Thomas M. Scanlon’s Critique of the Doctrine of Double Effect: Intention and Permissibility

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  • Tytuł: Thomas M. Scanlon’s Critique of the Doctrine of Double Effect: Intention and Permissibility
  • Autor/Autorzy: Karol Wołk (Autor)
  • Nazwa czasopisma: Studia Philosophiae Christianae
  • Rok: 2025
  • Tom: 61
  • Numer: 2
  • ISSN: 0585-5470
  • Adres www:: https://czasopisma.uksw.edu.pl/index.php/spch/issue/view/1055
  • Strony od-do: 178-195
  • Abstrakt: This article examines Thomas M. Scanlon’s critique of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), focusing on its validity and implications for his contractualist framework. Scanlon challenges DDE by questioning the moral relevance of distinguishing between intended and merely foreseen consequences. While his critique raises important concerns, it may overlook DDE’s practical utility in specific moral dilemmas. However, this article argues that Scanlon’s broader contractualist framework – distinguishing the meaning, permissibility, and blame of an act – functions as a viable alternative to DDE. Crucially, this framework remains intact even if Scanlon’s critique of DDE is deemed invalid, as it does not depend on rejecting DDE to maintain its coherence or applicability. This analysis highlights the strength of Scanlon’s contractualism as a comprehensive moral theory, independent of DDE’s fate.
  • Dyscyplina: filozofia
  • 002 a Thomas M. Scanlon’s Critique of the Doctrine of Double Effect: Intention and Permissibility
  • 003 b 0009-0007-6632-5659
  • 003 a Karol Wołk (Autor)
  • 004 a Oryginalny artykuł naukowy
  • 006 a Studia Philosophiae Christianae
  • 008 a 2025
  • 009 a 61
  • 010 a 2
  • 011 a 0585-5470
  • 014 a https://czasopisma.uksw.edu.pl/index.php/spch/issue/view/1055
  • 015 a 178-195
  • 020 a This article examines Thomas M. Scanlon’s critique of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), focusing on its validity and implications for his contractualist framework. Scanlon challenges DDE by questioning the moral relevance of distinguishing between intended and merely foreseen consequences. While his critique raises important concerns, it may overlook DDE’s practical utility in specific moral dilemmas. However, this article argues that Scanlon’s broader contractualist framework – distinguishing the meaning, permissibility, and blame of an act – functions as a viable alternative to DDE. Crucially, this framework remains intact even if Scanlon’s critique of DDE is deemed invalid, as it does not depend on rejecting DDE to maintain its coherence or applicability. This analysis highlights the strength of Scanlon’s contractualism as a comprehensive moral theory, independent of DDE’s fate.
  • 022 a intention
  • 022 a contractualism
  • 022 a Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE)
  • 022 a permissibility
  • 966 a filozofia
  • 985 a Uniwersytet Ignatianum w Krakowie
  • 985 b Szkoła Doktorska

Studia Philosophiae Christianae T 61 nr 2.pdf (2,32 MB)

  • Licencja: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
  • Wersja tekstu: Ostateczna opublikowana
  • Dostępność: Publiczny
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Repozytorium Akademii Ignatianum w Krakowie, które jest częścią Portalu Pracowniczego zostało zrealizowane w ramach projektu „Program wzmocnienia potencjału dydaktycznego Uczelni na rzecz rozwoju regionalnego” POWR.03.05.00-00-ZR10/18 współfinansowanego ze środków Unii Europejskiej w ramach Europejskiego Funduszu Społecznego.