tsarist prisoner soon arrived there: Sheptytsky. The community of Russian Catholics of the Eastern Rite came out of the underground. On the basis of special confidential powers obtained from Pius X, the metropolitan erected a new church structure in Russia—the Catholic Church of the Eastern Rite.⁷⁴ It was headed by Leonid Fiodorov. Sheptytsky wanted to consecrate Fiodorov immediately as a bishop who would report directly to the Holy See. However, he did not yet feel strong enough to take on such a large responsibility. Therefore, he asked Sheptytsky to temporarily appoint him only an exarch. As it turned out later, this was the only opportunity to ordain Fiodorov as a bishop. The successor of Pius X, Benedict XV, forbade Sheptytsky from ordaining bishops within the framework of his powers. In turn, the next pope, Pius XI, entrusted Father Michel d'Herbigny with

⁷² Paul Pierling, *Le prince Gagarin et ses amis*, Paris 1996.

⁷³ Міхал Вавжонек, *Екуменічна діяльність...*, pp. 138–168.

⁷⁴ *Митрополит Андрей Шептицький і греко-католики в Росії*, vol. 1, pp. 722–735.

matters related to the Catholic Church in Russia. The latter effectively sought to marginalize the structures erected by Sheptytsky and Fiodorov himself.⁷⁵ In 1923, Fiodorov was arrested by the Bolshevik authorities. A little earlier, the Russian had written to Metropolitan Sheptytsky that “when shootings take place, I will also be a victim, which, I confess, I would very much like. I am convinced that when our blood is spilled—perhaps in great quantities—it will be the best that can happen to us, ... otherwise—we will not live, but vegetate in our gloomy, hopeless, Soviet way of life.”⁷⁶ Soon after, a show trial began, during which Fiodorov, along with other Roman Catholic clergymen, were accused of “spreading religious superstitions among the masses.” The exarch showed no remorse. Responding to the accusations, he courageously defended the idea of unity between the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church. He tried to use the whole spectacle to manifest the existence of a community of Russian-Catholics who at the same time consider themselves Orthodox. Later he wrote from prison: “Among the Latin cassocks and shaven faces, my beard stood out, causing general consternation: what is it, it means that there are SUCH Catholics!”⁷⁷ In general, it should be noted that one of the main themes in the extensive correspondence between Fiodorov and Sheptytsky is the question of the “purity” of the Eastern Rite practiced in the Eastern Catholic churches. It was especially about the differences between the “Galician” rite, the one that was practiced in the UGCC, and the “synodal” rite, the one that was formed in the Russian Orthodox Church.

Fiodorov confessed to Sheptytsky that he was closely following all his activities in terms of the rite. The Metropolitan of Halych was “a hard rock to which I clung like a coral polyp,” and he put all his hope in Sheptytsky “right after God.” He stated that God gave Sheptytsky

⁷⁵ For more on this issue, see Léon Tretjakewitsch, “Andrey Šeptyckyj, Michel d’Herbigny et la Russie...,” pp. 464–479.

⁷⁶ Irina Osipowa, “Losy katolików rosyjskich 1918–1956,” in: *Skazani jako “szpie-dzy Watykanu.” Z historii Kościoła katolickiego w ZSRR 1918–1956*, ed. Roman Dzwonkowski, Ząbki 1998, p. 52.

⁷⁷ *Ibidem*.

“a special grace to raise the cause of the holy Union.” That is why Fiodorov was deeply affected by “every mistake” made by the Metropolitan of Halych in this matter. These errors were supposedly due to the fact that Sheptytsky “knows” the Eastern Rite, but does not “feel” it.⁷⁸ “You do not live it, and therefore you are not yet able to comprehend its essence.” Fiodorov claimed that the Eastern Rite is not an end in itself, but only a means to “convert schismatics to the bosom of the Catholic Church.” Fiodorov concluded that “there is nothing strange about it” because Sheptytsky “was brought up in a pious Latin family and, obviously, deeply imbued with the spirit of this Western Rite and culture.”⁷⁹ He then enumerates various elements of the Latin tradition in the liturgy and various related forms of piety which are cultivated or tolerated by the Metropolitan of Halych and which, according to Fiodorov, were unacceptable for a man really formed in the Eastern tradition.⁸⁰ Moreover, Fiodorov tries to comprehend the reasons why Sheptytsky “likes and is even fascinated by” the East. He stated that this is the result of Sheptytsky’s personality traits, i.e. his “sensitive, expansive, and aristocratic nature,” which makes him treat the Eastern Christian tradition from the position of an “esthete and archaeologist.”⁸¹ Hence, it is his desire to purify the rite in the Greek Catholic Church from Latin elements. However, when it came to the practical implementation of these plans, according to Fiodorov, Sheptytsky entrusted it to others, while he himself was supposed to remain a “semi-Occidentalist.”⁸² It seems that Fiodorov perceived Korolevskij in a similar way. He was convinced that Father Cyrille was unable to live the Eastern tradition authentically. According to Fiodorov, just as Sheptytsky allegedly disavowed the rite practiced in the Russian Orthodox Church without justification, Korolevskij allegedly did

⁷⁸ Letter from Leonid Fiodorov to Sheptytsky from December 20, 1912, in: *Митрополит Андрей Шептицький і греко-католики в Росії*, vol. 1, p. 529.

⁷⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 530.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*, p. 531.

⁸² *Ibidem*.

the same with regard to elements of the Greek (Hellenic) tradition in the Melkite Church. Against this background, various conflicts between Korolevskij and "authentic" Catholics, formed in the Eastern Christian tradition, were to take place.⁸³ At the same time, both Fiodorov and Korolevskij became key figures among the supporters of work for the Catholic Church in the Christian East, which centered around Sheptytsky. The three formed a very unique relationship. This can be reconstructed through a story about the idea to found a magazine, which was to be published in Italian, French, and Russian. Its mission was to "bring the West closer to Russia and the East."⁸⁴ On Sheptytsky's initiative, an organizing committee was assembled, which included both Fiodorov and Korolevskij. The future Russian exarch, in his letter of June 30, 1909 to the Metropolitan of Galicia, presented Father Cyrille in a very negative light. He claimed that "all Eastern Catholics in Rome hate Charon" and feel "terribly offended" by his activities. Fiodorov characterized Korolevskij as a conflict-maker, "a mad French Congregationalist who has taken in the ideas of the Assumptionists."⁸⁵ Therefore, according to Fiodorov, "the presence of Charon in our journal is extremely dangerous" and from the very beginning it aroused protests from other people involved in its creation. He also advised that actions be taken proactively to block Korolevskij's very likely attempts to take control of the journal. Therefore, according to Fiodorov, a "strict censor" was needed who would be able to tame Father Cyrille.⁸⁶ In his memoirs, Korolevskij also referred to the story with the journal that Sheptytsky wanted to create. He admitted that due to personal conflicts within the organizing committee, Sheptytsky resigned from the project after a year. However, he did not mention that these conflicts were also related to him. From the whole story related to Sheptytsky's attempt to create a journal, Father Cyrille drew

⁸³ Letter from Leonid Fiodorov to Sheptytsky from January 2, 1909, in: *Митрополит Андрей...*, p. 279.

⁸⁴ Августин Баб'як, "Митрополит Шептицький..." p. 188.

⁸⁵ Letter from Leonid Fiodorov to Sheptytsky from June 30, 1909, in: *Митрополит Андрей...*, p. 313.

⁸⁶ Ibidem, p. 314.

the following conclusions about the Metropolitan of Halych: “In this case, one of the characteristic features of the metropolitan’s character came to light. A great idealist, a great generator of ideas, completely selfless, completely non-nationalist, a man with a generous soul, capable of sacrificing everything for a cause, he easily believed that everyone else was just like him. More a theoretician than a practitioner, he did not know people, he cheated himself more than once, but he was never discouraged.”⁸⁷ Undoubtedly, Korolevskij was able to very critically and realistically assess the behavior and attitudes of people with whom he came into contact. His diagnosis of Sheptytsky’s personality is a good example of this. In addition, he was an authority in matters of the Christian East, which was also indirectly acknowledged by Fiodorov himself. Korolevskij also moved fluidly within the structures of the Vatican bureaucracy. However, based on the whole fiasco of the initiative to establish the magazine, it can be concluded that Korolevskij was at the same time quite uncritical toward himself. This led to him being perceived by many as a controversial figure.

Fiodorov, in turn, had an orthodox attachment to a specific version of the Eastern Christian tradition, which was formed, as he himself admitted, under the influence of the “Tatar-Russian primitive raid,” which settled on the “noble grace of the Greek form.” Nevertheless, he considered this tradition to be “his, native, grown on our Russian soil.”⁸⁸ And from this exclusionary perspective, he critically assessed the efforts of such converts as Sheptytsky and Korolevskij.

Meanwhile, Sheptytsky was able to rise above human weaknesses and passions. He also had a lot of humility. He could see the good in everyone and focused on it. Thanks to this, personalities with such different temperaments and ways of looking at the world as Fiodorov and Korolevskij gathered around him. Myroslav Marynovych drew attention to the key to understanding the logic that guided Sheptytsky in the doctrinal sphere and in his activities in the social, economic, and political spheres. Marynovych described it as the “win-win”

⁸⁷ Августин Баб’як, “Митрополит Шептицький...,” pp. 188–189.

⁸⁸ Letter from Leonid Fiodorov to Sheptytsky from December 20, 1912, in: *Митрополит Андрей...*, p. 532.

principle.⁸⁹ The example of Sheptytsky's relationship with Fiodorov and Korolevskij shows that the Metropolitan of Halych also applied this principle in interpersonal relationships. He did it consistently, even though it did not always directly yield the expected results.

5.2.3. Oleksandr Bachynskiy

Due to the course of events, Sheptytsky was absent from Lviv for over two and a half years. Probably neither he nor Father Cyrille expected that the great journey would take so long. This was due to a number of circumstances, including his illness. In the absence of the Metropolitan of Galicia, the diocese was managed by Father Oleksandr Bachynskiy, the vicar general of the metropolitan chapter in Lviv. He first had to take over Sheptytsky's duties during World War I, when the metropolitan was arrested and then transported deep into Russia. When the head of the Greek Catholic Church went on the trip to Western Europe and North and South America, Father Bachynskiy again managed the daily affairs of the Lviv diocese on his behalf. Thanks to the preserved and partly published correspondence⁹⁰ between the two clergymen, it is possible to look behind the scenes at how the UGCC functioned at that time.

In one of the letters to Sheptytsky, Father Bachynskiy proposed a reform of the rules for rewarding members of the consistory of the Metropolis of Halych in Sheptytsky's absence. Father Bachynskiy wanted to create a tool with which he would be able to skillfully manage the aspirations and ambitions of the members of the consistory as to their place in the hierarchical internal structure of the UGCC. Bachynskiy argued that "sometimes you have to take advantage of human weaknesses."⁹¹ A draft decree on the matter was attached to the letter.⁹² The vicar who managed the diocese in the metropolitan's place

⁸⁹ Мирослав Маринович, *Митрополит Андрей Шептицький і принцип «позитивної суми»*, Lviv 2019.

⁹⁰ Роман Дзюбан, Олена Канчалаба, "Листи Митрополита...", pp. 398–433.

⁹¹ Letter from Bachynskiy to Sheptytsky from May 5, 1921, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome, p. 2.

⁹² Ibidem, p. 1.

expected that this solution would allow him to better control the work of the members of the metropolitan chapter during that difficult time.

In response, Sheptytsky agreed in principle that a formalized system of rewards would help in the effective management of the church administration. However, he believed that the proposed changes could “cause a lot of unpleasantness” for Father Bachynskiyi. He feared that changes introduced in his absence would cause conflicts and disputes within the UGCC that his deputy would not be able to control, meaning that they would be used to criticize Sheptytsky for his prolonged absence from Lviv. Therefore, the Metropolitan of Halych asked Father Bachynskiyi to “stick to the principle of nihil innoventur as much as possible.”⁹³ In the next letter, Father Bachynskiyi, seeing Sheptytsky’s reluctance regarding the project of a reward system for distinguished members of the metropolitan chapter, did not push the idea further. However, he did ask the Metropolitan of Halych to “at least” address them separately in his letter with “expressions of his appreciation.”⁹⁴ Further on, Sheptytsky’s deputy would quite consistently persuade his superior to a more active involvement in the current affairs of the Halych metropolis. In his letter dated May 27, 1921, Bachynskiyi convinced the Metropolitan of Halych that in this way it would be possible to “show the world that your Excellency, although far away, remains [still] the main administrator and pastor of your archdiocese.”⁹⁵ He cited the example of St. Paul, who also traveled a lot “in different directions to preach the Word of God” and therefore appointed administrators in the communities he founded.⁹⁶ However, despite this, as Father Bachynskiyi emphasized, “he did not lose sight of the churches he founded, and from time to time he sent letters to his deputies and to the faithful.”⁹⁷ Therefore, Father Bachynskiyi asked his superior to

⁹³ Роман Дзюбан, Олена Канчалаба, “Листи Митрополита...,” p. 406.

⁹⁴ Letter from Bachynskiyi to Sheptytsky from May 5, 1921, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome, p. 3.

⁹⁵ Letter from Bachynskiyi to Sheptytsky from May 27, 1921, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome, p. 1.

⁹⁶ Ibidem.

⁹⁷ Ibidem.

“send letters from time to time, either to the clergy or to the faithful, which could be printed in the Archdiocesan News and in which he would convey at least briefly his advice, warnings, praise, and teachings.”⁹⁸ He mentioned the positive impression Sheptytsky’s last letter had made on the faithful and clergy, which he had sent from Rome a few months earlier.⁹⁹ Father Bachynskyi encouraged the Metropolitan of Galicia to share more—“even the shortest”—messages to his diocesans.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, the clergyman who replaced Sheptytsky as the administrator of the diocese also provided a ready-made set of topics that, in his opinion, could be addressed in such letters. He draws attention to the wide range of threads that concerned the clergy itself. Father Bachynskyi suggested that the Greek Catholic clergy should be admonished and instructed to “fully devote and diligently teach religion, both in the church and at school,” and to abstain from expectations as to the amount of sacrifice that the faithful are willing to make for the ceremonies and services. It can be concluded from the letter that there were cases when funerals were held without a clergyman, or that young people lived together in a non-sacramental relationship because the faithful “did not want to or were not able to pay the priest as much as was required for the funeral or wedding.”¹⁰¹ Father Bachynskyi asked Sheptytsky to remind the clergy that “the parish priest is for the parish, not the parish for the parish priest.”¹⁰² As for the pastoral care of the faithful, the temporary administrator of the Metropolis of Halych focused primarily on the threats that resulted from the activity of the Adventists and other sects “who wander around the diocese” and spread “untrue and completely heretical

⁹⁸ Ibidem, p. 2.

⁹⁹ This was the Message dated February 28, 1921, in which Sheptytsky quoted the letter “to the Ukrainian nation” he had received from Pope Benedict XV. In this message, the head of the Catholic Church assured readers of his interest and his sympathy for the “beloved Ruthenian people.” See *Львівсько-Архієпархіальні Відомости*, 34 (1921), no. 2, pp. 1–6.

¹⁰⁰ Letter from Bachynskyi to Sheptytsky from May 27, 1921, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome, p. 3.

¹⁰¹ Ibidem, p. 2.

¹⁰² Ibidem.

teachings.”¹⁰³ Sheptytsky took this last topic to heart. In response, at the very beginning, he stated that “he was very frightened by the information about the Adventists.” He also assured his deputy in Lviv that before leaving for America, he would “write a letter to the clergy and the people.”¹⁰⁴ Indeed, on July 20, 1921, the “Farewell Letter of the Archbishop” was published.¹⁰⁵ Its main message was the need to maintain “fidelity to the Holy Catholic Church.” Before his departure, Sheptytsky addressed the faithful of his diocese: “Do not be led astray from the right path, do not listen to false prophets.”¹⁰⁶ A few months later, on April 3, 1922, Father Bachynskiy again asked Sheptytsky to send “even a short pastoral letter to his flock.” At the same time, he still mentioned the first “foreign” message with a letter from Pope Benedict XV “that Your Excellency sent from Rome.”¹⁰⁷ The vicar of the Lviv metropolis could not have known that a new pastoral letter to the faithful had already been prepared. Sheptytsky wrote it on his way from the United States to South America and sent it to Lviv immediately after disembarking in Rio de Janeiro.¹⁰⁸ It is worth focusing on the excerpt in which Sheptytsky explains to his faithful about his overseas escapade, which extended his absence from Lviv for the months to follow. The Metropolitan of Halych wrote that the mission to South America had been entrusted to him by the Congregation for the Oriental Churches, and according to him, it was to be done “with such insistence, so pressingly” that, despite the hardships associated with the trip, “he did not dare to refuse.”¹⁰⁹ Sheptytsky went on to explain that this trip aroused

¹⁰³ Ibidem, pp. 2–3.

¹⁰⁴ Роман Дзюбан, Олена Канчалаба, “Листи Митрополита...,” р. 407.

¹⁰⁵ “Пращальне письмо Архієпископа,” *Львівсько-Архієпархіальні Відомости*, 34 (1921), no. 3, pp. 1–2.

¹⁰⁶ Ibidem, p. 2.

¹⁰⁷ Letter from Bachynskiy to Sheptytsky from April 3, 1922, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome.

¹⁰⁸ Роман Дзюбан, Олена Канчалаба, “Листи Митрополита...,” р. 416.

¹⁰⁹ “Пастырське Письмо Нашого Високопреосвященного Владика Митрополита Андрея Шептицького,” *Львівсько-Архієпархіальні Відомости*, 35 (1922), no. 3, pp. 1–3.

his fears, causing him to contemplate "whether it wouldn't be better to return home sooner." Therefore, he "officially" asked the members of the metropolitan chapter for advice on this matter, and allegedly only under the unanimous recommendation of its members did he decide to undertake the task that the Congregation had set before him.¹¹⁰ Meanwhile, in the light of the above-mentioned correspondence between Sheptytsky and Korolevskij, it is known that the motives behind the decision to send the Metropolitan of Galicia overseas were slightly different. It is true that Sheptytsky was afraid of this mission, which he repeatedly expressed in letters to various addressees. On the other hand, following Korolevskij's suggestion, he consciously decided to travel so far and deliberately avoided returning to Lviv. Moreover, it seems that the Congregation for the Oriental Churches did not in fact have to "force" Sheptytsky to undertake a mission to America. Despite his fears, he himself was also interested in doing so. As mentioned earlier, it gave him the status of a diplomatic representative and granted him diplomatic immunity, which protected him from the harassment by the Polish authorities he expected to encounter on his return.

At the end of the message written on the way to South America, Sheptytsky promised his followers that "after finishing my visit to the Brazilian and Argentinean colonies, I will write again."¹¹¹ However, as it turned out, they would have to wait more than a year for the next pastoral letter.

Therefore, although not all of Father Bachynskiy's initiatives were approved by Sheptytsky, it seems that in general, when it comes to tasks and challenges related to pastoral work and problems related to the administration of the church structure, the two men understood each other very well.

After the matter of Sheptytsky's journey was finally settled, Father Bachynskiy asked his superior for additional authorizations, thanks to which he would be able to effectively manage the diocese in the absence of the Halych metropolitan. A concise list was included

¹¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 2.

¹¹¹ Ibidem, p. 3.

in a letter from the vicar general to Sheptytsky, dated April 4, 1921.¹¹² The Metropolitan of Halych immediately wrote back and agreed to all of Father Bachynski's demands.¹¹³ How well the Metropolitan of Halych and his vicar general understood each other is also evidenced by the filling of three vacant positions in the metropolitan chapter a year later. Father Bachynskiyi raised this issue in a letter dated April 3, 1922, and proposed three specific candidates. He also stated that through these appointments, Sheptytsky would be able to prove that "although he is far away," he actually manages his archdiocese. Father Bachynskiyi reported that various "enemies" spread rumors that "Your Excellency will not return to his [metropolitan] throne."¹¹⁴ However, the aforementioned letter did not find Sheptytsky in Prudentopolis, where it was addressed. It did not reach the Metropolitan of Halych until the beginning of September.¹¹⁵ Meanwhile, Sheptytsky had already made appropriate decisions regarding the filling of the vacant positions, which he had informed his vicar of in a letter dated early April 1922. Importantly, two of the three clergymen whom he indicated as candidates for canons were also those proposed by Father Bachynskiyi.

Undoubtedly, it was unusual for a bishop to leave his diocese for more than two years. It was an extremely complex time. The political fate of the lands of the Halych metropolis was in the balance, and relations between both the Catholic clergy of two rites and the faithful of both nationalities (Polish and Ukrainian) were very tense. Nevertheless, Sheptytsky was able to leave his metropolis and devote himself to realizing his great plans and visions only because he had people like Father Bachynskiyi at his disposal. His competence, experience and loyalty were invaluable in such situations.

¹¹² Letter from Bachynskiyi to Sheptytsky from April 4, 1921, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome.

¹¹³ Роман Дзюбан, Олена Канчалаба, "Листи Митрополита...", р. 405.

¹¹⁴ Letter from Bachynskiyi to Sheptytsky from April 3, 1922, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome.

¹¹⁵ Роман Дзюбан, Олена Канчалаба, "Листи Митрополита...", р. 419.

5.3. Coping with everyday life of the diocese

The administration of the diocese was influenced by a whole complex of conditions stemming from the organizational culture of the Greek Catholic Church and determined by the fact that a significant part of the clergy was married. As a consequence, one of the bishop's basic administrative tasks, the appointment of parish priests in parishes, went beyond the sphere of purely pastoral issues. It affected the financial situation of the families of Greek Catholic priests.

As for the day-to-day administration of the Lviv diocese, one of the key issues was the management of the parish clergy. This concerned matters as obvious as directing priests to specific institutions, and in particular, appointing parish priests. They were the ones who managed the basic element of the church structure, i.e. the parishes, on a daily basis. They were also a key link between the faithful and the Church, understood as a separate, autonomous institution. However, it should be remembered that most Greek Catholic priests were married. Accordingly, the administration of the diocese was not limited to relations with the clergy themselves, but also with their families. The archival resources of the Basilian Order curia in Rome contain documents that allow us to look behind the scenes of the Lviv diocese when it comes to management, primarily how Metropolitan Sheptytsky dealt with the challenge. These documents are even more interesting because they concern a special period, when Sheptytsky stayed abroad for a long time and was therefore forced to manage his diocese from afar.

The parish was managed either by parish priests or temporary administrators. The position they held gave them practical independence within the church structures. Theoretically, every priest should start his pastoral work as an assistant (vicar). As a rule, self-directed management of the parish should be only the next step in the clerical career. Unfortunately, as Sheptytsky reported in a report for the head of the *Congregatio pro Ecclesia Orientalis*, Cardinal Eugene Tisserant, the Greek Catholic Church had far too few large parishes that would normally be able to provide for both a parish priest and a vicar. Therefore, as the Metropolitan of Halych explained, only a few Greek

Catholic priests have a chance to “go through this school of being a rural vicar subordinated to the parish priest.”¹¹⁶ The function of a parish priest was associated not only with a specific position in the organizational structure of the Church, but also with the right to collect income from their parish. The material status of this stratum of the Greek Catholic clergy depended on the condition of the parish and the resources that were available. These variables included such factors as the number of believers and the size of the land that the parish had at its disposal.¹¹⁷ According to Sheptytsky’s account for Cardinal Tisserant, in the interwar period, the income of the parish was “almost none, due to the impoverishment of the population.”¹¹⁸ This had a particularly negative impact on vicars and temporary administrators of parishes, who had to live on a state salary, and therefore often existed in “obvious poverty, especially married priests who had families.”¹¹⁹ The parish priests were in a better situation. However, their financial situation was always dependent on the wealth of the given parish. There were significant disparities in this regard.

Some light is shed on this everyday parish reality by a letter that Sheptytsky got in 1923 from the parish priest of the Cholhany commune, who complained that the income from *iura stolae* or perquisites received when administering the sacraments or sacramentals now represents “a third of what was before” and “the farm is completely destroyed.”¹²⁰ Father Kahanovskyi further complained that he had no

¹¹⁶ *Relation de l’Archiéparchie de Léopol* (February–April 1937), Bohdan Bociurkiw Collection, file 281.5.477.1 She, p. 13.

¹¹⁷ For more on this issue, see Наталя Колб, “Матеріальне становище греко-католицьких парохів у Галичині на початку ХХ століття (на прикладі львівської архієпархії),” in: *Україна: культурна спадщина, національна свідомість, державність*, Lviv 2001, pp. 465–479; Idem, “Греко-католицьке парафіяльне духовенство в Галичині на зламі ХІХ–ХХ століть: соціальна характеристика, майновий стан, спроби самоорганізації,” in: *Галицька митрополія 1307–1807–2007*, Lviv 2008, pp. 17–30.

¹¹⁸ *Relation de l’Archiéparchie...*, p. 16.

¹¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁰ Letter from Edvard Kahanovskyi from June 25, 1923, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome, pp. 1–2.

money to pay for the education of his children. The priest tried to earn some money by painting pictures for the churches. However, as he writes, “our people cannot or do not want to appreciate artistic work and pay me like a hired worker.”¹²¹ Father Kahanovskyi lamented that for ten years he had been unsuccessful in obtaining a nomination for another parish. Therefore, he asked Sheptytsky to intervene and appoint him as a parish priest in one of two particular parishes: Ozirna or Pidmykhaile.

Father Kahanovskyi was not the only person who wrote to the Metropolitan of Halych about Pidmykhaile. Thanks to this, there is an opportunity, not only to take a closer look at this matter, but also to reconstruct certain mechanisms that shaped the organizational culture of the Greek Catholic Church when Sheptytsky was its head.

On January 17, 1922, Anatol Dolynskyi, the parish priest in Pidmykhaile in the Kalush district, died. The parish also included the neighboring village of Dobrovliany and was one of the largest in the deanery of Kalush in terms of the number of parishioners.¹²² The parish in Pidmykhaile was unique in its own way, not only because of its size, but also because of its legal status, being one of the few parishes that the metropolitan curia could staff on its own.

The procedure of appointing a parish priest was closely related to the institution of the patron, i.e. the owner of the property at the disposal of a given parish. Traditionally, in former Galicia, most parishes were founded as part of private landed estates. In this case, the final choice from among the candidates for the parish priest belonged to the lay patron, the owner or owners of the property in which the parish was established. According to estimates by Natalia Kolb, in 1900, as many as 79% of the parishes under the metropolis of Halych were in such a situation. In addition, some parishes had the status of “state.”¹²³ In this case, the relevant representatives of the state

¹²¹ Ibidem, p. 3.

¹²² *Шематизм гр. Кат. Духовенства львівської архієпархії на рік 1924*, Lviv 1924, pp. 119 and 122.

¹²³ Наталя Колб, “Греко-католицьке парафіяльне духовенство східної Галичини початку XX ст.,” in: *Український Мойсей (до 150-ліття від дня народження*

administration participated in the selection of the parish priest. Based on the data provided by Sheptytsky in his report for Cardinal Tisserant from 1937, it can be concluded that little changed in this matter in subsequent years, at least as far as the diocese of Lviv was concerned. According to Sheptytsky's report, out of a total of 711 parishes, as many as 500 had secular people as their patrons (owners of private estates or state officials).¹²⁴ Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the parish lands belonged to Roman Catholic owners, most often the Polish landed gentry. At the end of the 19th century, the Polish–Ukrainian conflict in Galicia grew more and more intense. The Greek Catholic Church became the key institution of Ukrainian national life. Therefore, the Greek Catholic parish priests, over whom the right of patronage was exercised by Polish landowners, were in a very delicate situation. As a consequence, the right of patronage “was increasingly perceived by the Greek Catholic clergy as an oppressive and humiliating institution, which made Ukrainian parish priests dependent on Polish secular circles.”¹²⁵ As a result, according to Sheptytsky, this dependence neutralized the potential inclinations of the clergy toward “chauvinistic” behavior. Sheptytsky even claimed that the war experiences and the pressure that the Greek Catholic clergy found themselves under after the Polish victory in the conflict over Eastern Galicia reduced the patriotic outbursts from the clergy.¹²⁶ Pidmykhaile was one of the few parishes for which the right of patronage was held directly by the metropolitan curia, and not by a secular landowner. This made it attractive, because it could be managed in relatively comfortable conditions, without

*митрополита Української греко-католицької церкви Андрія Шептицького):
Статті та матеріали*, eds. Олександра Киричук, Марія Омельчук, Ірина Орлевич, Lviv 2015, p. 20.

¹²⁴ *Relation de l'Archieparchie...*, p. 19.

¹²⁵ Наталя Колб, “Греко-католицьке парафіяльне...,” p. 20. See also *idem*, “Проблема патронату й конкуренції в житті греко-католицького духовенства Галичини початку ХХ століття,” in: *Історія релігій в Україні*, vol. 1, Lviv 2003, pp. 285–292.

¹²⁶ “Звіт митр. Андрія Шептицького для о. Д. Дженоккі про стан Львівської Архієпархії,” in: *Митрополит Андрей Шептицький: життя і діяльність. Документи і матеріали 1899–1944. Церква і суспільне питання*, vol. 2, part 2, Lviv 1999, p. 725.

the need to seek favor and good relations with a patron who was outside the Orthodox Church.

After Father Dolynskiy's death, the question of appointing his successor naturally arose. However, the matter was not so simple. Dolynskiy was survived by his wife and three children. The previous income from the parish was their means of existence. As a rule, with the appointment of a new parish priest, the family of the deceased predecessor would lose the right to this income. Therefore, shortly after her husband's death, the widow, Melania Dolynska, wrote a letter to Sheptytsky, dated February 9, 1922, in which she asked him not to "appoint a new parish priest for as long as possible," but only a temporary administrator.¹²⁷ Thanks to this, she would not lose the right to the income from the parish; as she emphasized, she was in a difficult situation because she had three "unsecured" children to raise, and her youngest son had begun to study medicine in Prague.¹²⁸ As Dolynska had wished, the parish remained vacant for the next year. However, successively, other people were willing to take over the inheritance of Father Dolynskiy. In Lviv, in the absence of Sheptytsky, the metropolis was administered by Father Bachynskiy. Over the issue of filling the vacancy in Pidmykhaile, he was under increasing pressure both from the parish and his fellow priests. A year earlier, when it became clear that Sheptytsky was going on a long trip to America and would not be returning to Lviv soon, Father Bachynskiy asked for powers of attorney to fill vacancies in pastoral positions.¹²⁹ He was immediately authorized to do so.¹³⁰ However, apparently there was such tension among the clergy concerning the appointment to the parish in Pidmykhaile that Father Bachynskiy did not feel able to make a decision on his own.

This is evidenced by his extensive letter dated March 11, 1923. Father Bachynskiy reminded the metropolitan that the parish had been

¹²⁷ Letter from Melaniia Dolynska from February 9, 1922, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome, p. 2.

¹²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 1.

¹²⁹ Letter from Oleksandr Bachynskiy from April 4, 1921, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome, p. 2.

¹³⁰ Роман Дзюбан, Олена Канчалаба, "Листи Митрополита...", p. 405.

without a pastor since January 1922. As Father Bachynskyi reported, a competition for a new parish priest in Pidmykhaile was announced and 54 applications were received—mostly “from old priests.” When it was pointed out to them that due to their age this parish would be too difficult, “if only because the cemetery is 3 kilometers away from the church,” almost everyone said that they would take on a vicar. On this basis, Father Bachynskyi concluded that senior priests were applying for this parish “not for pastoral work, but only for rest.” In his opinion, they only wanted to “rest and collect income,” and they intended to delegate all pastoral work to the vicar.¹³¹ According to Father Bachynskyi, however, the problem was that there was no place to get young helpers, because there was already a shortage of them.

Therefore, 32 candidacies were rejected because they did not meet the curia’s expectations with regards to age. In the aforementioned letter, Sheptytsky received a list of 22 priests who were finally accepted as candidates. The oldest of them had already accrued 39 years of priestly service, and the youngest 22 years. Father Bachynskyi suggested to the metropolitan that he “entrust this parish to one of the young people.”¹³² However, he was unable to do it himself, because each member of the consistory promoted his candidate and therefore “it would be difficult to come to a final decision.” This account confirmed the generally known regularity that “family connections in the consistory” were extremely helpful in the efforts to be nominated for a parish.¹³³ Therefore, Father Bachynskyi insisted that Sheptytsky personally choose someone from the list to take over the parish in Pidmykhaile.

In addition, the situation was made difficult by the fact that the parishioners were also drawn into the game for the vacant position. In Pidmykhaile, a “Parish Committee” was established, which several times sent a petition to the curia with words of support for a particular candidate. One such letter from March 6, 1923 has been preserved.

¹³¹ Letter from Oleksandr Bachynskyi from March 11, 1923, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome, p. 1.

¹³² *Ibidem*, p. 2.

¹³³ Наталя Колб, “Греко-католицьке парафіяльне...,” p. 20.

Its senders announced that if the ordinariate sent someone else, that is, if they act “against our will and request,” then “know that now people are different than they were before the war.”¹³⁴ The signatories of the petition directly threatened that if the nomination was inconsistent with their expectations, the inhabitants of the parish “would not let the new parish priest into the village.”¹³⁵ The text of the letter showed that, in fact, the parishioners’ opinion was not unanimous, because a separate delegation also went to the curia demanding the nomination of a different candidate.¹³⁶ It can be assumed that this was not an isolated case of parishioners trying to influence the personnel policy of the Greek Catholic Church. As noted by Natalia Kolb, there were gradually more and more supporters of the view that the faithful of a given parish should take over the right of patronage, which until then had been vested in the lay owners of landed estates or in the metropolitan curia. Kolb stated that the most frequent supporters of this change were “Ukrainian politicians, mainly from the radical party.”¹³⁷ However, it can be assumed that clergymen could also try to use the support and sympathies of the faithful to put pressure on the curia regarding the nomination for the post of parish priest. It was probably no coincidence that in his letter to Sheptytsky of May 27, 1921, Father Bachynskyi asked the metropolitan to remind the clergy not to convince the faithful that they should choose a priest and not to “undermine” the “seriousness of spiritual authority” in this way.¹³⁸ In the aforementioned letter of March 11, 1923, Father Bachynskyi drew attention to the disastrous consequences of the prolonged state of what was meant to be a temporary situation. The pastoral service was performed by a vicar delegated from the neighboring parish, a “young energetic priest of the Latin Rite” operating in the area, who “convinced

¹³⁴ Letter from the “parish committee” from March 6, 1923, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome, p. 3.

¹³⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 2.

¹³⁷ Наталя Колб, “Греко-католицьке парафіяльне...,” p. 20.

¹³⁸ Letter from Oleksandr Bachynskyi from May 27, 1921, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome, p. 2.

everyone he could convert to the Latin Rite.”¹³⁹ Indeed, if we compare the available statistical data, it can be seen that the number of inhabitants of Pidmykhaile declaring affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church was growing steadily. In 1913, there were 390¹⁴⁰ of them in the parish, while during the census in 1921, 669 people declared themselves Roman Catholic.¹⁴¹ Ten years later, there were 800 Latin Rite Catholics in Pidmykhaile.¹⁴² On the other hand, the number of adherents of the Greek Catholic Church from 1913 to 1932 slightly decreased, from 2,441¹⁴³ to 2,311.¹⁴⁴ Even if only because of the ongoing competition for the faithful between the Catholic Churches of the Eastern and Western rites, the presence of a permanent, good Greek Catholic priest was evidently needed. The prolonged state of suspension and indecision, especially when Father Bachynskiy began to refer all interested persons directly to Sheptytsky, might have given the impression that the metropolitan really had “forgotten” about his duties. The fact that he had been away from the diocese for three years reinforced this notion.

Despite this, the Galician metropolitan still lingered. In a letter dated May 8–9, 1923, he apologized to Father Bachynskiy for not having nominated a priest for the parish, “about which Father Prelate once wrote to me.”¹⁴⁵ It can be assumed that it was about Pidmykhail. Sheptytsky explained that he did not do so because of the canonical visit. This probably refers to the visitation of the metropolis of Halych,

¹³⁹ Letter from Oleksandr Bachynskiy from March 11, 1923, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome, p. 1.

¹⁴⁰ *Шематизм всего клира греко-католицкою митрополичою архієпархією львовскою на рік 1914*, Львовъ 1913, p. 179.

¹⁴¹ *Skorowidz miejscowości Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej opracowany na podstawie wyników pierwszego powszechnego spisu ludności z dn. 30 września 1921 r. i innych źródeł urzędowych. Województwo stanisławowskie*, Warszawa 1923, p. 7.

¹⁴² *Шематизм гр. кат. духовенства львівської архієпархії на рік 1932/33*, Lviv 1932, p. 75.

¹⁴³ *Шематизм всего клира...*, p. 179.

¹⁴⁴ *Шематизм гр. кат. духовенства...*, p. 75.

¹⁴⁵ Роман Дзюбан, Олена Канчалаба, “Листи Митрополита...,” p. 424.

initiated by Father Giovanni Genocchi, the special delegate of the Holy See for the affairs of the Greek Catholic Church in Poland. At the same time, Sheptytsky justified his delay in this matter quite enigmatically with the “customs prevailing in Rome” regarding the conduct during the visitation.

Finally, a new parish priest for Pidmykhaile was appointed in the fall of 1923.¹⁴⁶ It seems that the metropolitan listened to the advice of his vicar and nominated one of the youngest candidates for this parish: Emanuïl Pidlisetskyi.¹⁴⁷ In the archives of the Basilian Order curia in Rome, there are two more letters on the nomination for the parish in Pidmykhaile from another sender, Father Volodymyr Plashovetskyi. He was the parish priest of Liatske Velyke (now Chervone) in the deanery of Zolochiv. This parish had a fraction of the parishioners in Pidmykhail, so it can be surmised that it provided a much more modest income. In the first letter, from January 25, 1923, Father Plashovetskyi complained that there was not enough to cover the costs of educating his three children “in the city.” The clergyman also revealed his traumatic experiences from World War I, that is, the “Orthodox invasion and three-year exile to Russia.” In asking for a nomination to Pidmykhaile, he stated that this was “the only hope for him and his family.”¹⁴⁸ Father Plashovetskyi wrote a second time¹⁴⁹ about the same matter five months later. Again he mentioned his exile to Russia, but this time his main argument was pneumonia and his wife’s tuberculosis. According to the clergyman’s account, her health had deteriorated while he was in Russia. Consequently, his wife was treated in Zakopane twice a year. She seemed to have recovered, but suffered a relapse. As Plashovetskyi wrote, Doctor Panchyshyn did not preclude the possibility of the patient’s recovery, but specified that she would “live

¹⁴⁶ *Львівсько-Архієпархіальні Відомости*, 36 (1923), no. 4, p. 13.

¹⁴⁷ Letter from Oleksandr Bachynskyi from March 11, 1923, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome, p. 2.

¹⁴⁸ Letter from Volodymyr Plashovetskyi from January 25, 1923, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome, p. 2.

¹⁴⁹ Letter from Volodymyr Plashovetskyi from June 28, 1923, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome.

in the greatest comfort in a different air.” Meanwhile, in Latske Velyke, “you can’t even dream of it.” Moreover, Father Plashovetskyi admitted that due to the meager income from his job, “I live thanks to the help of my mother-in-law, who has already supported another son-in-law without a job.” Therefore, the clergyman expressed the belief that after 16 years of pastoral ministry, he had the right to “move from a current misery to a larger parish,” especially since such a right is granted to “former wartime apostates.”¹⁵⁰ It was an allusion to the priests who converted to Orthodoxy during the Russian occupation of Galicia, and then “returned” to the Greek Catholic Church after the tsarist army was driven out.

Father Plashovetskyi was on the “short list” that Father Bachynskyi had presented to Sheptytsky. He met the main admission criterion, i.e. a relatively young age. He was ordained in exactly the same year as Emanuil Pidlisetskyi. So why did Sheptytsky choose the latter and not Father Plashovetskyi? Due to the lack of data, it is difficult to say which arguments ultimately prevailed. However, it seems that one can guess which circumstances were not conducive to Father Plashovetskyi’s candidacy.

From the quoted correspondence, a picture emerges of the hermetic world in which some of the Greek Catholic clergy lived or aspired to live, taking advantage of long-term spa treatments, consulting with outstanding specialists (the above-mentioned Dr. Marian Panchyshyn was certainly one of them), and “living in the highest comforts.” In this arrangement, the parish was seen more as a source of revenue to ensure this standard of living than as a place of pastoral mission. At least, this is how Father Plashovetskyi seems to have approached this matter and perhaps accounts for why he was not selected. From the previously quoted account of Father Bachynskyi from March 1923, it can be concluded that he was not the only one who treated the matter of parish management this way.

At the same time, it should be noted that shortly after Father Bachynskyi’s alarming appeal to make a decision on the Pidmykhaile case, the Metropolitan of Galicia received a second letter from Melania

¹⁵⁰ Ibidem, p. 2.

Dolynska, the widow of the late parish priest of Pidmykhaile. It was written on March 19, 1923, or 8 days after Father Bachynskyi had written. The widow of the parish priest, Pidmykhaile, complained to Sheptytsky that her husband had taken over the parish only three years before his death. It was a very unfavorable time, because “war damage and two years of crop failure ... did not allow us to earn even a little money.”¹⁵¹ Dolynska informed the metropolitan that she still had two “unprotected” children, including a son in his second year of medicine in Prague. Therefore, the widow asked Sheptytsky not to appoint a new parish priest, at least until the autumn, “if it is not possible longer.” Thanks to this, she could maintain the right to income from the parish land, which in turn would allow her to “help her children a little.”¹⁵²

Sheptytsky did not fill the parish priest position until the autumn, so he did as Father Dolynskyi’s widow had asked. Presumably, this was not a matter of chance. The widow’s argument of needing to support her son while he studied medicine in Prague might have been persuasive for the Metropolitan of Halych. In any case, this would not be the only case when Sheptytsky supported the formation of a new secular Ukrainian national elite. This becomes more understandable if we consider the broader social context in which the battle for the parish of Pidmykhaile took place.

Until the beginning of the 20th century, the core of the Ukrainian national elite in Galicia was traditionally formed by the Greek Catholic clergy and their families. However, on the eve of World War I, the process of modernizing social life was gaining momentum. It was associated with such phenomena as secularization and the expansion of socialist, nationalist, and liberal ideologies. More and more layers of society gained agency within the political processes and in public life in general. For the Greek Catholic clergy, which formed a separate and quite hermetic “group of interests” in society, and in which a conservative way of looking at the world was predominant, these were new

¹⁵¹ Letter from Melaniia Dolynska from March 19, 1923, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome, p. 1.

¹⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 2.

challenges.¹⁵³ One of the consequences of the new situation was the formation of Ukrainian secular intellectual elites. At that time, as noted by Isydor Sokhotsky, a new generation of Ukrainian politicians appeared, to whom “the clergy largely handed over political leadership.”¹⁵⁴ This does not mean that the Greek Catholic clergy stopped being involved in political life. In the 1920s, the belief that Greek Catholic parish priests should “subordinate their activities to higher national interests” took root in the social consciousness. Therefore, as “fathers of the nation,” they would not only implement typical pastoral goals, but also take over the function of “national-political” educators of their faithful.¹⁵⁵ However, due to certain objective conditions, it was not easy for the parish clergy to meet these expectations. The institution of patronage meant that most parish priests remained partially dependent on the owners of landed estates, the vast majority of whom were Poles. In a report from 1923 for the papal visitor, Father Genocchi, Sheptytsky explained that married priests, which constitute the majority of the clergy, are more dependent than celibates on lay “patrons’ who owned parish land, on the government, and even on the faithful themselves.”¹⁵⁶

Along with the process of social modernization at the beginning of the 20th century, a whole galaxy of new secular leaders of Ukrainian social and political life appeared in Galicia. Most often, they were either academic teachers or lawyers and a large number of them were children of Greek Catholic priests. However, in the modernized model of society, the elites were not limited to political activists. They were made up of educated people who performed professions that enjoyed special social prestige, such as doctors.

Andrey Sheptytsky tried to actively support the process of creating new Ukrainian elites among the “exiles” from Greek Catholic clergy families. The son of the deceased parish priest from Pidmykhaile would not be the only person whom the Metropolitan of Galicia helped

¹⁵³ Роман Лехнюк, *На порозі...*, pp. 29–30.

¹⁵⁴ Ісидор Сохоцький, *Що дали Греко-католицька церква й духовенство українському народові*, Філадельфія 1951, p. 39.

¹⁵⁵ Роман Лехнюк, *На порозі...*, p. 259.

¹⁵⁶ “Звіт митр. Андрія Шептицького для о. Д. Дженоккі...,” p. 725.

to join this group. He also gave similar support to the children of Father Hryhorij Selianskyi, who had been a parish priest in the village of Vovchyntsi in the Stanislaviv district and who died in 1920. His eldest son and daughter, Ostap and Maria Selianskyi, started studying medicine in Prague in the early 1920s. Ostap and Maria supported themselves in Prague thanks to a scholarship they received from the Czechoslovak government.¹⁵⁷ However, their five siblings were dependent on their mother. Her income was very modest and limited to a “small pension,” which she received as a widow of a Greek Catholic priest, and a “small income from the farm.”¹⁵⁸ This was not enough to provide the remaining children, who were in junior high school, with the conditions for further education. Therefore, Ostap Selianskyi decided to ask Sheptytsky for help. He presented the whole matter in a letter of May 10, 1923. The Metropolitan of Halych must have reacted almost immediately, because the next letter he received from Ostap Selianskyi was dated June 7, 1923.¹⁵⁹ Unfortunately, there is no data to help determine what exactly that help consisted of, but it is known that Sheptytsky did indeed take under his care not only Ostap and Maria, but all their siblings. As a result, all seven received a higher education.¹⁶⁰

The aforementioned second letter received by Sheptytsky is very telling. Ostap Selianskyi wrote that the day he received an answer from Sheptytsky was “one of the happiest days we have experienced in recent years.” Ostap immediately realized that it was a letter from Sheptytsky. He confessed to the metropolitan that “for a long time, he did not dare to open it and read it.” Ostap wrote, “I felt nervous, curious, and afraid of its content.” Selianskyi asked Sheptytsky for forgiveness for “doubting his help,” but, as he explained, he was convinced that in the face of “so many troubles and more important matters,” the metropolitan was unable to “take care of everyone and help everyone”—especially since

¹⁵⁷ Letter from Ostap Selianskyi from May 10, 1923, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome, p. 1.

¹⁵⁸ Ibidem, p. 2.

¹⁵⁹ Letter from Ostap Selianskyi from June 7, 1923, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome.

¹⁶⁰ Ліліана Гентош, *Митрополит Шептицький...*, p. 243.

the previous efforts for help made had not yielded any results.¹⁶¹ Selianskyi wrote that wherever his mother had turned for help and advice, “answers did come, but there was a forced official tone in them” and that, apart from empty words of sympathy, “rarely could one find in them a word from the heart.” Selianskyi wrote that “often from influential people who could help ... I did not even get a reply written by [their] secretary.”¹⁶² Then Selianskyi emphasized that “only from a man of such a noble heart, sensitive to the misery of his younger brother, from a famous man, a true aristocrat of spirit, I was able to read these dear words, which I did not even expect recently.” At the end of the letter, the future graduate of Prague medicine assured Sheptytsky of his undying gratitude for the help provided.¹⁶³ Fifty-five letters from Ostap Selianskyi to Sheptytsky have been preserved in the Lviv archive. This seems to prove their lasting and quite close relationship. Selianskyi was for a time the personal physician of Metropolitan Sheptytsky. Sheptytsky was also the godfather of Ostap Vir’s daughter, who was born in 1926. As noted by Liliana Hentosh, “in the conduct of the metropolitan one can see not only noble mercy, but also a certain prudence. By helping all the children of this family to obtain a higher education, Sheptytsky took care of one more generation of intelligentsia.” Such behavior is a good illustration of the way in which Sheptytsky understood the challenges in the processes of social modernization and how he perceived the role that the Greek Catholic Church was supposed to play in them.

A little earlier, in 1918, Sheptytsky, together with bishops Khomyshyn and Kotsylovskiy, wrote in a special pastoral letter about the need to form new Ukrainian elites. The Greek Catholic bishops focused on “the tasks of the Church and the nation in the post-war period.”¹⁶⁴ One of the key challenges that the authors outlined for the

161 Letter from Ostap Selianskyi from June 7, 1923, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome, p. 1.

162 Ibidem, p. 2.

163 Ibidem.

164 “Спільне Пастирське послання митр. Андрея Шептицького та ін. Єпископів до духовенства й вірних про завдання Церкви і народу в післявоєнний період,” in: *Церква і суспільне питання*, vol. 2, part 1, Lviv 1998, pp. 445–452.

faithful was the formation of a new elite of the society and nation. It was supposed to be created by “great people, outstanding leaders and saints,”¹⁶⁵ “people who are required by our times and the situation of our nation.”¹⁶⁶ It seems that it is no exaggeration to say that Ostap and Maria Selianskyi fit perfectly into the archetype of the new Ukrainian national elite outlined in this way.

Before he went to college, Ostap joined the Sich Riflemen in 1915 and took part in battles in World War I and in the Polish–Ukrainian war for Eastern Galicia. Finally, in 1920, he was taken prisoner by Poland. However, he managed to escape and to study medicine in Prague.¹⁶⁷ After graduating, Selianskyi returned to Galicia, got married, and ran a medical practice in Kutuy. During this period, he turned to Sheptytsky for support in the education of local talented children.¹⁶⁸ After the outbreak of World War II and the threat from the NKVD, the Selianskyi family left for Germany in 1939. Eventually, Ostap Selianskyi found employment in one of Dresden’s hospitals.

When the carpet bombing of Dresden began, Dr. Selianskyi was performing an operation. The surgery was to save the patient’s life and the doctor refused to abandon it and retreat to the shelter. Selianskyi was killed along with the patient and a nurse assistant by an Allied bomb.¹⁶⁹ His daughter—Sheptytsky’s goddaughter—emigrated to Brazil shortly after the end of World War II. As Vira Vovk, she gained fame as one of the most outstanding Ukrainian writers in exile.

In 2017, Ostap Selianskyi symbolically “returned” to his homeland. At that time, on the initiative of Vira Vovk (Selianskyi) and in cooperation with the social organization “Sviaty Yur,” a symbolic urn was put in the crypt of the Cathedral of St. George. The urn contained soil from

¹⁶⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁶⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁶⁷ Letter from Ostap Selianskyi from May 10, 1923, Archive of the General Curia OSBM in Rome..., p. 1.

¹⁶⁸ Ліліана Гентош, *Митрополит Шептицький...*, p. 243.

¹⁶⁹ “Лікар Остап Селянський – історія життя,” <https://huculia.info/ostap-selyanskyj-kuty/>.

the mass grave of the victims of the Allied air raid on Dresden was buried.¹⁷⁰ On the surface, the case of staffing the parish in Pidmykhaile may look like an example of Sheptytsky's negligence and nonchalance, that being so engrossed in his foreign travels, he "forgot" about the function entrusted to him. Undoubtedly, in comparison with other vacant pastoral positions, the one in Pidmykhaile aroused above-average emotions. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the situation in which the parish was managed by a temporary administrator for about two years was not uncommon in either the practice of the entire Lviv archdiocese or in Pidmykhaile itself.¹⁷¹ Such cases happened quite often.

Perhaps in this case the delay was not due solely to some negligence on the part of Sheptytsky. It can even be hypothesized that the Metropolitan of Halych deliberately delayed the settlement of the matter of appointing the local parish. The case can be interpreted as another example when Sheptytsky applied the "win-win" rule—this time in a very specific context of the life of the Greek Catholic parish clergy. By delaying the decision, the Metropolitan of Halych gained a chance to get to know the candidates and their motivations better. At the same time, the son of the late Father Dolynskyi was able to continue his education in Prague and one more representative of the Greek Catholic priest's family thereby got a chance to join the ranks of the new secular Ukrainian intelligentsia. The fact that Sheptytsky was actively involved in the process of shaping the new Ukrainian national and social elite is evidenced by the example of the Selianskyi family.

¹⁷⁰ "У крипті собору Святого Юра перепоховали капсулу з прахом Остапа Селянського," <http://ukrpohliad.org/national-memory/u-krypti-soboru-svyatogo-yura-perepohovaly-kapsulu-z-prahom-ostapa-selyanskogo.html>.

¹⁷¹ If we also look at the biographies of individual Greek Catholic clergymen, the vast majority of them served as administrators more than once and most often held this position for about 2 years—see Dmytro Blazejowskyj, *Historical Šematism of the Archeparchy of L'viv (1832–1944)*, vol. 2: *Clergy and Religious Congregations*, Kyiv 2004.

CONCLUSIONS

There was no institutional or professional representative of the “hardware” of historical culture at the end of the Soviet Union that could have restored Sheptytsky’s legacy from its state of aborted legacy. The political dimension totally dominated Soviet historical culture. The main goal and mission of the actors forming it was to legitimize power. When Ukraine ceased to be a Soviet republic and became an independent state, new power structures emerged that required new formulas of legitimacy. This involved the need to assimilate a specific set of symbols and types of narration. This transition was relatively smooth, and on the institutional level it is illustrated by the mass transformation of departments of history of the CPSU into departments of the history of Ukraine and the retraining of a large part of their staff to become specialists in ethnopolitics and ethnohistory.¹ This was enough to serve the new government, especially since it included many representatives of the party nomenklatura.

On the other hand, the incorporation of Sheptytsky’s legacy into Ukrainian historical culture after 1990 required that it undergo a deeper re-evaluation. First of all, it was necessary to restore its cognitive dimension. In practice, this meant that it was not enough to simply change the names of units and phraseology from Marxist-Leninist to national. Successive generations of Soviet historians learned to construct an image of the past in accordance with propaganda guidelines. Now, instead of these guidelines, the criterion of truth had to be applied. Regardless of how it was understood, one thing was certain: where this truth was not defined and determined

¹ Georgiy Kasianov, *Memory Crash: The Politics of History in and Around Ukraine 1980s–2010s*, Budapest–Vienna–New York 2022, p. 178.

by the clearly articulated expectations of the political authorities, virtually all of the hardware of post-Soviet historical culture which had developed during the Soviet period turned out to be dysfunctional.

In the case of Ukrainian historical culture, two breakthrough moments can be distinguished: 1989–91 (independence) and 2013–14 (Revolution of Dignity). In both cases, this breakthrough was also related to the memory of Sheptytsky. In 1989, the Greek Catholic Church emerged from the catacombs. This also marked the beginning of the process of restoring its place within Ukrainian historical culture. In 1990, the aforementioned conference devoted to Sheptytsky was held in Lviv. An event on such a scale heralded the beginning of the construction of “hardware” that would be an alternative to the institutions and “specialists in historical culture” inherited from the Soviet period. The crowd that gathered in May 1990 in the auditorium of the Lviv Medical Institute and on the street in front of the building testified to the fact that within the historical culture, next to the hitherto passive addressee, a new type of recipient of messages and narratives about the past appeared: an active participant. In the Soviet model, this type was unknown, or at least undesirable.

The example of the memory of Sheptytsky shows very clearly how Polish and Ukrainian historical cultures are interconnected. After the fall of communism, actors in both Poland and Ukraine faced the challenge of rebuilding the cognitive dimension of their cultures. This was clearly demonstrated by the conferences devoted to Sheptytsky, which took place in Lviv and Krakow in 1990. The timing of the two events was not accidental. Importantly, their participants were then convinced that cooperation was necessary on issues such as Sheptytsky’s legacy.

In the following years, the process of restoring the memory of Sheptytsky from the sphere of aborted legacy continued. In the political dimension, it culminated in the resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of 2014 at the all-Ukrainian celebration of the 150th anniversary of the birth of the Metropolitan of Halych. This was the beginning of the “mnemonic counteroffensive” that followed the Revolution of Dignity, which culminated politically with the laws on decommunization.

By then, the process of discovering Sheptytsky’s legacy in Ukraine had advanced significantly. After 2015, it gained even more momentum.

However, the actors primarily consisted of a segment of Ukrainian historical culture that was not burdened with Soviet heritage. This applies to institutions such as the Ukrainian Catholic University (UCU) and the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINP), as well as entities created by the Ukrainian diaspora. They create an infrastructure for professional historians interested in Sheptytsky's legacy, both from Ukraine and from outside the Ukrainian field of memory (from Poland and from the diaspora).

Under these conditions, a tremendous amount of research was done and source materials were published. Actors from Ukraine and abroad established fruitful contacts and cooperation. The monographs by Liliana Hentosh and Magdalena Nowak are a kind of showcase of these interactions between the Polish and Ukrainian fields of science and between Polish and Ukrainian historical culture.² Admittedly, various myths are still reproduced within Ukrainian historical culture. Sheptytsky is still not one of the most recognizable historical figures in Ukraine.³ But in general, the legacy of the Soviet propaganda in Ukraine has been overcome.

The commemoration of Sheptytsky after the Euromaidan was dominated by mnemonic warriors. Memory of his legacy was formatted and adapted to political goals. Legitimization of the formal and informal structures of the state power after the Euromaidan was one of them. To that end, at least part of their representatives presented themselves as credible continuators of the integration into the UE and reliable partners of the West. Therefore acting president of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov asserted on the 17th March 2014 that "Signing Ukraine-European Union agreement is our pivotal task."⁴ A few weeks later the newly elected president Poroshenko declared during

² Magdalena Nowak, *Dwa światy...*; Ліліана Гентош, *Митрополит Шептицький...*

³ Joanna Konieczna-Salamatin, Tomasz Stryjek, Natalia Otrishchenko, *Wydarzenia. Ludzie. Historia. Raport z badań sondażowych o pamięci współczesnych Polaków i Ukraińców*, Warszawa 2018, p. 38.

⁴ "О. Турчинов: Європейська інтеграція залишається пріоритетом нашої зовнішньої і внутрішньої політики," <https://www.rada.gov.ua/news/Povidomlennya/89743.html>.

his inaugural speech that “European democracy for me, is the best way of state government which has been invented by humans.”⁵ In this context, Sheptytsky’s legacy was then a mean for “drawing Ukraine closer to the European Union.”

However, in parallel with the process of associating Ukraine with the EU, a military conflict in Donbas escalated. The fundamental existence of the Ukrainian state was threatened. Thus dreams of its “European prospects” were overshadowed. The main tasks were consolidation of the political community and its mobilization against hybrid warfare. Thus the image of Sheptytsky was strongly narrowed to “a state-maker” (*derzhavotvoret*). All the other threads related to the Sheptytsky’s legacy became too complicated or sophisticated. In particular, this refers to such topics like Holocaust or attitude towards the Ukrainian nationalist movement.

From the moment of the Ukrainian Supreme Council’s declaration, a process of nationalizing symbolic capital related to Metropolitan Sheptytsky started (in the sense of its expropriation beneficial to the formal and informal structures of state power). It was also used in activities destined to legitimize neopatrimonial and oligarchical rules in terms of post-Maidan Ukraine through the manipulation of notions and values. For example, at the award ceremony, Pinchuk stated that he considered himself “an integral part of civic society” in Ukraine.⁶ The legacy of Sheptytsky is an issue that goes beyond the memory of one community. It is thus a very good example that a given type of mnemonic regime, as well as the structure of the mnemonic field do not only depend on internal actors; they are also influenced by the external environment. Choices of strategies and mnemonic issues may be determined by the activities and goals of external agents. In the case of Sheptytsky, apart from Russia, there are at least three potential external agents influencing Ukrainian memory field who have referred to the Holocaust: Yad Vashem Institute, researchers

⁵ “Petro Poroshenko’s Speech at the Inauguration: Full Text,” <http://euromaidanpress/2014/06/07/petro-poroshenkos-speech-at-the-inauguration-full-text/>.

⁶ “Victor Pinchuk at the Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky Award Ceremony,” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PkJ0jsB6l10>.

who question a “Germano-centric conceptualization of the Shoah” and the Ukrainian diaspora (UJE), and the actors involved in the politics of memory in Poland. Each of them, to some degree, has introduced the strategy of a mnemonic warrior. They fight for “their version of the truth.” Their activities generate constraints which affect the politics of memory in Ukraine.

Oxana Shevel pointed out that a pillarized mnemonic field “is not only more conducive to political pluralism and democracy; it is arguably the only sustainable one in a society such as Ukraine that features multiple historical, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural experiences and identities.”⁷ The legacy of Sheptytsky might be very helpful in achieving “a compromise in the form of a mnemonic reconciliation.”⁸ The problem is that according to the Kubik and Bernhard’s theory of politics of memory, there is no place for a warrior in a pillarized regime.⁹ However, it is worth noting that in regards to some issues, actors behaving in the manner of mnemonic warriors may also contribute to the pluralization of memory and the democratization of society. For example, this refers to agents involved in commemoration of the Holocaust. Although they do not simplify the achievement of reconciliation, they may, for example, secure the mnemonic field from being dominated by other warriors. Apart from this, they supply incentives for “finding a way of reading” the legacy of the past.

It seems that the mnemonic warrior strategy, when employed by an actor of a given mnemonic field, results not only from “a calculation of the political benefits” and “an assessment of what position is the most advantageous,” but also from the context. In other words, some topics and issues from the past are more conducive to the mnemonic warrior strategy in a given circumstance (e.g., the Holocaust in Eastern Europe) than others, which better suit the position of a mnemonic pluralist.

Kubik and Bernhard stressed the importance of the “limits of malleability in the presentation of the cultural/historical material that

⁷ Oxana Shevel, “Memories of the Past and Visions of the Future...,” p. 161.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ Jan Kubik, Michael Bernhard, “Introduction,” in: *Twenty Years After Communism...*, p. 4.

are imposed by the visions of history that resonate in the discursive field of the target group. The line between credible and incredible visions of the past is not easy to specify, and it shifts; once it is crossed, however, the entrepreneur's claim to legitimacy in a given context fails or is weakened."¹⁰ However it is not only the credibility of the historical narration which matters in politics of memory. The credibility of the narrator is also an important factor influencing the results of the mnemonic activities. A given "mnemonic actor" has to fit in with the content promoted in the frames of politics of memory. It means that it is very important what the recipients of the historical narration already know about this actor and to what extent a broad context related to this narration is coherent with common knowledge about a narrator.

For example, the impression of such particular incoherency might emerge when Pinchuk with a Sheptytsky medal on his chest publicly condemns corruption and declares himself to be a member of civil society. Probably for that reason, metropolitan Shevchuk reacted with self-constraint to the idea of granting the oligarch Sheptytsky medal. This difficult situation which Archbishop Shevchuk had to tackle probably quite well reflects the complexity of social reality in Ukraine after Euromaidan. As a result, in the case of such agents like UJE or UGCC, it used to be hard to unequivocally assess the relevance of their primary intentions and aims to the final results of their activities in the memory field.

In the case of Sheptytsky's legacy, the issue of "finding a way of reading it" becomes important because the UGCC was excluded from the process of shaping the identity of the majority of contemporary Ukrainians, for whom it was therefore an "aborted legacy." During the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan, the UGCC started to play the role of an All-Ukrainian civil society institution. The intention to link various aspects of Ukrainian life to Sheptytsky's "aborted" legacy emerged among actors of all categories that were attempting to forge Ukraine's collective memory. Therefore, attempts to link the memory of Sheptytsky with the lived social world in Ukraine has taken on a new dynamic.

¹⁰ Jan Kubik, Michael Bernhard, "A Theory of the Politics of Memory..." p. 9.

These attempts correlated with the process of decommunization, that is, liberating Ukrainian historical culture from the burdens associated with the legacy of the Soviet era. This involves the need to cross a kind of mental Rubicon, which is still a significant challenge because, according to the still quite popular belief, revising the Soviet legacy entails the risk of rejecting “the modernity brought by the Soviet experience.”¹¹ According to this narrative, the Soviet era brought Ukrainians “modernization and a leap into industrial society.” A “necessary condition” was “the achievement of cultural homogeneity,” “unification and standardization of the cultural space.” The tool of this “unification and standardization” was the Russian language. Consequently, “it was the language of science, high culture, technology, politics, and social mobility, and also the language of domination and coercion.”¹² Within this paradigm, the Ukrainian national intelligentsia “found itself in a kind of a cultural ghetto (sometimes out of necessity, sometimes willingly) where development stopped at the level of the ‘national revival’ of the second half of the nineteenth century or, in the best possible case scenario, the game-changing 1920s (‘the Executed Renaissance’).”¹³ Georgiy Kasianov’s conclusion was based on the implicit belief that Soviet culture and Soviet science were associated with development and progress. It should be noted that at least from the point of view of European standards, such an assumption is at least questionable. This applies in particular to the humanities, which are of key importance to the politics of memory. In this field, Soviet science was, after all, subordinated to the rules of the “culture of the party leadership.” This led to a deep collapse, a degeneration of the Soviet field of science.

In the model of historical culture that was formed in these conditions, there was only room for a passive recipient (“addressee”) of messages formulated by institutions and “specialists in historical culture.” There was no space for active participation; there could be no feedback between the addressees and the actors creating the “hardware”

¹¹ Georgiy Kasianov, *Memory Crash...*, p. 391.

¹² Ibidem.

¹³ Ibidem.

of Soviet historical culture. Therefore, “the modernity brought by the Soviet experience” because of its nature and the core features could not be reconciled with the process of democratization in Ukraine, and within this process the Soviet experience could not be an alternative to what Kasianov calls “national/nationalists’ narrative.” The narratives of Soviet nostalgia and of national revival were mutually exclusive. Therefore, the legacies of Yaroslav Halan and Andrey Sheptytsky cannot be reconciled within one internally coherent historical culture.

In the Soviet realities, the alleged cultural ghetto in which, according to Kasianov, the Ukrainian national intelligentsia was stuck at least to some extent protected them from the cultural and civilizational regression that had such a disastrous effect on the Ukrainian Soviet humanities. Staying in this ghetto allowed at least the preservation of the memory of the ties to European culture.

The 1990 conference in Lviv was an example of leaving such a ghetto. Importantly, it was an outcome which, as Kasianov would have wished, gave the opportunity “to ‘decapsulate’ the national narrative of history and memory, to include other ethnic groups and nations, [and] to represent the Ukrainian past as a space for the interaction of cultures, civilizations, ethnic groups, and nations.”¹⁴ Sheptytsky’s legacy is perfect for this purpose. The awareness of this value was preserved in that ghetto. It seems that it has survived mainly in the form of unarticulated knowledge. During the Revolution of Dignity, this knowledge was referred to as part of the memory policy. In the meantime, many efforts were made to restore Sheptytsky’s legacy for Ukrainian historical culture and to link it with the current reality. For this purpose, source materials were published, efforts were made to grant the Metropolitan of Halych the title of Righteous Among the Nations, and steps were taken toward his beatification.

As far as Polish mnemonic field is concerned, in the conditions of historical culture inherited from the communist period, there were much better prospects for discovering Sheptytsky’s legacy than in Ukraine. However, despite much better starting conditions and more

¹⁴ Georgiy Kasianov, *Memory Crash...*, p. 394.

comfortable conditions in the following years, the reception of Sheptytsky's character after 30 years returned to the starting point.

As a result, Sheptytsky remains a controversial figure in Poland. While the controversies themselves should not be surprising and are not unusual, the problem is that 30 years after the fall of communism, these controversies are still intensified by manipulated messages, as in the case of the publication of Hryhorij Khomyshyn's notes, and by a kind of renaissance of interest in Edward Prus's pseudo-scientific publications on Sheptytsky. It would seem that after so many years of transformation of historical culture in Poland, these should have "gone to the past" a long time ago. Instead, they keep coming back and they remain in circulation.

To illustrate the situation in Polish scholarship and memory regarding Sheptytsky's heritage, it is worth examining two pairs of quotes. On the left side of the table, examples of a positive narrative about Sheptytsky are presented; the quotations on the right side illustrate the negative discourse about him.¹⁵

Positive discourse	Negative discourse
1. "The policy pursued by Sheptytsky in a way bordering on the risk of losing and being misunderstood was based on the principle of neighborly love. A principle understood comprehensively, as a fight for one's own rights without violating the rights of others."	1. "Sheptytsky was unable to formulate doctrinally stable ethical judgments and abruptly abandoned the already accepted diagnosis only to return to it again, depending on external circumstances, the expectations of the other party, or the state of his own emotions." Alternatively, he accurately diagnosed the situation "from the point of view of Catholic doctrine," but "treated politics and morality separately" as "a racial politician, educated on Machiavelli."

¹⁵ Source of the examples of the positive discourse: Andrzej A. Zięba, *Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki: biskup i mąż stanu (Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky: bishop and statesman)*—manuscript of the article from 1988, File JKS-MA 3.39., Sheptytsky Family Archive; source of the examples of the negative discourse: Andrzej A. Zięba, "Szeptycki w Europie Hitlera," in: *Prawda historyczna a prawda polityczna w badaniach naukowych*, ed. Bogusław Paż, Kraków 2013, p. 425 (1) and 429 (2).

Positive discourse	Negative discourse
<p>2. “Ukrainians ‘had every reason’ to [take] ‘recourse to extreme solutions’ including terrorism. Sheptytsky fought against the spread of this ideology in the name of Christian principles. Was his fight successful? Certainly yes. Because the very fact of giving a testimony of loyalty to the homeland and Christian conscience was such a success. Sheptytsky made these two values one throughout his life. Thanks to this, he built a pattern that has not only been imitated by many Ukrainians, but also has a meaning that goes beyond the framework of the Ukrainian nation.”</p>	<p>2. “Throughout his life, Sheptytsky was mostly content with adding his own post scriptum or commentary to the events. This was especially the case at the intersection of politics and morality. Too late, he voiced his objections to policies devised by others, and in addition, one that he had previously helped implement. That is why the final balance of his life in this respect is negative. This is the greatest paradox of this man: fulfilling the role of authority and leader, prepared and designated for the role of the one who is to be conceptually ahead of his time and be a signpost for his community, he changed it into the ambition of being together with it. He did not lead—he walked in the herd when it was lost, so was he.”</p>

Differences of opinion are nothing surprising in themselves. What is striking, however, is that they were formulated by one and the same researcher. What’s more, positive opinions come from the late 1980s, when the negative narrative about Sheptytsky imposed by communist propaganda was in force. The opposing critical assessments in turn were formulated after 2015.

The actions to commemorate Sheptytsky and to form a positive image of him in Ukrainian memory that were undertaken after the Revolution of Dignity clearly mobilized some of the actors operating within the “hardware” of Polish historical culture to undertake a kind of contraction. However, this contraction refers primarily to opinion, not to knowledge of facts. The facts themselves are often adopted selectively and are subject to manipulation.

Surprisingly, during the debate on Sheptytsky’s legacy which continues in Polish mnemonic field, some of the actors use myths and stereotypes that they themselves once tried to combat and neutralize. As a consequence, at least in the segment of Polish historical culture that is associated with the memory of Sheptytsky, the political dimension begins to dominate the cognitive one. As stated in the

introduction, in the political dimension, historical culture becomes a tool for legitimizing power. Who on the Polish political scene would be validated by a campaign discrediting Sheptytsky with the use of myths and stereotypes propagated at the time by Soviet propaganda and others? Unfortunately, it is difficult to find a clear answer to this question.

In 1923, the papal visitor, Father Giovanni Genocchi, was to come to the Greek Catholic archdiocese. Sheptytsky, as the superior of the province, prepared a special report for Father Genocchi about the state of his diocese. The Metropolitan of Halych had been away from his diocese for over two years and likely realized that this must have had a negative impact on its functioning. He explained that he was interested in “many church matters, but they go beyond the borders of my diocese.”¹⁶

In the aforementioned report, Sheptytsky also wrote directly about his dilemmas, which were related to the performance of such a difficult and responsible function as heading his church province. He admitted that he was not in control of all matters related to the administration of the diocese entrusted to him. Tired from the hardships of many months of travel and the illness he suffered during them, he wrote about his poor physical condition (“I am crippled, my health deteriorated”¹⁷) and complained that he lacked the appropriate “energy, ability.” He also admitted that he “couldn’t find himself in small things,” that he left “a whole set of issues to solve” for his consistory and that he “lacked organizational skills.”¹⁸

Being aware of all his shortcomings as administrator of the Lviv archdiocese, Sheptytsky declared to Father Genocchi: “I am a monk and I want nothing else than to be able to move to the monastery and stay there for the last years of my life.” He added that he “would be grateful” to the pope if he would allow it.¹⁹ This confession may come

¹⁶ “Звіт митр. Андрея Шептицького для о. Дженоккі...,” р. 728.

¹⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁹ Ibidem.

as a bit of a surprise. The metropolitan was then a public figure. For his faithful and for the vast majority of the clergy, he was an authority—not only in purely ecclesiastical matters, but also in social matters. The subject of his return to Lviv in 1923 was a real challenge for Polish diplomacy. This alone shows quite well what importance Sheptytsky had for the Ukrainian society and nation in former Galicia. Did the Metropolitan of Galicia really intend to withdraw from everything and escape behind the walls of the monastery in those circumstances?

In search of an answer to this question, it is worth juxtaposing the above quoted excerpt from the report for Father Genocchi with the letter Sheptytsky wrote to Father Korolevskij two years earlier. It was written in preparation for the trip to America. The Metropolitan of Halych admitted that the enormity of the challenges associated with this undertaking overwhelmed him and he “did not have the courage to start this journey.” He stated that “if I were to act according to what I desire and what I am inclined to do, I would shut myself up in a Studite, Trappist, or Carthusian monastery.” However, in the very next sentence he added, “of course, if I had done so, I would not have been able to persevere and would have left the monastery before the end of the first day.”²⁰

Based on these excerpts of correspondence, it can be concluded that humility was a basic principle for Sheptytsky. The Metropolitan of Halych was guided by it in both his personal life—as evidenced by the story of his vocation and his relationship with his father—and in his public work. For Sheptytsky, humility was not only one of the personal virtues, but it became a key element of the strategy that he used in purely ecclesiastical matters, as well as in social and political matters.

However, this humility should not be equated with passivity or a lack of ambitious plans. Sheptytsky had great projects referring to the idea of Church unity to which he was ready to devote himself. He tried to win the support of successive popes for them and therefore had to participate in various behind-the-scenes games in the Vatican

²⁰ Cyrille Korolevskij, *Kniga bytija...*, p. 186.

dicasteries. In addition, he was very interested in organizing permanent pastoral care for the steadily growing number of Ukrainian immigrants in North and South America. In addition to these “ecclesiastical matters,” the Metropolitan of Galicia engaged in quasi-diplomatic activities for the Ukrainian cause in Eastern Galicia. All this may have meant that Sheptytsky lacked the time and strength to manage the mundane everyday matters of his diocese on an ongoing basis. This does not mean, however, that he had no contact with it, or that he lost sight of it when he had great visions before him.

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The example of the memory of Andrey Sheptytsky shows very clearly how Polish and Ukrainian historical cultures are interconnected. After the fall of communism, actors in both Poland and Ukraine faced the challenge of rebuilding the cognitive dimension of their cultures. [...]

In the case of Sheptytsky's legacy, the issue of "finding a way of reading it" becomes important because the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) was excluded from the process of shaping the identity of the majority of contemporary Ukrainians, for whom it was therefore an "aborted legacy." During the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan, the UGCC started to play the role of an All-Ukrainian civil society institution. The intention to link various aspects of Ukrainian life to Sheptytsky's "aborted" legacy emerged among actors of all categories that were attempting to forge Ukraine's collective memory. Therefore, attempts to link the memory of Sheptytsky with the lived social world in Ukraine has taken on a new dynamic. [...]

These attempts correlated with the process of decommunization, that is, liberating Ukrainian historical culture from the burdens associated with the legacy of the Soviet era. This involves the need to cross a kind of mental Rubicon, which is still a significant challenge because, according to the still quite popular belief, revising the Soviet legacy entails the risk of rejecting "the modernity brought by the Soviet experience."

Sheptytsky remains a controversial figure in Poland. While the controversies themselves should not be surprising and are not unusual, the problem is that 30 years after the fall of communism, these controversies are still intensified by manipulated messages.

From book's Conclusion

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