Doxastic Responsibility and the Challenge of Doxastic Voluntarism

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Tytuł: Doxastic Responsibility and the Challenge of Doxastic Voluntarism
Autor/Autorzy: EWA ODOJ (Autor)
Nazwa czasopisma: Forum Philosophicum
Rok: 2025
Tom: 30
Numer: 2
ISSN: 1426-1898
e-ISSN: 2353-7043
Adres www:: https://czasopisma.ignatianum.edu.pl/fp/article/view/2025.3002.12
Abstrakt: In the article, I present the debate on doxastic voluntarism and its rela‑ tion to doxastic responsibility. I outline the discussion in the literature, focusing on Alston’s argument against doxastic responsibility, and then present my own position in this debate. I defend a conception of doxastic freedom that remains consistent with the principle of alternative possibilities. To this end, I provide an epistemological analysis of the phenomenon I call “doxastic self‑deception.” I also introduce the notions of “doxastic strategy” and “alethic impurism”—a view con‑ cerning the possibility of pragmatic reasons for beliefs. I conclude that doxastic responsibility is possible because we have the ability to self‑deceive, and at the same time possess metacognitive capacities that enable cognitive self‑control.
Dyscyplina: filozofia

002 a Doxastic Responsibility and the Challenge of Doxastic Voluntarism
003 a EWA ODOJ (Autor)
003 b https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0821-9317
004 a Oryginalny artykuł naukowy
006 a Forum Philosophicum
008 a 2025
009 a 30
010 a 2
011 a 1426-1898
012 a 2353-7043
014 a https://czasopisma.ignatianum.edu.pl/fp/article/view/2025.3002.12
020 a In the article, I present the debate on doxastic voluntarism and its rela‑ tion to doxastic responsibility. I outline the discussion in the literature, focusing on Alston’s argument against doxastic responsibility, and then present my own position in this debate. I defend a conception of doxastic freedom that remains consistent with the principle of alternative possibilities. To this end, I provide an epistemological analysis of the phenomenon I call “doxastic self‑deception.” I also introduce the notions of “doxastic strategy” and “alethic impurism”—a view con‑ cerning the possibility of pragmatic reasons for beliefs. I conclude that doxastic responsibility is possible because we have the ability to self‑deceive, and at the same time possess metacognitive capacities that enable cognitive self‑control.
022 a alethic impurism
022 a doxastic freedom
022 a doxastic responsibility
022 a doxastic strategy
022 a self‑deception
966 a filozofia
985 a Wydział Filozoficzny
985 b Instytut Filozofii

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