The Turing Test, or a Misuse of Language when Ascribing Mental Qualities to Machines

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  • Tytuł: The Turing Test, or a Misuse of Language when Ascribing Mental Qualities to Machines
  • Autor/Autorzy:
  • Nazwa czasopisma: Forum Philosophicum
  • Rok: 2022
  • Tom: 27
  • Numer: 1
  • e-ISSN: 2353-7043
  • DOI: 10.35765/forphil.2022.2701.01
  • Adres www:: https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl/7009-2701-01.html
  • Strony od-do: 5-25
  • Język:
    • angielski
    • angielski
  • Abstrakt: In this paper we discuss the views on the Turing test of four influential thinkers who belong to the tradition of analytic philosophy: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Noam Chomsky, Hilary Putnam and John Searle. Based on various beliefs about philosophical and/or linguistic matters, they arrive at different assessments of both the significance and suitability of the imitation game for the development of cognitive science and AI models. Nevertheless, they share a rejection of the idea that one can treat Turing test as a test for “machine thinking.” This seems to stem from a concern for the proper use of language —one that is a fundamental methodological commitment of analytic philosophy.
  • Dyscyplina: filozofia

MARC

  • 002 $a The Turing Test, or a Misuse of Language when Ascribing Mental Qualities to Machines
  • 003 $b 0000-0001-9664-8896
  • 003 $b 0000-0002-0910-4928
  • 003 $a JÓZEF BREMER (Autor)
  • 003 $a Mariusz Flasiński (Autor)
  • 004 $a Oryginalny artykuł naukowy
  • 006 $a Forum Philosophicum
  • 008 $a 2022
  • 009 $a 27
  • 010 $a 1
  • 012 $a 2353-7043
  • 013 $a 10.35765/forphil.2022.2701.01
  • 014 $a https://forumphilosophicum.ignatianum.edu.pl/7009-2701-01.html
  • 015 $a 5-25
  • 017 $a angielski
  • 018 $a angielski
  • 020 $a In this paper we discuss the views on the Turing test of four influential thinkers who belong to the tradition of analytic philosophy: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Noam Chomsky, Hilary Putnam and John Searle. Based on various beliefs about philosophical and/or linguistic matters, they arrive at different assessments of both the significance and suitability of the imitation game for the development of cognitive science and AI models. Nevertheless, they share a rejection of the idea that one can treat Turing test as a test for “machine thinking.” This seems to stem from a concern for the proper use of language —one that is a fundamental methodological commitment of analytic philosophy.
  • 022 $a analytic philosophy
  • 022 $a artificial intelligence
  • 022 $a misuse of language
  • 022 $a philosophy of mind
  • 022 $a Turing test
  • 966 $a filozofia
  • 985 $a Wydział Filozoficzny
  • 985 $b Instytut Filozofii

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1.bremer.flasinski.pdf (321 KB)

  • Licencja: CC BY-ND 4.0
  • Wersja tekstu: Ostateczna opublikowana
  • Dostępność: Publiczny