P.F. Strawsona pierwotność pojęcia osoby a problem umysł-ciało

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Tytuł: P.F. Strawsona pierwotność pojęcia osoby a problem umysł-ciało
Autor/Autorzy: JÓZEF BREMER (Autor)
Nazwa czasopisma: Przegląd Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria
Rok: 2019
ISSN: 1230-1493
DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2019.130924
Adres www:: http://journals.pan.pl/dlibra/publication/130924/edition/114346/content
Strony od-do:
- 275-298
- 1.5
Język: polski
Abstrakt: From a historical point of view, Peter F. Strawson’s philosophical studies are an important element within contemporary interdisciplinary investigations of the mind-body problem. The aim of this article is to present and analyze Strawson’s program of descriptive metaphysics, along with the associated conception of persons, that he has proposed. In the second part, I also present his non-reductive naturalism, focusing on two of his analyses that belong to the field of mind-body relations: these concern the problem of other minds, and the question of the nomological reduction of mental states of persons to physical ones (i.e. mind-body identity theory). I then point to several possibilities of using Strawson’s conception of persons in the context of issues raised by other questions linked to the mind-body problem (namely, personal identity as it relates to split-brain persons, and the different phases of a person’s development).
Dyscyplina: filozofia

002 $a P.F. Strawsona pierwotność pojęcia osoby a problem umysł-ciało
003 $a JÓZEF BREMER (Autor)
003 $b 0000-0001-9664-8896
004 $a Oryginalny artykuł naukowy
006 $a Przegląd Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria
008 $a 2019
011 $a 1230-1493
013 $a 10.24425/pfns.2019.130924
014 $a http://journals.pan.pl/dlibra/publication/130924/edition/114346/content
015 $a 275-298
016 $a 1.5
017 $a polski
020 $a From a historical point of view, Peter F. Strawson’s philosophical studies are an important element within contemporary interdisciplinary investigations of the mind-body problem. The aim of this article is to present and analyze Strawson’s program of descriptive metaphysics, along with the associated conception of persons, that he has proposed. In the second part, I also present his non-reductive naturalism, focusing on two of his analyses that belong to the field of mind-body relations: these concern the problem of other minds, and the question of the nomological reduction of mental states of persons to physical ones (i.e. mind-body identity theory). I then point to several possibilities of using Strawson’s conception of persons in the context of issues raised by other questions linked to the mind-body problem (namely, personal identity as it relates to split-brain persons, and the different phases of a person’s development).
966 $a filozofia
985 $a Wydział Filozoficzny
985 $b Instytut Filozofii

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