Zasada hamulców i równowagi a ideały rządów bezpośrednich : wokół wartości amerykańskiego konstytucjonalizmu

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  • Tytuł: Zasada hamulców i równowagi a ideały rządów bezpośrednich : wokół wartości amerykańskiego konstytucjonalizmu
  • Autor/Autorzy: RAFAŁ LIS (Autor)
  • Nazwa czasopisma: Przegląd Sejmowy
  • Rok: 2017
  • ISSN: 1230-5502
  • Adres www:: http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/przeglad.nsf/0/00D59EFCB09FC788C12581E8003709E7/%24File/PS.5.2017__6-Rafa%C5%82%20Lis.pdf
  • Strony od-do:
    • 59-72
    • 1.14
  • Język: polski
  • Abstrakt: CHECKS AND BALANCES PRINCIPLE AND THE IDEALS OF DIRECT REPRESENTATION: REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM The purpose of the article is to show that the constitutional values of the American presidential system, especially the tenets concerning the role of the President in the lawmaking process, do not serve the ideals of direct democracy. In particular, it is argued that the presidential veto was established in order to counterbalance just these tendencies which ultimately were ascribed to more direct forms of popular government. Avoiding oversimplifications, the author presents the stances of the leading framers of the Constitution, such as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, and later controversies as well, considering both the presidency and means of direct democracy. However, all these findings suggest that the introduction of the latter on the federal level would undermine the principles of the decision-making process commonly attributed to the American system. Such a conclusion can be especially drawn from the comparison with the example of Switzerland.
  • Dyscyplina: nauki o polityce i administracji

MARC

  • 002 $a Zasada hamulców i równowagi a ideały rządów bezpośrednich : wokół wartości amerykańskiego konstytucjonalizmu
  • 003 $b 0000-0002-8700-0366
  • 003 $a RAFAŁ LIS (Autor)
  • 004 $a Oryginalny artykuł naukowy
  • 006 $a Przegląd Sejmowy
  • 008 $a 2017
  • 011 $a 1230-5502
  • 014 $a http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/przeglad.nsf/0/00D59EFCB09FC788C12581E8003709E7/%24File/PS.5.2017__6-Rafa%C5%82%20Lis.pdf
  • 015 $a 59-72
  • 016 $a 1.14
  • 017 $a polski
  • 020 $a CHECKS AND BALANCES PRINCIPLE AND THE IDEALS OF DIRECT REPRESENTATION: REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM The purpose of the article is to show that the constitutional values of the American presidential system, especially the tenets concerning the role of the President in the lawmaking process, do not serve the ideals of direct democracy. In particular, it is argued that the presidential veto was established in order to counterbalance just these tendencies which ultimately were ascribed to more direct forms of popular government. Avoiding oversimplifications, the author presents the stances of the leading framers of the Constitution, such as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, and later controversies as well, considering both the presidency and means of direct democracy. However, all these findings suggest that the introduction of the latter on the federal level would undermine the principles of the decision-making process commonly attributed to the American system. Such a conclusion can be especially drawn from the comparison with the example of Switzerland.
  • 966 $a nauki o polityce i administracji
  • 985 $a Wydział Pedagogiczny
  • 985 $b Instytut Nauk o Polityce i Administracji

Dublin Core

Pliki

Lis R_Zasada hamulców.....pdf (95,8 KB)

  • Licencja: CC BY 4.0
  • Wersja tekstu: Ostateczna opublikowana
  • Dostępność: Publiczny

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